

RELIGION IN LIFE

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A CHRISTIAN QUARTERLY

WINTER
NUMBER
1945-1946

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RELIGION IN LIFE

A CHRISTIAN QUARTERLY

Vol. XV

Winter Number, 1945-1946

No. 1

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CONTENTS

PAGE

The Immortality of Man	William Ernest Hocking	3
Francis Asbury	Francis J. McConnell	23
Religious Liberty	John C. Bennett	37
Form Criticism and Faith	Paul S. Minear	46
The Roman Catholic Church in Europe	Adolphe Keller	57
Interpreting the Time	Amos N. Wilder	75
"Spiritual Letters"—A Theological Reprint	Archbishop Fénelon	91
The Church and Social Action	Ansley C. Moore	94
The Hidden Church and the Churches in Sight ..	H. Richard Niebuhr	106
The Treatment of German War Criminals	Raymond Gibson	117
Wanted: The Recovery of the Christian Paideia ..	E. G. Homrighausen	126
A Batch of Books—A Review of the Quarter's Fiction ..	John C. Schroeder	137
Book Reviews		143

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Printed in the United States of America

Published by

ABINGDON-COKESBURY PRESS

150 FIFTH AVENUE

NEW YORK

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P152 Harkness Georgia
150-11 Marlatt, Earl
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Borden P. Bawne Library Fund
Bound Nov. 1946

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RELIGION IN LIFE is published quarterly by Abingdon-Cokesbury Press at 75 cents per copy. Annual subscription, \$2.00 per year in the United States and possessions and Mexico; Canada, postage 18 cents additional; other foreign postage, 30 cents additional. For the convenience of readers in Great Britain, subscriptions will be received by the Epworth Press, 25-26 City Road, London, E. C. 1, at the rate of nine shillings and sixpence per year.

Publication office, 310 Broadway, Nashville 2, Tennessee. Editorial and General offices, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York 11, New York. Entered as Second Class Matter, January 16, 1932, at the post office in Nashville, Tennessee, under Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized March 14, 1933.

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V. 15

32

The Immortality of Man

WILLIAM ERNEST HOCKING

IF THERE is any such person as "the modern man," he is not one who worries much about the question whether human life continues beyond death.

For some, there is no worry because the question is closed, either for or against immortality. I have met a few human beings, not many, who profess that they have never doubted that life goes on in another world. They are not unintelligent people; they are fully conscious that they are in a minority. I regard their assurance as important, if only because it shows that such a conviction is wholly consistent with a modern mentality.

I have met others, indeed many more than in the first group, for whom the question is closed because they have completely rejected the belief, and have no inclination to reopen the problem. They do this usually on scientific grounds; and it is usually an acquired position—that is, it results from abandoning an earlier acceptance or at least entertainment of the hypothesis of immortality. We are certainly not born with the scientific conception of the universe. But when that view dawns on us with its full clarity and unity, and the persuasive alliance of human with animal life in the evolutionary series, it is likely to melt away all beliefs that appear inconsistent with it. And I can speak from my own experience in saying that immortality is one of these apparently inconsistent beliefs. As a boy I read Herbert Spencer, and was fully persuaded by him that man can have no other destiny than that of the animal series from which he comes; that in both cases, the birth, growth, decline, and death of the body are paralleled in the history of the mind. Without a brain, there can be no thoughts; and when the brain dies, thought ceases. This, of course, is not a proof; it is only an analogy. But the analogy is so complete that it throws the burden of proof strongly on anyone who questions it. Hence, for many today, the question no longer exists.

But if I can estimate the position of the majority of our compatriots today, they have ceased to concern themselves about the problem of immortality not because it is settled but because it is, as they say, speculative. And they have been led to believe, first, that *we cannot do anything about*

it in any case: it will either happen to us, or not happen, as the universe provides; if it does, we may be agreeably surprised; if it does not, we shall never know of our disappointment: the only thing we can really affect is the present scene of things—let us deal well with this. They have also been led to believe that we *cannot know anything about it*: we can only conjecture. And where there can be no evidence valid either in the court of science or in the court of law, wise men will refrain from judgment.

I regard it as one of the signs of the shallowness of our age that this indolent and defeatist point of view is so prevalent. As long as there are some good and intelligent people who regard immortality as unquestionable and for them certain and important, it is pure laxity of mind to retreat from the search for evidence. And if it should be discovered that immortality is either actual or possible, it is again an attitude of moral abandonment to decide without enquiry that nothing can be done about it. Millions of people have believed and do now believe that *everything we do in this life has an inescapable effect* in a life to come; many have believed and continue to believe that this life is a sort of preparation for another life, and has its chief meaning in that relationship. And some have believed and do believe that the manner of our living here may determine the question whether we do or do not survive the crisis of death—my own view.

If any of these people are right, there is *a great deal to be done* in the present about a future life.

This present idleness of mind on this great subject—out of which I would like to shake this generation if I could—is in extreme contrast to the preoccupation of a few generations ago with the future fate of their souls. To them the whole point of religion lay in the issue between future torment and future bliss. The imagination was so busied with this enormous gamut of hope and fear as to subtract a good deal from the attention due to present business. Karl Marx was not entirely wrong when he described this kind of religious concern as an opiate, fixing men's minds on the subjective condition of their consciences and withdrawing their energies from the social struggles in which objective rights and wrongs were contending. Through the obvious justice of such criticisms as these, religion has, for the most part, swung far in the other direction. Without surrendering its central doctrine that there is an infinitely important difference between being "saved" and being "lost,"

it has been inclined to teach that nothing very bad will happen in a future life to a man who fights the good fight here; and nothing very good will happen to a man, however pious, who neglects that present duty and conflict. The great thing, then, for both worlds is to be a good citizen of this one. And from this plausible position it is but a short distance to the position that the whole duty of man is to watch the step just ahead of him, and leave the rest to God.

Professor Julian Huxley, the British biologist, recently wrote as follows: "The religious fervor which used to go into theology and man's preoccupation with his salvation in the next world is now being canalized and directed towards terrestrial ends, and those ends are concerned with social reconstruction. The individual finds the escape from his own limitation . . . in the unlimited possibilities of a continuing social order. Many observers have commented on the religious ardour animating Russian Communism, and the same fanatical ecstatic spirit is evident in Nazi Germany. . . ."

"In the circumstances the only rational attitude to take, until conclusive evidence of the fact of survival is forthcoming, is to concentrate on the enrichment and amelioration of this life, in confidence that if our personalities do survive death, a sane and hopeful activity in this world is the best preparation for the next."

This is also the position of the religious humanism of today.

The difficulty with this position is that in order to fight well as a man, one must fight as if one could reasonably disregard danger and even death; and to do this, one must believe that there are things in the world more valuable and more enduring than human life itself.

To put this idea into a nutshell: It is impossible, I maintain, to make a reasonable contrast between being a good citizen of this world and having a concern for immortality, because in order to be a good citizen of this world, whether to do a good job or to fight a good fight here, *we must have an outlook beyond this world.*

Here I think I hear a chorus of objectors. The good fighting done in the current war appears to have been wholly independent of whether a man did or did not believe in immortality. It is enough to mention the armies of Soviet Russia which were officially materialist in outlook, so far as they took the Party line. There was no difficulty in getting up suicide squads in any of the contending armies, regardless of the presence or absence of the hope of a future life.

I agree to all this, and yet I hold to what I have said. The immediate inspiration of men lies in the *cause* for which they are working or fighting. It belongs to the ordinary sociability of the human being to be welded together strongly with his fellows whenever there is a cause—especially if the cause is under fire—which evokes common efforts and sacrifices. Working for the cause heightens fellowship; fellowship in turn heightens the devotion to the cause. Nobody reaches the summit of his capacity as a man until he has felt the experience of being lifted above himself by the power of this threefold relationship; the self, the fellow man, the common cause. Friendship itself is comparatively empty unless it is enlarged by the presence of this comparatively impersonal third being, the object which both friends serve and both obey.

The cause need not be from our point of view a good cause in order to produce this effect upon those who serve it. Any national cause is likely to elicit this kind of devotion; all kinds of isms, including fascism, Nipponism, and nazism have had their enthusiastic or fanatical adherents. It is only necessary that these adherents believe in that cause, whether through indoctrination or illusion or through some glimpse of truth under grotesque disguises. And to say that they must believe in the cause is to say that they must think of it as something better than their private point of view, their *parti pris*, that which seems to them to be good because they are born that way: they must fancy themselves as getting hold of something genuinely valid and just.

And now let us take another step. Those who *truly* believe that their cause is valid and just and those who *mistakenly* believe that their cause is valid and just have something important in common, as against those who do not care whether their cause is valid and just or not. These first two groups believe *that there is something valid and just in the universe*. This belief links them with something not perishable, which is the first stage in an outlook beyond this world.

And if they were to think this out, which most of them do not, they would find themselves enquiring into personal immortality. They would begin to realize that this idea was assuming for them an immense practical importance. Let me indicate briefly why this is the case.

The reason that a cause is or may be more important than a human life is that a good cause, like just government, will continue to knit together countless human lives throughout human history, once it is achieved, or to the degree in which it is achieved. Justice is sometimes

said to be a "value": that is, as an idea, it is something which rational beings recognize as a standard to be appreciated, worked for, embodied in institutions. As a logical idea, it belongs to the category of "values"; but as a working factor in the real world it is a *value only if and when it is valued*, when some mind takes it as a cause to be served. Destroy the minds, and justice vanishes into the status of an ineffective definition.

Hence it is that all those who serve causes assume that there will always be minds to care for them: they take for granted the continuance of the race, and the identity of the ideas the race cherishes. But suppose that some cosmic catastrophe wipes out the human race. Suppose that the planet freezes, and the last man sinks into an icy sleep. That assumed perpetuity is gone. Now nothing is valuable in fact, for there are no minds to value anything. In a dead universe nothing has any worth at all. Hitherto the death of the individual has been, in some degree, compensated by the continuance of the species. Now the species fails, and can anything compensate for *its* death?

The answer has to be, Nothing! unless the individual, who appeared to die, does in fact continue to live. It is the individual in the last resort that must make up for the mortality of the race; not the race that makes up for the mortality of the individual.

Nature, it has been said, cares for the species and sacrifices the individual. It lavishes its care on the resources of reproduction; it exhausts the energy of the parent in the launching of the child, but only because the child in turn will be exhausted for the sake of *its* child. When that is done, the hollowed shell lives on as a wraith which men may cherish but nature merely tolerates. But this picture attributes to nature too great solicitude, even for the race. In point of literal fact, nature cares for nothing; for it has no care, it has only necessity. Nor does the race care for itself, for the race has no separate consciousness. *The only thing that can care is an individual.*

If, then, the race is cared for, it is because individuals care for it. And if in the end those things which the race builds up in works of technical power, in works of art, in products of thought and of the ethical prowess seen in systems of law and trade—if these things have any value in the universe, it is because individual egos somewhere appreciate them.

Then what men *mean* when they sacrifice themselves for a cause, whether they are aware of it or not, is that the values of the world *must somehow last*. The meaning of their sacrifice lies in the tacitly assumed

endurance of the human soul. And once this is seen, the folly of that biological judgment becomes obvious. The individual, in his reproductive capacity, throws off a new generation as his pledge to the future. In so doing, instead of exhausting himself as an individual he matures himself; for he assumes a mental as well as a physical responsibility for the ongoing human stream, so long as it may endure. He does this from his superabundance; and having done it he remains himself, more completely than before. He has shown that the race is contained in him, the individual.

And here lies the practical value of the belief in immortality—that though men do not know that their devotion to causes assumes that belief, when it is renounced the scheme of human values slowly becomes sick, as of a mysterious anemia. Nothing can have full dignity which has only transitory being. When all that men serve is taken as passing, life can continue its gaiety, its fervor, its energetic resolve, its constructive passion, and its angers that strive to the death—but all of this has to be referred to the pattern of vital drives, because it can no longer be referred to a defensible reason. *The irrational* becomes the accepted excuse for human action; and activity is taken as a merit for its own sake, because no other merit can be found. A civilization that has embraced the causal scene of nature as its largest scheme of truth does not cease to operate; that is precisely what it continues—*operation*: the viscera generate their energies, and the limbs continue to swing, the gusto of pleasure increases—for it must fill a void, and the bravura of achievement stirs a growing pride—for what the universe cannot applaud must wait for the banzais of the crowd. Nothing changes but the quietly growing emptiness at the center, and the fear of rational analysis carried to the bitter end. Man can no longer face the question, *Cui bono*? He knows that he has in advance made the answer impossible.

The other day I met a man who had found out what his life, had to mean to him. He was a manufacturer, and a successful one in the business way. He was even more successful as a reader of the distracting scene of the present human anguish. Men must suffer, he said, in order to learn; there are terrible lessons for our group life and for our personal life, and we will not learn them in ease; we reject the effort to learn until terror and blood consume our best. The race is trying to unlearn its greed and its grasping for power; the exploiters have to unlearn the will to exploit, and the exploited have to unlearn their own ignorance and sloth and envy and the will to depend on public charity and the gangster arm of the labor-patriot. All have to unlearn the materialism

of the flesh and the sluggishness of the spirit. But why must we learn these things? For it is just the learning that is difficult; the greatest lethargy is the lethargy of the spirit which so slowly heaves itself into the atmosphere of love. Why must we learn?

Here his answer was simple, direct, and unhesitating. Because we must continue to live. The meaning of the world is the development of the personal soul, a task unfinished in any one life. It is God's plan for us that we learn, and forever continue to learn.

With this clue, he could take what came to him; he could learn the art of learning from those who unjustly opposed him—by finding what Yeats called the "pilgrim soul" in them also. And he could hold a steady head in full view of the slaughter of men and nations in the vast catastrophe of war. For to him the ultimate evil was not death, but the hardening of the mind against truth.

I do not say that his solution is the true one; I certainly do not say that it is final. But I say that an outlook like his which fills his life with zest, leaves him resilient against immense losses, makes him a source of strength to many other men, is of immense practical importance. So far from being disaffected from active life, he has something from which the sagging morale of this era might be rejuvenated—provided only that it were true.

But can it be true? Here, I turn to address myself to those for whom the problem of immortality is an open question, and who feel it important enough to worry about. They feel the force of the scientific position, that is to say, the usual attitude of scientific men. But they are ready to believe that this attitude may be mistaken, provided there is any substantial ground on which an affirmation of continuance could be built. They are unwilling *to resort to a will to believe*; they fear, rather than court, the influence of their own wishes. I very much respect this state of mind; I would even urge those for whom the matter is already settled to adopt it hypothetically, for the sake of the argument ahead of us.

I propose that we take up first certain objections to the belief in immortality from the side of science and of philosophy, because in dealing with them we shall see more clearly what positive grounds for the belief there could be.

I. THE SCIENTIFIC OBJECTION

Let me first make clear that science does not deny the possibility of immortality. The field of science is this world of nature; it knows nothing of any other world. The term "world" in this sense includes, of

course, the entire universe within the single space-time continuum which is the field of our gravitational-electrical relationships. Whatever belongs to this causal system belongs to nature in this sense.

I say that science does not deny the possibility of another universe, or of other universes. It does, however, doubt whether the suggestion that there might be other such worlds has any assignable meaning. It calls to witness here certain newer developments of logic, or of semantics, concerned with the meaning of "meaning," and interested in saving mankind fruitless speculative worry by marking off the realm of enquiries which have significance from those which have none. The general trend of opinion among semanticists is that metaphysical statements—among which we must include any statement about another life—are either meaningless, or else devoid of *scientific* meaning, however they may still have a vestige of emotional meaning.

On the basis of this doubt, science today is disposed to ignore the question of immortality as in any case beyond its jurisdiction. To our question it answers neither no nor yes. But it tends to make the proposal of survival appear increasingly improbable, and on one specific ground—that of the precise *fitness between mind and body*. Mind and body vary together at every point. Aristotle has the distinction of first drawing attention to the force of this fitness, as a refutation of the fancies of Plato that the soul might not alone leave the body and wander through the realms of Hades, but might also return in another body differently disposed and equipped. For Plato adopted the belief in transmigration, as well as the belief in immortality: and he thought the mind might be better off without any body at all, so far as clear vision of truth is concerned.

Aristotle very rightly observed that the mind of one man would not fit the body of another: the mind of Homer could not be transferred to the body of Solon; still less could the mind of a man take up its abode in the body of a tiger, or that of a tiger in the body of a man. Transmigration, then, was an absurdity; and as Aristotle felt, the idea of a soul without any body at all was still more absurd, since what we mean by the soul is nothing more nor less than the inner life of a given body, its guide in growth and behavior—in Aristotle's somewhat difficult phrase, the soul is the "form" of the body, and therefore not conceivable apart from the body requiring that particular form. Aristotle would have relished the problem dealt with in a seventeenth-century Harvard thesis

—Whether the speech of Balaam's ass required a temporary alteration of the animal's vocal chords!

Now this observation has been enforced rather than weakened by all the subsequent growth of our knowledge about the relation between mind and body. We have learned to associate the mental life, not with the body as a whole, but more directly with the brain and the central nervous system. And while most thoughtful men recognize that the mind is not the same thing as the brain, nor as the physiological action of the brain, they will agree that the activities of the mind and of the brain go along so closely together as to imply an exact mathematical relationship. Just what the relation is still eludes analysis; but much hope is placed on recent enquiries which indicate that there are electrical phenomena which accompany mental action from whose shape it is possible to infer—not one's thoughts, to be sure—but the gross distinctions between sleeping and waking, effort and rest, anxiety and peace. We know infinitely more than Aristotle of the extremely sensitive response of the mental condition to variations in the chemical constitution of the blood supply of the brain, as affected by food and drink, by drugs and vitamins, by the functioning of the glands of internal secretion. All of these items of knowledge lend a cumulative force to the supposition that when the brain ceases to function, that particular stream of consciousness ceases to exist.

It is just this conclusion, however, which requires a careful examination.

All the facts we have mentioned may be summed up as *facts of covariation*: change the brain action and you change the mind—to which there is another side also—change the mind and you change the brain action. This fact of covariation, or of the perfect fitting of two sets of changes, implies, of course, that we have two distinguishable sets of changes to deal with. It is the distinguishability which is important.

In order to show what is at stake here, let us take another case of covariation equally exact. A set for a movie play is being photographed; every slight action, every shadow, every play of expression is precisely caught by the film. This film could not possibly be the record of any other actors or of any other act than this one. Aristotle's exact correspondence is literally preserved. Yet if we should argue that there could be no other film record of that set, we should be obviously wrong. Two cameras, at different points, would get numerically different records.

Both records would be perfect correspondents to the action, in such wise that they could fit no other set in the universe. But no two corresponding pictures in the two films would be identical. The given mind, to draw our inference, can logically have two different bodies; and if two then more than two, so far as the mere fact of perfect covariation is concerned. It is logically just as possible that the soul should have a plurality of bodies, each of which uniquely fits it, as that a body should have a plurality of shadows, each of which uniquely fits it, each of them unmistakably the shadow of that person and of no other in the universe.

Aristotle's argument, a good argument against the idea of a soul moving into the body of another person, or into any kind of a misfit body, thus proves to be no argument at all against the idea of a soul having another body or series of bodies each of which fulfils the requirement of being a precise representation in space of that soul. And all the subsequent arguments which make the picture of fitness more precise are equally incapable of excluding the possibility of a plurality of embodiments of a given mind.

Indeed, I think we may say that we have experiences which, without amounting to anything like a proof that it is so, vividly indicate to us how this might be.

Persons who dream do not always dream of having a body. That is, they do not always, in their dreams, give attention to the fact that they have bodies. But they frequently dream of moving and acting in situations which imply a body; if one dreams of trying to escape from a pursuer, he may be desperately annoyed by sluggish and disobedient limbs; but his efforts imply that there are limbs and that they are his. And they are certainly not identical with the limbs which are quiescent in the bed. The dream body is in effect another body; yet it is uniquely the body of the dreaming person.

I conclude that this particular scientific objection to the notion of another life vanishes upon careful logical analysis.

2. THE PHILOSOPHICAL OBJECTION

The scientific conviction runs deeper than this formal consideration of fitness. It would be comparatively easy for a scientist to agree that we could imagine the soul to have many bodies, just as we can imagine a given snake to have a series of skins, each of which is peculiar to that individual snake. But to believe in that possibility requires something

more than to imagine it. In the case of the snake, the animal produces the skin, not the skin the animal. However, the analogy seems to fail, for in the case of the human being, the scientist feels that the body produces the soul, not the soul the body. If the body produces the soul, it would be impossible that a given soul could have any other body than the one which produces it. Only if the body is a product of the soul could there be another body for the same soul, in another sphere of existence.

The problem here is one for philosophy and not for science. The question is, which is first in being, the body or the soul (and I am here using "soul" and "mind" as equivalent expressions, for the sake of simplicity).

All the appearances, or most of them, favor the idea that the body is first in existence; and the mind a later development. The process of human reproduction is biological: one would say that what is continuous from parent to child is not the mental life but rather the germ plasm. It is a generally accepted view that the embryo must have a certain degree of development before consciousness arrives; though the moment of that arrival is not one which science is prepared to fix, since the fact of consciousness is wholly inaccessible to observation. But the signs of mind, in groping and experimental behavior, only appear as the child approaches the stage of independent bodily existence; they seem to follow from the appropriate development of the nervous system; and they seem to come when they do because the body can then make use of an organ of guidance for its own behavior. All of this, as well as the facts we have already mentioned showing that the condition and vigor of the mind depend on its nutrition and the quality of its blood supply, seem to certify that the mind is present for the sake of the body, as one of its means of survival and guidance, and not the body for the sake of the mind. And if this is the case, when the body has run its course, its particular mind has no more to do; and as dependent on the body, it can no longer exist.

This, I believe, is the persuasive argument against the continued life of the personal consciousness. It is so obvious, and so in accord with common sense as well as with science, that in its presence the notion of immortality takes on the guise of a pleasant fancy which sober judgment, based on the patent facts, tends to dismiss.

We remember that in the Platonic dialogue, the *Phaedo*, when Socrates in the prison observes two of his young friends consulting one

another during a pause in the discussion, he surmises that they feel his plea for survival to be defective, and are hesitating to press their objections lest, in this his last day of life, they should be depriving him of at least a comforting hope. It is he, then, who takes the initiative to drive into the open the lurking doubt. Least of all does he, in that hour, wish to go forward under any illusion. In the unique moment of death, which each must face alone, the only firm companion is the truth.

Socrates had suggested that the body was like a musical instrument, the soul like the music; so that the body was for the sake of the soul, not the soul for the sake of the body. But then comes the damaging reflection, if the instrument is broken, the music also must cease. It is at this point also that our present and modern argument seems to stand, with all the fortification of the scientific demonstrations of dependence. And it is not at once clear that we can derive any light from the consideration by which Socrates revived the argument with his friends. He reminded them that there was one important difference between the instrument-music relationship and the body-soul relationship. The instrument needed some outer person to play it; the soul seemed to initiate its own music—it played itself. That is true; but does not this simply mean, in modern terms, that the body-mind combination is able to initiate its own motions, without external help? It does not imply what we need, namely, that the mind is able to call the body into being, as in a sense the music calls the musical instrument into being.

And if the mind were able to call the body into being, would we not know it? Whereas is it not the reverse that we are aware of in our inner consciousness—that our minds are frail things, flickering with every wind of health and illness, vigor or fatigue, and when the physical basis is too disturbed, flickering out?

This, I think, is the crucial point in the philosophical enquiry into immortality. Is it true that the mind depends upon the body, and not the body on the mind? If so, immortality is excluded.

But a closer look seems to show that both things are true. Of course, we must take our food in order to keep on thinking; but also we must think in order to take our food. Of course, we may speed up our thinking if we so desire by a cup of coffee; but the body does not take the cup of coffee without the prior decision of the mind. To say in such cases that the state of the mind depends on the body is to say only half the truth; the whole truth is that the state of mind at the present moment

depends on what the mind in a previous moment decided to do to itself *by way of the body*. The body was a necessary means for working out the mind's own wishes for its future condition. The initiative lay wholly with the mind.

And in the course of years of this submission to the mind's dictation the body is modified, or even made over: it becomes more completely the mind's instrument. It has been said that at fifteen a woman begins to show the beauty that nature gives her; at fifty she shows the beauty that she gives herself. There is much truth in this, for at fifty the constant working of the character into the attitudes and expressions of the body tells an unmistakable story; and if this simple truth were better known by the women of America, their artificial methods of achieving beauty might give way to something far more substantial and, may one say, far more effective.

If I were to correct that statement it would only be by way of questioning what it says about the beauty of youth and childhood; that this is what nature gives, and not the self. I would rather say that the early beauty of the human body is what the mind accepts, the later beauty is what it fashions. As I look more closely at the relation between mind and body in childhood, I would not say that the mind at that time is more at the mercy of the body. I would say that the earlier period is one of *docility*, the later period one of *command*. The child is at a stage in which nutrition is the dominant impulse and necessity; but the *nutrition is both mental and physical*. The child is docile toward its entire social surrounding; it is highly content to be itself; it has no quarrel to pick with its ancestry, with its race, color, shape, or condition; it desires simply to be *more of the same*, i.e., to grow. It has to find out what this person is it calls itself, and what it is like as compared with others; it is becoming acquainted, through the mirrors of social life, with the self which it knows at first only as an intimate and somewhat formless center of consciousness and action.

At the same time it is becoming acquainted with its visible body. The child does not at first see its body; it only feels it as a mass of sensation, comfortable or uncomfortable, and with various possibilities of action bringing about changes in sensation. This is as much as to say that the body, for the child, is at first a part of its conscious mind. To say that it accepts this consciously felt body is simply to say that it accepts itself; and if that body seems to an outer observer to have beauty,

that beauty is not in any exclusive sense the beauty which "Nature" has given, it is also the beauty of that inner self in its early harmony. There is nothing in that situation which requires us to say that the body is first and the mind a product. Both develop in complete accord. The facts would be quite as well satisfied by a hypothesis which to my mind is far nearer the truth: that the body is simply the visible symbol of the mind. And if the will has an influence over the body in later life, as it certainly has, it is probable that it has at least as much influence over the body in childhood. Only, in childhood, the influence of the will should be more completely subconscious, because, in the period of docility, the child has less capacity to criticize the sort of being it is, and has therefore less conscious motive to make itself over.

I reach, therefore, this general result, that *throughout life the body depends on the mind*, even while the mind is dependent in other respects upon the body.

With this result we are, so to speak, halfway emancipated from the notion that the mind is so far a slave of the body that if the body dies the mind must die also. We reach the point of seeing the mind as at least an equal partner in the destiny of the person. But it is only a halfway emancipation. What we have is a familiar sort of *interdependence*; A depends on B and B depends on A. In this sort of mutuality there is no assurance that if one of the members drops away the other can continue to exist.

It would be possible to point out that with the growth to maturity, the period of command replaces the period of docility and the body becomes increasingly subject to the will of its owner. It becomes increasingly natural for the soul to refer to "my body" and increasingly unnatural for the body to refer to "my mind"! But then it has also to be admitted that with advancing age the mind seems to lose its ascendancy, and the infirmities of the body begin to impede its own self-command.

We would do better to enquire *in what respect* we have to say that the mind is dependent on the body, and in what respect it is not dependent.

It is customary to think of the dependence of the mind on the body in three main ways. First, it is said we require the body to keep us informed of the outer world through sensation, especially through sight and hearing. Second, it is said we require the body to give us an active effect on the outer world through the motor nerves and the muscles: without this we would be helpless spectators of events, able to think

but not to will. Third, it is said, we require the energy of the brain to supply the energy of thought. I am not sure that any of these statements is exact.

Ordinarily we seem to see by way of our eyes; but then our eyes are one of the things we see. And if we only know of our eyes by way of our eyes there is a chance we may be mistaken about that necessity. We dream fairly well when our eyes are shut. And Beethoven set music before his mind long after his ears were soundless. It is not absolutely certain that we require eyes and ears for seeing and hearing; though we require them for keeping in touch with certain sources of light and sound we call external. As for the energy of thought, it does not seem to be in any clear relation to the physical energy of the brain: the best intelligence is not the intelligence that has to strain hardest to get an idea, but the intelligence that grasps the idea without effort. Farsightedness seems to be a function of mental balance rather than of mental strain. There is no known way of stoking the mental engines so that a slow wit will become even moderately bright, and no dosing with iodine or any other known drug will turn a moderate ability into a genius, though there are drugs which may produce the sad illusion of genius.

But allowing the body in all these matters the benefit of such doubt as there is, we may say that the body appears to be the agency of connection between one person and that "outside world" which consists primarily of another group of persons. The connective tissue between members of a community is what we call the physical world of "Nature." Nature is common property for all of us; we have the same space and time, the same earth and stars, the same geological history. We do not see one another's minds; but we see bodies which we learn to identify with the minds of others. The body is first of all the means of identification which other people use for any given person—the body symbolizes the person. Then, as that body seems to use its eyes and ears, we assume that the person symbolized by it is conscious of the same world with us, and may be apprehending the signals we issue. As the body acts, we assume that the person is using volition to effect changes in his own position, or changes in the world outside him. All this sums up in the proposition that the body is a means of communication between one person and other persons by way of a common physical world.

It is also, of course, a means of receiving communications and effects. You arrest a person by arresting his body; you fight him by fighting his

body; if you injure his body you injure him; if he demands a court hearing you grant him the use of his body, "habeas corpus."

But in all of this one thing has *not* been said. It has not been said that we require the body in order to exist. Until someone comes forward with an explanation of how it would be possible for a body to *produce a mind*, the assertion that the body develops or evolves the mind connected with it remains both unfounded and unintelligible. With all the ingenuity of scientific hypothesis, it has to be said that no advance whatever has been made since Aristotle or before in answering the question how, from a mindless universe, or a mindless organism, a mind could emerge. (I use the word "emerge" intentionally, because I wish to include "emergent evolution" explicitly among the hypotheses which are intended to relieve the mystery, and which completely fail to do so.)

But on the opposite question, How can the body depend on the mind for its existence? there is at least one definite item of evidence. That is found in the everyday *experience of decision*. In the act of deciding a course of action between several alternatives, it is necessary that each alternative shall be imagined as a future possibility. We can choose between going into dairy farming or into wood cutting only if both of these occupations are available to us, and only one of them can happen. Our minds are busy with prophetic pictures; we see ourselves surrounded by our future herd, or by the grimmer scenes of the winter forest; we see the paths leading to each of these scenes. All the past moments of nature lead up to the moment in which I now stand facing these alternatives; but they do not carry me through that moment. I halt the impetuosity of Nature until I am ready to decide. Then I insert into the causal runways of Nature the special actions which will carry me along one path or the other, to the dairy farm or to the winter forest. And when the chosen picture arrives it will be I and not Nature that made it real; and yet—and here is the point—it *has become a part of Nature*. And without me, and my imagination, it could never have come to pass. It is my mind, in what we call a free choice, upon which that particular bit of the physical world depends, and within it, that activity of my body which belongs with it. Here the very existence of that phase of the bodily life depends on the prior mental act of choice.

The implications of this fact are momentous. If the human mind or soul is capable of what we call a free choice, it is, in that small chink of the universe, standing for a moment outside the stream of cause and

effect and determining what nature shall contain. In principle, the body is there dependent on the mind, not the mind on the body.

And if this is the case in that small chink of the universe, we have there an insight into the way things are put together. We can see that in its own character, the physical world, which destroys the body, cannot destroy that which is free from the body.

The death of the body, if we are right, would be the cessation (or the symbol of the cessation) of a set of connections with a particular community of other persons. There would remain the possibility that the inner energy of the self, if it had attained to that self-command which would give its continuance a meaning, would enable it to make connections with other such communities. And in so doing, it would find itself with another body, exactly fitting its own individual character, identifying it in its relations with that new environment.

So far, we find that the philosophical objection to the idea of immortality does not hold good. Like the scientific objection, it leaves the field free for any ground of a more positive nature which we may have to justify a belief in that further dimension of the universe.

3. THE GROUND FOR BELIEF

No one, I think, is likely to come to a belief in immortality through argument. It is the work of argument to remove obstacles, not to bring positive conviction. The argument is necessary because no one living in a scientific age can fairly remain indifferent to the view of man which science suggests; he must listen to it and settle his accounts with it. But he must not expect it to provide the answer. The answer must come directly from personal experience.

But how can there be a personal experience of immortality, that is, of something which relates to a future time, and to a time beyond the limits of human life?

This question which seems quite natural to the American mind would appear unnecessarily stupid to a Hindu or a Buddhist. The object of the Hindu's meditation is to achieve what he calls a "realization" of truth, and of one truth in particular, the truth that in his deepest self he is identical with the source of all being, Brahma or God. To realize this is to know that the accidents of earthly existence, even the deepest of accidents—which is death—cannot destroy the self, any more than night—which is the accident of a shadow—can destroy the sun.

Any personal experience which can show us clearly how things are put together in this universe—what is superior and what is inferior, what the soul is and how it is related to its body, what death is, what it can do and what it cannot do—any experience, I say, which lights up in a flash *the articulation of this living world* may give us even now an outlook on the future.

C. F. Andrews, friend of Gandhi and of many others, has written of experiences of his own, in connection with the approach to death of two of his nearest friends, which led him to the conviction of immortality. "Truth," he wrote, "is never wholly gained until it becomes individual and personal. An inner conviction has now come to me. There is now a certainty within me that our Spirit is independent and survives all change."¹

He had in mind one of Gandhi's fasts in which Gandhi came very near to death. "His (Gandhi's) suffering had become almost unbearable. . . . His mind also seemed under a cloud and he spoke with great difficulty. . . . I questioned him whether he was conscious inwardly of the joy in the spiritual life about which he had spoken before. His face lighted up again immediately, and his answer in the affirmative was emphatic. . . . It came to me with a new power of understanding that the spirit of man is in some way independent of the mind, and in a real sense immortal. . . . It appears to be distinct from the mental process, which is more closely connected with the body. . . ."

Such experiences are not uncommon. They come to us in different ways. They are likely to be such individual perceptions that they mean everything to the one who has them and little to anyone else. Some people I have known have become persuaded of immortality through the very thing which would be likely to rob them of that belief, the death of a wife or husband. I had a letter some time ago from an old friend, a skeptical and hardheaded naturalist, who had lost his wife. He said: "I have never taken any stock in the notion of anyone living after death. It is too contrary to everything that we biologists seem to see with our eyes. But when X died, I suddenly realized that as biologists we see nothing that touches the question at all. We see the body die; and we think of life as a property of the body. But consciousness and personality we do not see; they are not the same as organic life. I have

¹ *Christian Century*, Aug. 29, 1934, p. 1094.

a feeling deeper than any argument, not affected by argument, that X cannot have vanished from the universe." Such a statement can hardly be persuasive to anyone who has not gone through a similar experience, and yet it is probable that a similar revulsion against the claim of death to have conquered life explains the widespread belief in survival among all races of mankind.

More common is the experience or illusion of partial detachment from the body, in which the body appears as something semialien to oneself, an experience which occurs sometimes in deep reverie, and sometimes in illness or convalescence. The experience is variously reported as that of being free from one's body, or of observing it as from outside. The significance of such experiences lies not in the question whether they are illusory as particular events, but in the incidental discovery that the self need not be identified with this particular body in order to be itself. In its most general meaning, it is a discovery which anyone can make at any time—that of the *inner plurality of the self*. For when one thinks of oneself, or observes or judges oneself, there is immediately a distinction between the self which observes and the self which is observed. Suppose one has done something of which he is afterward ashamed, and suppose him busied with the remembrance of that deed and his regret at having done it. The *judged self* is condemned and repudiated by the *judging self*, though the weakness which led to that act is still present. The self which is caught in the meshes of habit, heredity, passion is haled before the court of a self which knows what ought to be and holds that standard free from the deflections of time and circumstance. One might say perhaps that the eternal self is judging the temporal and experimental self. Both selves are required to make up the complete and humanly living self, but the self which (as Plato would put it) participates in the true standards of judgment can be seen to have a deeper lodgment in the nature of things than the self of these experimental excursions. It is more "real."

And it is interesting to observe that when the human being thinks about his own death, and of the time after his death when he will no longer be present among men—an act of reflection which men often perform, and which in all probability animals never perform—one has to imagine this reflective self as *continuing to live*; otherwise it could not observe the absence of the visible self from among the living. The

thought of annihilation can never be completely executed, because self-consciousness must remain in order to attempt to execute it.

From such experiences and reflections many have come to the clear personal perception that the true self cannot be destroyed by the crisis of death, for its position is such that it rides above that crisis.

This conviction gives them a further answer to the question which we earlier raised, about the possibility of that free sacrifice of life for a cause which we find so common today in the armies of materialistic societies. Indeed that willingness to die is present wherever we have human nature at its best, as in the pursuit of new paths in medicine and in other phases of science and its applications. There never have been wanting men who were ready to die for the sake of man. For, as we now see, in freely rejecting life, there is a self which is rejected *and a self which rejects*. In rejecting life for the sake of a higher good, the self which rejects unconsciously lays hold on that which is more valuable and more durable than that life itself which is rejected.

But there is a third type of experience more common, I believe, than either of these. It is the realization that there must be *purpose in the universe as a whole*; and that the annihilation of the spirit of man in death would by canceling the meaning of things amount to the denial of purpose. For somehow the aspiring and questioning human soul, weak as it is, embodies all that we can see of the significance of creation. The world is vast and man is puny; but unless the vast world *knows itself* and its meaning, it is *less real than petty man*, who *does know himself* and his unending craving for finding the meaning of his life in space and time.

That living spark, just because it is inquiring and seeking, just because it raises the question of futility which a dead universe cannot raise, just because it is capable of suffering at the spectacle of an infinite waste of insensate matter, is more *real* than any such waste could be. And seeing this, one apprehends at once as by a swift flash of light that since the more real cannot be obliterated by the less real, the soul that aspires cannot be obliterated by death.

EDITOR'S NOTE: The Garvin Lecture for 1945, Lancaster, Pennsylvania.

Francis Asbury

FRANCIS J. McCONNELL

THERE are not many single incidents in the career of Francis Asbury which we can call dramatic or spectacular. The story of his life is one of steady putting forth of human energy through a long period with vast cumulative effect. Now and again some writer seeks to draw a picturesque contrast between the condition in life from which Asbury came and the place to which he attained, by speaking of him as if he almost leaped out of poor educational opportunities at the beginning. A letter which he wrote in 1768 uses the small "i" instead of the capital "I" when he speaks of himself. Though Asbury was then twenty-three years old, this peculiarity is too small to be striking. The letter itself is straightforward and sensible. Asbury had a good elementary education. At eighteen he had been licensed as a local preacher and at twenty-one had been received into the Wesleyan Conference and regularly appointed to a circuit. In 1771 he was sent by Mr. Wesley to America, the third Methodist to be thus sent, and at once settled into a marching stride which did not slow down for thirty years.

I have said that there was not much in Asbury's career which we could call dramatic, but there was from the beginning extraordinary strength of mind and will. He was determined from the outset to prepare himself as best he could for the work of preaching, especially by mastery of the Scriptures in the original tongues. Simpson's *Cyclopedia of Methodism* said of him that he had a "fair" knowledge of Hebrew and Greek, but that he had any at all is extraordinary. Neither language lends itself readily to study on horseback. After an incredibly busy day Asbury records that he "rapidly" read before retiring "several chapters" of the Old Testament in the Hebrew. Waiving the question of speed, that exploit would have put Asbury in a class of his own among Methodist preachers of his day, or of any day. Moreover, Asbury had quite a discerning alertness as to biblical problems. In a passage in his diary he notes the dependence of Matthew and Luke upon Mark. This was an astonishing comment, considering that at the time such interdependence of scriptural passages was a "sign" that the Divine Spirit was infallibly dictating parallel utterances without regard to any possible knowledge by one evangelist of the work of another.

If we ask for the secret of the success of Asbury as the agent most justly to be called the Founder of American Methodism we find it chiefly in the enormous driving power of his will. Here, I repeat, the marvel is not in anything spectacular, but in the long and continuous putting forth of energy at the same high level without much variation. It is said of Our Lord after his baptism: "And straightway the Spirit driveth him forth into the wilderness." Asbury, like many of his Methodist contemporaries, was often troubled as to whether he possessed the Divine Spirit or not. He often seemed to conceive of the Spirit as manifested in a restful mood of contentment. If he had understood himself a little better he might have seen what we see today, that the Divine in him was a driving, incessant power which would not brook any obstacle or delay. To behold him riding on horseback, or in his "light carriage," along a lonely trail might not have suggested much of the picturesque or thrilling, but when we reflect that this type of movement went forward without interruption from 1773 to 1816 at the rate of about five thousand miles a year, reaching in his ministry a total of at least two hundred thousand miles, we may well be pardoned for gasping a little. Traveling began within a month of the day Asbury landed in Philadelphia from England. At first his work was the visitation of Methodist groups around Philadelphia and New York and along the roads between. Then the journeys began to reach farther to the South and North, and with the organization of the Methodist Church in 1784 and the election of Asbury as Bishop the itineraries covered all the main roads, and some that were not main, that could be reached on horseback—to New England and upper New York, and down the Atlantic coast to Georgia, west to Kentucky, and thence back to the East. It was the plan of Asbury to get over these long journeys once a year, to say nothing of the more frequent visits that had to be given to communities in which Methodist societies were growing rapidly. Dr. Elmer T. Clark has traced upon the map of Virginia the journeys of Asbury through that state. The map looks like the warp and woof, or at least the pattern, of some gigantic garment.

It is not the purpose of this article to lay much stress on the cost of all this to Asbury—cost which he paid from his strength as a matter of course—except that a glance at the difficulties does suggest something of the achievement. Let me say then that even the physical power of Asbury lay in his will and not in any bodily superiority, for he was ill much of the time. In the earlier days of his term as Bishop he suffered

excruciating torments from a virulent throat infection. Judging by its symptoms we might feel free to call it the old-fashioned quinsy which would run through its painful course without much possibility of relief, though the good women of Methodism had a concoction—a stew into which they cast horseshoe nails that some virtue in the iron might bring cure. Terrific pain, raging fever, extreme prostration were the experiences of the Bishop times almost without number until after a period of years he seems to have worn out this malady. The first disease was followed in later life by what was at the time called consumption, whose distresses need no description.

The Bishop could not get the food and rest he needed in his travels. We find him now and then yearning for a good clean plank on which to sleep and for a little food that he could eat with any relish. He could not have had comforts even if he had had money to pay for entertainment, but he had no money worth speaking of. His salary was sixty-four dollars a year, out of which he had to send something home to his widowed mother in England. Once we read of his starting out upon a two-thousand-mile trip with three dollars in his pocket. What this meant was, obviously, that he had to chart his course from one Methodist home to the next, and that if he failed to reach the next house before nightfall he had to sleep out-of-doors without supper, and often without having eaten anything at all through the previous twelve hours. The lack of money itself was not so serious a hardship as it seems. Bishop Roberts records of himself that he once traveled from near Erie, Pennsylvania, to a conference at Baltimore, starting with one dollar, and that he arrived at conference with six dollars and twenty-five cents. We have no record that Bishop Asbury ever reached a journey's end with just such a surplus, and if he had he would have put it in what he called the "mitebox" fund to help preachers needier than himself. Bishop Asbury more than once gave away a shirt to some poverty-stricken brother, though he planned to reserve at least one for himself. The portraits of the Bishop with coat buttoned up to his chin look quite clerical, but possibly there was another reason for this besides a clerical spirit.

I have no desire to paint the pioneer conditions of Asbury's day in dark colors, but we have in our day no idea of what those conditions really were, especially to one compelled constantly to travel through them. There were indeed some colors that suggested romance, but for the most part the colors were not those of romance. Poverty was ex-

treme in the West where Asbury did so much of his work, and the West began not much more than a hundred miles from Philadelphia. Houses were far apart, the inhabitants were overworked in the hard struggle for life, and got readily, perhaps too readily, into the mood of "letting things slide." Asbury, himself, was almost overnice in his tidiness. One of his major trials was the necessity of staying at night, and sometimes for days together, in homes that were not only disorderly but filthy. He tried under such circumstances to keep his mind off his immediate environment by his devotional readings and the study of a few favorite books, as, for example, Wesley's sermons and John Marshall's *Life of George Washington*. That and the writing of his diary and of his innumerable letters kept his attention occupied until the hour came for his departure when he fairly rushed forth to resume his journeys along woodland trails. The forests and the open country were lonely enough but they were fresh and clean. His words of gratitude at escape from frontier uncleanness are at once revealing and pathetic.

What I am thus writing does not refer to the older, better-settled communities, but to the pioneer experiences, and Asbury was a pioneer. His entertainment in the eastern states was generous enough, but even in the East there were hardships. Asbury never ceased to voice his gratitude to Judge White, of Delaware, for protection from Tory-hunters during the opening months of the Revolutionary War, but the protection consisted for weeks in hiding him in out-of-the-way hiding places where no American patriot would think of looking for him. In passing, I may remark that those American patriots were not gentle souls. What they did to many good Americans who did not move fast enough in clamoring for national independence is a black page in our history. The English Methodists who came over to work here left for home as soon as the Revolutionary storm began to brew. Thomas Rankin, whom Wesley had appointed superintendent of the preachers here, with Asbury as assistant, did remain until 1788—the Rankin who was so pro-English that he was constantly hindering the Methodist work. What finally saved Asbury from being driven out was the discovery of a letter written by him to friends in England, manifesting his devotion to the American cause.

Was it necessary for Asbury, especially after he became Bishop, to give himself to this unceasing travel and toil? It certainly was if there was to be any spreading of scriptural holiness throughout America. The congregations organized autonomously did an immense service. It is

probably not an overstatement to declare that without the democratic procedure learned in the town meetings of Connecticut and Massachusetts American independence would have been vastly harder to win. Asbury and Coke, however, had the Wesleyan ideal of spreading scriptural holiness throughout the new nation. Asbury and Coke called on George Washington at their earliest opportunity and each of the three makes reference to the call in his diary. All three thought nationally. Admittedly a process of spreading is likely to mean that what is spread is somewhat thin in spots but that was inevitable with the Methodist aim of national expansion of the denomination to keep pace with the expansion of the republic. Even by admitted implication Methodist policy was extensive rather than intensive, and the implication was realized in practice.

This meant that the Bishop, or bishops, at the beginning had to know personally, by actual contact if at all possible, every congregation. We must keep in mind that there was at the beginning no presiding eldership. There were circuits, some of them very large, ministered to by senior and junior preachers, but the Bishop was the only bond among them. Indeed, the Bishop in Asbury's day was the only focus and center and symbol and controller of the denomination as such. He was forced to travel incessantly, to preach in barns and dwellings, for he had neither the time nor the money to undertake building enterprises. He seldom could stop at an inn. There weren't many inns, and he did not have money enough for entertainment. Moreover it was more necessary for him to get hay and corn for his horse than bread for himself.

All this had one superlative advantage. *It could be done*, even if at huge cost in the wear and tear on the Bishop, and it kept the Bishop in living touch with the preachers and the people, and that was what was needed above all things else if the denomination was to be nation-wide.

Always let us remember that the second generation of pioneers paid the cost of pioneering. Those who actually went forth from settled communities to new lands went with a cultural background and a measure of cultural training. By second-generation pioneers I mean those born on the frontier, with few neighbors, almost no schools, with heavy work for the children from the time they could walk. A frontier like that of the new American republic was full of superstition, with no chance at many ideas with more than a geographical range of a few miles. The pioneer in our country was one of the most skilled experts the world has ever

seen with two instruments, the rifle and the axe, but the two together did not supply much material for thought beyond emergency needs. As to human stock there was not much finer muscle or soul on earth than that in the log cabins, but the social stimulus was not abundant. With the vision of the human needs always before him, Asbury could never rest from the driving of the Spirit, and he infused the same unrelenting vigor into the preaching of his itinerants. The earthly lot of the pioneer was real enough. Asbury sought to make spiritual forces likewise real—and succeeded.

Simpson's *Cyclopedia of Methodism* says that Asbury's preaching was "generally very earnest." That sentence is a marvel of understatement. "Generally" indeed! It was always "very earnest" except when the preacher was sick or utterly worn out. Pulpit speech could not have got a hearing in those early days if it had not been in earnest. To seize and rivet attention was the first requisite for getting a hearing. Probably that is why the preachers depended so much on what they called "rousements" which by fervid emotional appeal brought hearers not only to attention but to surrender of will to the demands of the new life. Asbury was a rational sort of person. He could not have put so much stress on careful outlines for his sermons if he had not been. He seldom mentions any of his sermons in his diary without carefully outlining his thought down to one, two, and three and sometimes to more divisions. He was not offended by the shouts and outcries of the old camp meetings, but he took his own presentation of the gospel most seriously, sometimes too seriously, as when he would break up a passage which was evidently best adapted to make its impression by its own unchanged phrasing into a half-dozen subheads.

It will not do to discuss the early pioneer preaching, the type insisted upon by Asbury, as mostly superficial emotionalism. Some of the themes discussed were dignified and profound as, for illustration, human freedom and divine sovereignty. The Presbyterians were moving into the West and South in Asbury's day. They worked together with the Methodists in the mighty revival efforts in the opening years of the nineteenth century, but always contended powerfully against the Wesleyan idea of human freedom. Asbury and his followers considered predestination of some souls to eternal life and others to eternal death by divine decree, without regard to the decisions of the souls themselves, unworthy both of God and of man. They were especially distressed

by the antinomianism which now and again accompanied Calvinism—the belief that whatever a person called of God to eternal bliss might do was not sin, for once in “grace always in grace.” This left considerable leeway to the loosely knit, morally speaking, among the elect. On the other hand, those who believed they were not among the elect, if there were any such, were likely to assume that since they were damned anyhow it did not make much difference what they did. The arguments of the Presbyterians were usually from the point of view of carefully reasoned theological principles. The Presbyterian ministers in Asbury’s day were much better-trained thinkers than the Methodist, because of the Presbyterian insistence upon an educated ministry on the frontier as well as in the more settled communities. Still the Methodists, and in this the leadership of Asbury was quite pronounced, made up in serious moral insight what they lacked in formal logical skill. One of the best discussions of Calvinism Methodism has ever produced is *Objections to Calvinism*, by Randolph S. Foster, afterward Bishop. This book was written within about thirty years of the death of Asbury. Foster was born on the frontier, educated in Kentucky, and preached for many years in the frontier communities. He was one of the greatest theological leaders Methodism has ever produced.

Before leaving this point it may be well to say that Asbury’s practical difficulties as a religious leader were with the Methodists, both ministerial and lay, who perverted and abused their freedom of will by falling from grace. The disciplinary situation in early Methodism was no small problem. The frontier was in its nature not notably law abiding. Divine grace was “free and abundant” so that it was not the easiest achievement in spiritual training to make even professed believers in the gospel aware of the sacredness of moral law. The regular annual conferences, not supposed to last more than a week, sometimes kept the preachers together for longer periods in straightening out the moral confusion and tangles in which both preachers and laymen had become involved. Trials of ministers by church law were not infrequent, though it is only fair to say that the most notable of these trials were for insubordination, in one famous case the insubordination being refusal to accept the appointment to which Bishop Asbury had assigned the defendant. I don’t know that the conference which tried the case went quite so far as to pronounce the defendant guilty of a breach of the moral law, though those handling the situation showed probably a little more than a due sense of gravity.

We come now to an appreciation of some services rendered by Bishop Asbury which have not always been sufficiently stressed. We think of him first as influential in freeing American Methodism from the organizational control of British Wesleyanism. Wesley, in yielding to the independence of American Methodism, made the determining influence the political separation of the two countries. This was certainly a factor, but the movement toward ecclesiastical independence was not wholly a result of the Revolutionary War. It is tolerably clear that Wesley had stirrings of hope that American Methodism might remain under the British tutelage after the war. We are dealing here with John Wesley, one of the strongest leaders of his century. We have to take him as we find him. Without his firm resolution Methodism could never have lasted long in England or America or anywhere else, but the firmness brought with it some disadvantages. I have heard a distinguished Englishman say that from John Wesley to Francis Asbury was a "step down." It was not a step down from intellectual and spiritual qualities necessary for Methodist success in America, but we do not disparage Wesley's humility when we say that Wesley may have assumed that it was. We not only have to take Wesley as he was, but as Wesley took himself, especially in the self-consciousness which recognized his own pre-eminence over any other Methodist.

It may be questioned whether Wesley ever fully appreciated Asbury. To begin with, they were too much alike. Any reader of Methodist history will have to grant that Wesley was far superior to Asbury in range of interest and breadth of view. Oxford, for good or ill, played too large a part in Wesley's development to make it relevant to discuss the two men from the point of view of formal educational training. When, however, we come to sheer dynamic force of will the men were pretty much on the same plane. Even what we may call the narrowness of Asbury gave him a force of incalculable importance.

We go back for an instant to Thomas Rankin whom Wesley sent over to America in 1773 to superintend the Methodist work and to hold it loyal to England with Asbury to remain in the position of assistant. Rankin had hardly disembarked before he called a conference of all Methodist preachers to instruct them in Methodist ways. There were two handicaps, however, in Rankin's leadership. One was that he had not been here as long as Asbury, and the other was that he was a Tory, with the American Revolution just around the corner. Asbury's devotion

to the American cause was becoming increasingly known. The upshot was that in 1775 Rankin wrote Wesley asking for Asbury's recall and Wesley replied with a message of recall. All this was in wartime and the order never reached Asbury. Rankin remained on this side of the sea until 1778, and by that date Burgoyne was having trouble in upper New York and Rankin concluded that he might just as well return to London. He spent a good deal of time in the next half-dozen years pouring into Wesley's ears complaints about Asbury's incompetence.

The return of Rankin left nobody in America to do any work of supervising Methodism except Asbury, and Asbury went ahead and did it. In 1784, as we all know, the organization of American Methodists as an independent church had become imperative. Coke and Asbury were named by Wesley as Superintendents, but at Asbury's insistence the organizing conference formally elected the two men to the General Superintendency. The Superintendents were soon called Bishops, to Wesley's vast disquiet. Wesley wrote a letter to Asbury on the title "Bishop" with which, according to Wesley, "Frankie strutted while he himself was willing to be plain Mr. Wesley." In the treatment of this letter Asbury acted much more creditably than did Wesley in sending it.

The use of the title Bishop did for a time let loose on Methodism a flood of discussion as to the legitimacy of the title as used by Asbury and Coke. To paraphrase a sentence of Lincoln's, if anyone likes that sort of discussion that is just the sort of discussion he will like, and there was plenty of it. Incidentally, I recall seeing a statement that some Methodist of the early time carried to Benjamin Franklin this question as to what the Methodists should do as to the episcopacy, receiving the reply: "If the Methodist Conference wants Bishops by all means let it go ahead and elect them." I have a distinct recollection of seeing this somewhere but cannot recall where.

Next we must look at the relations between Asbury and Thomas Coke. Coke was a graduate of Oxford, an able preacher, and an indefatigable traveler. He greatly desired administrative work in America but never got much chance at what he desired. In the adjustment of conference appointments Asbury kept matters in his own hands, while assigning the important public addresses to Coke, who complained that he was being treated as a "mere preacher." There was never any open clash between the two leaders. Indeed, Coke's disappointment never came to light until the publication of some of his correspondence only a few

years ago. Probably Asbury, knowing immeasurably more about the American preacher and congregation than did Coke, had simply determined to arrange schedules so that Coke could do the work for which he was best fitted. The American Methodists were pleased to have Bishop Coke among them, but they were not pleased to have him dividing his time between the United States and England and Ireland if he was to insist upon making appointments of the preachers. Coke said that he himself could travel ten thousand miles a year, while his wife could travel five thousand. Five thousand was what Asbury's schedule called for. Coke could not have traveled ten thousand miles through the frontier districts, experienced traveler though he was. In his devotion to America he did cross the ocean eighteen times and had nothing to say about the discomforts of the voyage.

In these days of ecumenical tendency it may seem strange to write of Asbury's making American Methodism American rather than English. We all rejoice today in every step toward world-wide ecumenicity, but aside from the practical difficulties in administering churches across three thousand miles of ocean there is, or rather was, the harmful psychological effect which would have been produced in our American church by dependence on British control. Such dependence would have begotten an inferiority complex in Americans, or a boastfulness which would have come equally from a sense of inferiority. It will be understood that I am talking of conditions of over a century ago. Asbury perceived from the start that American Methodism must work out its own forms of thought and of practice. Wesley finally acceded to this. He pronounced the separation a providence, though a "strange" one. He did send over Richard Whatcoat with a request that the General Conference make him a Bishop, which the Conference did after a wait of eight years.

Again, Asbury served Methodism by helping it to a modified form of democracy. After the Revolutionary War democracy in America was in a wild temper. It is the fashion in some quarters today to speak of the Constitution of the United States as if it were about the last word in efficiency in thwarting the will of the people. Washington and Hamilton and Madison, however, knew the people and sought to establish agencies of control in democracy—Washington and Madison no doubt in sincere regard for the people, and Hamilton with little or no regard whatever. Almost every President of the United States from the time of Asbury till the administration of Polk was more or less of an autocrat. Washington, Jefferson, Madison, John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson,

James K. Polk, were all steel-willed and not especially democratic in actual governmental practice. Much of their service to the republic was in their steadying democracy till it got safely upon its feet. Likewise, Asbury served the Methodist movement by holding democratic centrifugal impulses within safe orbits. There were plenty of tangential forces at work. No wonder Asbury did not like to have the preachers talking "politics." Much as the Methodists abhorred the theology of Tom Paine many of them were inclined toward his social views.

Asbury had to make his own precedents. Not outside of the Roman Church had there ever been in Christendom quite such an attempt at centralized church control as that of early Methodism in the United States. Wesley traveled almost as many miles every year as did Asbury but Wesley moved through a much more populous territory and could achieve more visible results with less effort. He had more Methodists around him, more opportunities to consult with his people, though Wesley himself was not given to excessive consultation. It was easy for American preachers to feel aggrieved at a Bishop's "arbitrary" appointments when the posts were scattered so far apart. There was indeed sharp and often bitter criticism of Wesley's handling of the preachers as the years went by, but the criticism of Asbury began almost at the outset. This was inevitable. The preachers shared the democratic mood of the times which nurtured the notion that any man was about the equal of any other in the ministerial task. In one respect this was true enough since all were about in the same plane as to hardship and sacrifice required. Salaries could hardly be called such at all. The ministry was supported by gifts of the people out of their poverty—as to money. Judged by amount of money actually in his possession every Methodist was poor. This condition was general throughout the frontier. Schoolteachers, some of them of marked ability, did not fare better than preachers as to money. They boarded around with the parents of their pupils and saw little currency from one term to another. This was true of any work which depended not upon fees or wages but upon free gifts of the people. When work was done under the authority of a superior, as was that of the Methodist ministry, it was unavoidable, under all the peculiarities of the period that resentment over appointments would at times become acute, especially since city appointments did pay in larger money sums. Many a preacher felt that the Bishop did not understand his case. Probably most preachers in the history of Methodism have felt at one time or another that their cases have been exceptional.

One difficulty was notably heavy. The meagerness of the money support prevented many preachers from marrying. The result was that preachers married and gave up the ministry. Asbury was not patient enough with this situation, celibate as he was himself. There is a line in a letter that he wrote from America to his mother which seems to refer to a love affair before he left England, but there is not enough in it to warrant any conclusions whatever as to Asbury's interest in marriage. So far as his preachers were concerned Asbury seemed to think of marriage as a positive hindrance, and preachers' wives, whom he called the preachers' "dears," as incumbences.

Asbury did try to use a so-called Council to help in making appointments to churches, the Council being composed of presiding elders. It is not easy to see the difference between the Council and the present-day cabinet in Methodist organization, but it was a failure almost from the start. The preachers felt that their fields were arbitrarily, not to say despotically, assigned to them in a council by Asbury appointees. Two serious crises arose in Asbury's administration, one led by James O'Kelly, a forceful character who eventually sought to found a new denomination in protest against Asbury's autocracy, and another led by Jesse Lee, after Asbury as powerful a figure as appeared in Methodism in the first fifty years after 1784. O'Kelly's ability was largely that of persistence in accusation and protest, and Asbury let the protests wear themselves out. Lee's talents were altogether extraordinary, especially in debate against Calvinism. He was the real founder of Methodism in New England, to say nothing of the effectiveness of his preaching in Maryland and Virginia. Lee had failed of election to the Bishopric in 1800 by two votes, and always felt that Asbury was against him, even accusing Asbury of "electioneering" so as to prevent his election. Asbury was a master at keeping his own counsel. It is a principle of sound procedure in executive as distinguished from administrative measures, that choices of officials, personal as they are, cannot always be publicly discussed as can adoption of impersonal administrative measures. Even in administrative policies there may be reasons which cannot well be phrased—they must be felt rather than declared. Asbury treated both O'Kelly and Lee with fine consideration, meeting furious railings with unruffled calm. Lee was given to coarse speech. Asbury had the controlled self-discipline of a wise umpire. Nobody cares for an arguing umpire. If I may use the expression of a friend of mine, a devotee of America's national sport who occasionally

discusses religious authority in baseball terms: "Nobody loves an umpire. But we must have the umpire—for the game must go on!" Asbury knew that the game must go on—and saw that it went on. The best discussions of Asbury's relations to Coke, O'Kelly, and Lee are those by Dr. W. L. Duren in his biography of Asbury and in his *Top Sergeant*, a life of Lee.

It is well to call attention to one further service rendered by Asbury to Methodism. We owe it to him that Methodism has been more western than eastern. Asbury discerned the significance of the vast migration to the West which set in at the close of the eighteenth and at the beginning of the nineteenth centuries. He kept his eyes on the West and South and journeyed repeatedly into Kentucky where he had to meet peril from Indians and other enemies of the new nation. Mississippi and Missouri were always before his thoughts of the future. The late Professor F. J. Turner and his disciples have shown the predominant significance of the opening of the West for all nineteenth-century developments of the United States, and Theodore Roosevelt never tired of telling of the contribution of the itinerant preacher to the winning of the West. I do not know that Asbury saw in prophetic vision the conquest of the continent between the Alleghanies and the Pacific as a basis for fresh advance in civilization, but whether he acted out of vision or impulse he rendered stupendous aid nevertheless. We freely concede that he personally did not care much for the East, especially for its cities. He fought always against the demands of congregations in the cities for this or that preacher, and against the willingness of preachers to listen to such appeals. He could not see that New England had any religion worth speaking of, and to him Connecticut, in particular, was lacking both in religion and good manners. New Haven and Yale College, he felt, needlessly slighted him and his preaching. Nobody in Connecticut, it appeared, ever came to him after a sermon to tell whether the preaching was acceptable or not. For upper Canada and the Hudson Valley he had large hopes, but his expectations for the future looked toward the Mississippi Valley.

There has been some, though not much, criticism of Asbury for what has seemed like a compromising attitude on slavery. His own feeling was strongly antislavery and whenever a chance came he preached with all his power to and for the slaves. He did consent to the erasure from the *Discipline* of the earlier, vigorous rules against slaveholding by Methodists. The rules were cast out of the *Discipline* issued for the states where slavery was most thoroughly established. Bishop Coke was never

satisfied with Asbury's lack of radicalism in actually dealing with slavery, but Coke was not under administrative responsibility for handling the difficulty. The slavery question became most deadly after the invention of the cotton gin began to show its industrial potentialities in a phase of economic determinism which shaped political and social institutions. It is hopeless to try to assess blame as between North and South; the slaves were in the South, but the money-profit of the slave trade was largely in the North. In carrying antislavery convictions into actions Asbury was just as helpless as were the majority of people North and South who held similar sentiments. Recurring to Asbury's interest in the West we note that he favored the plan of a delegated General Conference which delivered the West in large degree from the overwhelming preponderance in numbers and resources of eastern cities like Philadelphia and Baltimore.

It remains to say only a word about Asbury's personal religious experience. Though he was not much inclined to surrender his will to other human wills, his thirty-two years in the episcopacy were given every day—some days in hour-length prayers—to discover and yield to the Divine Will. Perhaps it might have been better if he had more fully recognized that other human wills than his own could be channels of divine illumination, but it is not likely that the most careful study of his administration will discover any substantial mistakes in his decisions.

Asbury's diary abounds in self-reproaches for faults which do not seem to us today to have been worth serious remorse. He was troubled over his proneness to levity and humor. After an extensive search of all three volumes of his diaries and all his available letters, I have been able to find but one recorded experience of his mirth. That was an occasion when a slaveholder complained that religion had spoiled one of his best slave women—spoiled her, that is, as a slave. I suppose the joke was on the slaveholder. Religion is expected to spoil slaves.

Asbury complains also of his temptation to "wandering thoughts." The context usually suggests that they were indeed wandering all the way from New England to Georgia, up to Canada, out to Kentucky and Mississippi and Missouri. He was a seeker also for what the Wesleys called Christian perfection, hoping to gain in it some mystic sense of abiding peace. We can see that what was pushing him on to increasing fullness of Christian life was that driving force from which he never was free. We may well be thankful that in his career his Master's experience was repeated, and that the Spirit drove him into the wilderness.

Religious Liberty¹

JOHN C. BENNETT

IT HAS been the discovery of this generation that problems which, to our immediate predecessors, seemed on the way to solution can appear in more acute forms than ever. This is the case with religious liberty. To be sure, the most acute forms of this problem today are aspects of the general problem of human liberty in the face of the threat of the totalitarian state. Religious minorities and even religious majorities have been the victims of persecution, not in the interests of orthodox religion, but in the interests of state power, and these persecutors have had at hand instruments of oppression that would have aroused the envy of earlier political and religious tyrants.

If the problem of religious liberty consisted only of this totalitarian attack upon spiritual freedom there would be little need for a special study of religious liberty as such. There are, however, two other aspects of the problem that are more obvious to us than they were to the last generation. One is the inherent intolerance of most organized religion. I believe that Protestants are more aware than they were a decade or two ago of the real logic of Roman Catholicism. Students of the encyclicals and of Catholic doctrine knew about it but in America it was covered over, in liberal circles, with sweetness and light. To mention the real and unchangeable claims and objectives of the Roman Church was to be classed with the Klan and other obscurantist anti-Catholics. Now, however, Protestants know that there is an ultimate conflict in thought between Catholic doctrine and religious liberty. This conflict is sometimes mitigated by expediency or by charity or in the case of individual Catholic thinkers by insight into the conditions of religious growth. In many countries where the Roman Church has a privileged position, even now liberty for other religious groups is seriously curtailed. This may have been known but it was regarded by Protestants, whose ancestors had been intolerant and who were sure that the world was becoming more and more tolerant, as a kind of cultural lag and not as the natural working out of the logic of Roman Catholicism. What is true of Catholic intolerance is many times more true of such a religion

¹ Based upon *Religious Liberty: An Inquiry*, by M. Searle Bates. New York: International Missionary Council, 1945. pp. xviii, 604. \$3.50.

as Islam which, in combination with the forces of nationalism, is seeking to protect itself against Christianity.

There is an even more profound reason for the revival of interest in the problem of religious liberty. It is the fact that one of the by-products, or at least accompaniments, of a generous provision for religious liberty has been the secularization of society. The usual American assumption that the separation of Church and State is a solution of the problem of religious liberty is an illusion. I believe that the separation of Church and State is, except for such special cases as England and the Scandinavian countries, a necessary framework within which positive solutions must be found, but of itself it may be an invitation to the development of a religious vacuum. It may mean such emphasis upon the rights of all to be free from religious pressure that there will cease to be much positive religious influence. We see already from American experience how this works out in the field of education. Say what we will about the evil of Catholic intolerance or of Catholic aggressiveness, something more is needed than the liberty of indifference, more than Protestant abdication. We can no longer assume that what a man believes in his heart is of no concern to society.

The other side of this development of a religious vacuum is the rise of substitutes for religion which are themselves faiths and which, at least in the face of fascism and National Socialism, are enemies of freedom and of decent human living. In a clumsy way we are now engaged in the task of seeking to eradicate from the mind and soul of Germany and Japan faiths of which we disapprove. Religious freedom in the sense of freedom for Christianity or Judaism or Buddhism will of course be permitted but there will be a planned effort to keep young Germans and Japanese within a limited area of faith. This is doubtless as it should be but it has implications for the discussion of liberty that are profoundly important. We are going to make sure that "truth" has rights not given to some kinds of "error."

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Dr. Searle Bates was asked by the Joint Committee on Religious Liberty of the Foreign Missions Conference of North America and the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America to prepare a study of religious liberty as an urgent contemporary problem. Dr. Bates, who is a professor at the University of Nanking, brought to the study the perspectives of both East and West, of both the churches of Europe and

America and the younger churches of Asia. Also, he brought to the study an astonishing capacity for work! He had the guidance of the sponsoring committee and of the criticisms of fifty leaders and specialists who read the book in mimeographed form. He has produced a book that is extraordinary in its comprehensiveness and thoroughness and in the fairness and wisdom of his thought. It begins with a survey of the existing situation in regard to religious liberty both in those countries where there is acute difficulty and in such countries as our own where religious liberty is well established. Then, there follows a review of the problems of religious liberty in almost every country for each period that is distinctive since the rise of Christianity. In this the author largely depends upon the best secondary sources but he has had the benefit of expert criticism. The two middle chapters in the book deal with the nature and the grounds of religious liberty. These chapters are rich but they are not so well organized as the descriptive ones. There follow special studies of the status of religious liberty in international law and in the constitutions of most countries. The book concludes with summaries and with proposals for immediate action to safeguard liberty both by the Church and by the nations.

The book will seem diffuse and repetitious to the reader who reads it through as a whole. But Dr. Bates has quite rightly sacrificed that function of the book to its use as a collection of special studies and he has made some of his chapters both connected arguments and anthologies of the literature. For example, in nearly every chapter there is a discussion of the teaching and policies of the Roman Church; but wisely, and at the risk of seeming repetitious, the author includes a systematic study of the Catholic position that gives one a total view of the subject. In doing that he quotes at length from Catholic writers of all shades of opinion. The effect of the book is to make the unwary Protestant realize that Catholicism will long be an obstacle to religious liberty because of the inner logic of Catholicism, but this impression comes not from polemics against Catholicism but from scores of long quotations from encyclicals and leading Catholic authorities. Large place is given to those Catholics who try to find ways of harmonizing their faith with religious liberty and, indeed, the strongest things said against Catholic practice anywhere in the book are said by Catholics who are quoted. Among the Catholic writers most often quoted to show how far Catholics themselves go in trying to make place for religious liberty or in criticism of the oppressive

forms of clericalism in their own Church are: Jacques Maritain, Lord Acton, Carl Eckhardt, Daniel Binchy, Luigi Sturzo, and Arthur Vermeersch.

I have said that the descriptive and historical chapters are better organized than those that deal with the nature and grounds of religious liberty. It is also true that the book is more definite as a statement and analysis of facts than it is as a discussion of the perplexing issue of the limits of liberty. In one of the most pregnant sentences of the book Dr. Bates says, "in the prescriptions of freedom for the individual from all compulsion and for the sect from all discrimination, it appears that the state and the community have lost their freedom to be religious in sufficient concreteness" (p. 218). Those words indicate that the author is fully aware of the profoundest problems, but I think that it can be said that he does not follow them up in a systematic way. His chief concern is to show the continuing basis of religious liberty as against the external restraints of totalitarian states or clerical intolerance.

I shall comment upon the book and its contribution under three heads: (1) The impression created by the story of religious persecution and oppression; (2) the nature of religious liberty; (3) the roots and grounds of religious liberty.

I. RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION AND DISCRIMINATION

One is tempted to hope that not many persons who have no inner knowledge of Christianity will read the first three hundred pages of this book. Certainly they would be driven to the conclusion that the long-suffering human race would have done better without benefit of clergy! Religious liberty is a young and tender plant, far more so than even the informed American reader is likely to realize because he so easily takes his liberties for granted. Dr. Bates shows that except for Protestantism's left wing there was originally no essential difference between Catholicism and Protestantism. He says: "It needs to be pointed out again and again that religious liberty, like all liberty, has been sought by minorities and seldom granted spontaneously by majorities or by authority of any sort" (p. 365). Both secular and religious factors have in the course of history made Protestantism, even when dominant, favorable to religious liberty. The whole process is clear in the development of American Christianity. Religious minorities in their struggle for religious liberty prepared the way for political and civil liberty.

Today there are large areas of the world in which we must still expect constant pressure upon conscience, the use of the coercive power of the state by religious groups to make life difficult for the nonconformist. This is true of the Moslem countries. It is true of Tibet. It may be true of an India dominated by Hinduism. It is true of several nations dominated by the Eastern Orthodox Church though no one can predict what the combination of Orthodox and Communist or Russian influences will create. It is true of those "Christian States" sometimes regarded as the pride of the Roman Church—Spain and, to a lesser extent, Portugal. And it is true in some measure of Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and perhaps other Latin-American countries, though we can expect the Latin-American pattern to be changeable as in the case of Mexico. Pressure and persecution encouraged by the Christian Church in these countries is milder than in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Heretics are not burned at the stake. Excommunication is the only penalty for heresy recognized by Canon Law (p. 149). There have been atrocities acquiesced in by local church authorities, but usually the major cause has been political, for example, the conflicts between Roman Catholics and Eastern Orthodox in Yugoslavia and the persecution of Protestants in Spain. The chief difficulties are to be found in control of education by the dominant church, in discriminations in regard to marriage, in monopolistic use of the radio and other public channels of expression, in limitations in the holding of public office and in many petty restrictions and annoyances that are encouraged by the church in particular countries.

In spite of the strong tendency of the Church to deny liberty in the past, the dominant fact about the present situation is that the Church—both Catholic and Protestant—has been on the side of civil and political liberty as against the totalitarian state. We can explain this in part because the Church is always in favor of liberty when it is in a minority but this is not the only explanation. Protestants have been taught by events to favor human liberty and they now understand well that it has a sound basis in the Christian religion. Catholics, whatever may be their tendency to favor the dominance of the Church, have their natural law doctrines which furnish a basis for the belief in human rights against the tyranny of the state. Moreover, there is a strong liberal ferment in Roman Catholicism and many Catholics recognize that political privilege corrupts the Church, that the clerical state may be little more than

a whited sepulcher, that true faith cannot come by intimidation or external pressure. It has not passed unnoticed by Catholic authorities that there is greater Catholic vitality and even more freedom for the Church in the United States than in most Catholic countries. It is encouraging that both Eire and Belgium are nations with a Catholic majority in which there is full religious liberty.

2. THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

Dr. Bates gives several brief definitions of religious liberty but they are less illuminating than his lists of the actual liberties that religious people should seek for themselves and grant to others. Religious liberty cannot be isolated from other forms of liberty of conscience and expression. The following paragraph is a good summary of what a religious individual or group should be free to do:

First of all, arising out of conscience and its simplest expression, there is the freedom of the individual man to think, to believe, to worship in private. Then, there is liberty of corporate worship, with the elements of fellowship, association, and organization that are requisite to the maintenance of the cult. Thirdly, there is freedom to speak as an individual to an individual, in testimony of religious values and of religious experience. Fourthly, comes freedom to teach within the association of believers. Fifthly, there is the liberty of public preaching and evangelism within the local and national community. Then, as an extension of the same liberty and following naturally in a free world, yet with some distinctive problems, comes freedom to preach and evangelize in a foreign country. In these unfolding aspects of religious liberty there is inevitably implied the means of organization to use them effectively and, also, the expression of conscience alike in social service, in sound challenge of customs and of institutions that fail to bring to men true opportunities of life, and in the reasonable activities of believers for good ends throughout community and State (pp. 302-3).

It must have been an oversight to insert without explanation adjectives such as "sound" before challenge, "reasonable" before activities, and "good" before ends. Even though we grant that liberties must be used with some sense of responsibility and with due regard to the essential moral convictions of the community it will be necessary for the majority to permit much that it regards as unsound, unreasonable, and even bad if there is to be liberty at all. In addition to these general aspects of religious liberty there are many specific rights that should be possessed by churches—such as the right to own or to be secure in the use of property—and specific protections that a minority group should have in its relation to the majority especially in the educational system.

Without thinking in terms of their order of importance, I believe,

on the basis of this study, that there are three essential forms of external religious liberty that will be the most difficult to win or preserve in various parts of the world. By external liberty I refer to liberty that extends beyond the religious community itself. In Moslem lands and also in India and Tibet it is the right to be converted from the established religion to Christianity. In Russia and in many another nation in the Western world it is the right of the Church or the individual Christian to criticize the policy of the state. Unless Christian churches assume this prophetic function they will become instruments of the state even though they may possess much internal liberty. In every country the establishment of an entirely fair relationship between religious groups in regard to public education is a vexing problem. Often it will be necessary to combat wilful discrimination but there is no country except, perhaps, the homogeneous Scandinavian countries where frequent readjustment will not be necessary. It will be difficult to secure effective religious liberty for the minority where there is an established church and for the majority where the state is neutral.

3. THE ROOTS AND GROUNDS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY

A central question that should be answered by such a study of religious liberty is whether it has any permanent basis in the nature of Christianity or whether it is chiefly the result of accommodation to religious diversity within the community under the guidance of secular ideas of liberty. Except for the left-wing Protestant sects, especially the Baptists and Quakers, there has been little evidence that Christianity necessarily leads to liberty, except the inner liberty of the Christian soul. There is abundant evidence that religious liberty came in societies which found it inconvenient to continue a policy of repressing dissenting sects and which were influenced by both a decline in religious certainty and by rationalistic conceptions of toleration. Dr. Bates quotes with some approval Voltaire's gibe: "If there were one religion in England, its despotism would be terrible; if there were only two, they would destroy each other; but there are thirty, and therefore they live in peace and happiness" (p. 206).

Is this all that there is to be said and must we admit that our religious liberty is little more than an accident of modern history? Would a more intense conviction of religious truth and a more profound understanding of the vagaries of the human mind cause us to seek new forms of religious control? It is the chief purpose of this study to show that

whatever may have been the historical circumstances under which Christians came to believe in religious liberty, they have found that it does have a basis in the Christian faith, that it is a requirement of Christian ethics.

This is Dr. Bates's conclusion and it is fully justified. He quotes with approval A. J. Carlyle's conclusion: "We have seen that while it is unhappily true that in the course of its history the Christian Church had even sometimes presented itself as the enemy of freedom, yet in the long run it has been compelled not only to accept toleration, but to recognize that the principles of intellectual and moral freedom are a necessary expression of its own principles" (p. 419). I shall summarize in my own way the chief grounds for this conviction.

1. The first of these grounds is the voluntary character of the religious life, of religious loyalties, of religious insights into truth. It is true of all honest thought that it cannot but come to its own conclusions, that all external pressures are an intrusion. Corporate religion depends upon real fellowship and is poisoned by coercion. There is room for authority, but the right of any authority to speak must itself be recognized ultimately by the persons to whom it speaks. All forms of enforced uniformity, if they succeed, do so at the cost of insincerity. The pressure upon conscience to make men do or say what those in authority wish has been a violation of souls.

2. It follows that Christian love implies care for the conditions of the spiritual growth of others. To tempt them to be insincere is to sin against them. This kind of respect for the other person does not preclude repudiation of his ideas and purposes. But when such repudiation is necessary it is important to win the other person so that he sees from his own center the error of his thought. There are serious problems here. One is the prevention of the adherents of an antisocial creed from corrupting the community. The other is the way in which the stage is set to encourage children to grow up into one positive religious faith rather than another. Whatever may be done in detail in regard to those problems, the importance of this respect for the inner integrity of the other person remains.

3. A Protestant basis for religious liberty which is difficult for those who have the Catholic conception of absoluteness in relation to ecclesiastical decisions and to the formulation of dogma is humility in regard to the way in which one holds the truth. Where this is full

skepticism, it is not a Christian position at all. But the Christian conception of the sin and the finiteness of all men before God gives a basis for flexibility and respect for others in the statement of the faith, in one's attitude toward concrete decisions. It should help men to accept the validity of this emphasis when they see the consequences to any religious institution that come from its being uncriticized or unchallenged. So limited is the grasp of any finite mind upon truth, so subject to corruption in its way of applying even right standards to concrete problems where there are vested interests of any kind, that those who may be in a central way guardians of religious truth are in need of the criticism of others, even of those who in important respects may be wrong. In those whose vision is distorted there may be a fresh insight that has been neglected too long.

There are two other supporting grounds for religious liberty that have no necessary connection with Christian faith but they are on the whole sound. One is the belief that if there is a free forum in which all ideas are criticized, it will be more difficult for error than for truth to survive. This faith in the power of truth has often involved a false confidence in human rationality. Truth does not necessarily control behavior, for human interests are often allied with error. And yet truth has cumulative power that is not given to any particular error. The second consideration is that attempts to combat error by censorship or by police measures of any kind become oppressive. They are easily exploited as shields for a greater error than the one originally opposed. They corrupt those who do the censoring and those who are censored. Even when the initial attempts at control seem to have some justification, they soon become an evil habit and an intolerable burden for the spirit.

These are grounds enough to cause us to renew our commitment to religious liberty. They do not imply that such liberty should have no limits. But they should make clear that a society is most fortunate when it can afford to tolerate every minority that does not offend against elemental decency or incite to violence. For a society to become that fortunate depends upon its having a positive faith. So, we come once again to the old problem which this study only touches—how to encourage a generation to grow up in that positive faith without which a society is not likely to have enough health to be free and yet to do this without infringing upon the liberty of minorities in the process. That is the American problem of religious liberty.

Form Criticism and Faith

PAUL S. MINEAR

Both read the Bible day and night,
But you read black where I read white.

THE aptness of Blake's couplet must strike anyone who has participated in a Bible class. From the same text, two readers make opposite deductions. Each pair of eyes has a different filter; each filter a different mesh.

Whence comes this difference in mesh? Partly from the varying expectations held at the moment of reading. And these expectations are determined in part by the forms of literature being read. Dante and Euclid create different moods of response; *Alice in Wonderland* and John Dewey communicate divergent messages. Unless our eyes adopt a filter appropriate to the form of an advertisement, a chemical formula, a love letter, an April Fool's joke, confusion of images is inevitable.

Now this is precisely what has happened in the use of the Gospels. Readers' eyes have not been adjusted to the forms of communication. There are, of course, many reasons for this failure. The three Synoptic Gospels, as separate written documents, are like nothing else in the world's library. If they were dramas or biographies or novels, analogous writings would have trained our eyes to adopt appropriate filters. But in the case of writings so unique as these, we hardly know what to look for. Moreover, each Gospel contains within itself a baffling variety of forms. And each form requires a different mood and a different response. To ignore this form is to warp the image which our minds record. Form Criticism is a method of minimizing this astigmatism by a study of forms within the Gospels, and the form of each Gospel as a whole. The impact of Form Criticism upon faith, therefore, is bound to be subtle and far-reaching. And this impact will be measured both by the observable change in one's ideas about Jesus and by the different accents which a reading of the Gospels produces. In assessing the implications of Form Criticism for faith, one must sense this changed accent as well as the changed doctrines. In assessing these changes, however, I am speaking only for myself and not for other critics. Form Criticism is a technique used by scholars of every theological persuasion; the application of the technique does not determine the theological conclusions of the scholar.

We begin by trying to summarize the attitudes of this type of criticism toward the Gospels. These attitudes may be condensed into three definitions or descriptions in turn, of the form, content, and function of the Gospels.

1. In form, a Gospel is the literary deposit of oral preaching, teaching, and worship of the early Church; an anonymous compilation of traditional materials, each unit of which constitutes a point of contact between the mission of Jesus and the life of the disciples.

2. In content, a Gospel is an expansion backward and forward of the message of salvation. The passion story is extended backward to include significant recollections of Jesus—who he was, what he said and did, why and how he died—and is extended forward to include the present sufferings of Christians and their hopes for the approaching Kingdom.

3. In function, a Gospel is a witness of believers to believers for the purpose of establishing and sustaining faith, correcting misunderstandings, guiding behavior, meeting doubt and temptation, inspiring endurance and hope. This function is fulfilled by fresh proclamation of God's word in Christ and by appropriate response of faith.

If the Gospels are writings of this sort, how may I approach them to receive their maximum meaning? What should be my expectation? For what sounds should my ear be alert? I must stand where their first readers stood, i.e., within the orbit of God's power, as that power manifests itself in Jesus the Messiah. I must stand within the Church, and use each unit according to its original intention, i.e., in situations of worship, moral decision, inward openings of the heart toward God. The central message will be communicated not in a classroom but in my own upper-room, not in theological debate but in the chapel. The teachings on almsgiving are most germane "when ye give alms"; the teaching on prayer, "when ye pray" (Matt. 6:1-15).

The situation will define the mood in which the tradition exerts its greatest power. Consider this saying, for example:

And ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake: but he that endureth to the end, the same shall be saved (Mark 13:13).

Will the meaning of this promise be more accessible to a Martin Niemöller in prison or to a successful ecclesiastic after his most popular sermon and most elegant dinner? Is the truth of this promise to be tested by historical evidence or by logical argument? Or can the promised salvation

be manifested only to one who endures the hatred of all men for His name's sake?

The three definitions given above should help in excluding false expectations and the ensuing disappointments. They should keep me from claiming for the Gospels something which their earliest readers did not claim. For instance, they did not base the validity of the tradition upon such considerations as literal infallibility, prosaic exactness, historical objectivity. Why, then, should I, unless I enjoy being deceived? This tradition exerted its maximum power over them even before it was written down. Why then should I suppose that the power depends upon the finality of the written word? Such considerations inhibit me from the false piety which turns Christian faith into verbal acceptance of a set of ideas.

I am also inhibited from stressing those aspects of Jesus' life which were quite unimportant to early Christians. They did not care to ask about his personal appearance; why, then, should I seek to create a portrait of him? They were unconcerned about his boyhood and youth, the training received at home, the psychological development; why should I be disappointed by their absence or try to supply the missing data? To them it was not vital to remember the exact chronological order of his movements, the quality of his achievement as a carpenter, his personal relations with individual men and women. Does it serve our faith to speculate about such matters?

Gospel study indicates not only the uselessness of such modern interests; it indicates their danger as well. The desire for such data, as accompaniments of hero-worship, constitutes the taproot of legend. Sentimental pictures of Jesus' home and boyhood all too easily deflect attention from the message which he preached. Eulogies of him as master psychiatrist, as philosophical genius, as the paragon of educational method—all these are deceptive substitutes for faith. Of the making of legends there is no end; every Sunday a new stock of them radiates from the pulpits. In their production the twentieth century is really more prolific than the first. In fact, the marvel about the Gospels is not the presence of legends but their rarity. But the same cannot be said of our own traditions about Jesus. The rationalist, who deplores the superstitions of the New Testament, creates his legend of a pure thinker, depending upon pure reason and sane empirical observation. The pietist, who scorns the dogmatic constructions of the early Church, pictures Jesus as a perfect pattern for prayer. And his portrait of Jesus in prayer violates

the Gospel reticence in such matters and disregards what Jesus himself said concerning complete secrecy and inwardness in prayer (Matt. 6:5-6). Form Criticism has great value, not only in detecting legends in the Synoptics, but also in catching our own propensities for idealizations.

It is thus that Form Criticism teaches us what not to expect in reading the Gospels; it also teaches us what to expect. It indicates both what was nonessential and what was essential to early Christians. And their judgment should have weight, because they were in a position, better than we, for knowing where Jesus placed his emphasis. Moreover, for his sake they risked and often lost their lives. Surely, with so much at stake, they would not wish to be easily hoodwinked. Words that have been bought and written in blood carry their own authority with them. The tradition which they preserved insists upon six things, at least, as essential:

1. Jesus lived as a man in Galilee under Herod Antipas and died in Judea under Pontius Pilate. The earliest nuclei of the various units in the Gospels assume his historical humanity. Form Criticism has helped to destroy the claims of the Christ-myth school. It helps to detect both ancient and modern forms of the heresy that denies that the Messiah came in the flesh.

2. The earliest materials point indubitably to the lowly status of this man Jesus. Born in obscure and humble surroundings, without pedigree or prestige, he began his work without displaying credentials that would support his claims to kingship. Though God had anointed him for special tasks, he came incognito, and not even his disciples could understand fully the character of his mission. He gave great offense to the wise and good men. The fulfiller of the Jewish Law came as a sinner; the Saviour of Gentiles came as a Jew. Gospel study stresses this stubborn realism of the early memories of Jesus.

What do these observations signify? Surely they suggest that impartial historical research is not adequate in itself to prove that Jesus was the Messiah. At most, it can place us in situations analogous to those of Josephus or Nicodemus. The tradition does not confront us with evidence designed to lead us to the conclusion: this man is the wisest, greatest, best man who ever lived. Tradition does not suggest that high regard for the historical Jesus is tantamount to Christian faith. In fact, the Gospels usually place such eulogies on the lips of those who reject Jesus! Gospel study may therefore seem to make faith more difficult; it will hardly make it more difficult than it was for the earliest disciples.

3. The primitive preaching by Jesus and his disciples centered in the proclamation of the Kingdom of God. Jesus and his disciples renounced everything to seek this Kingdom, which they expected as a divine gift that would bring an end to human history. This personal orientation toward the Kingdom furnished the context for the tradition as a whole. In this area of eschatological expectation, it seems to me that the work of Form critics has tended to support three conclusions. The first is the close continuity and correlation between the eschatology of Jesus and that of the early Church. The second is the interdependence of messianic-consciousness and kingdom-consciousness. The third is the interpenetration of all aspects of Jesus' teaching with this future hope and its present impact. Some scholars have felt that the teaching of Jesus could be arranged systematically under topical categories, and that the sayings listed under the caption "eschatology" could be deleted as inaccurate, or as due to Christian interpolation, without seriously affecting such categories as theology or ethics. Form Criticism tends to destroy these neat categories and their mutual independence.

What does this imply for current theology? Does it not suggest that the Gospel still has its primary relevance to the problems of history, that the work of Christ involves the destiny of men? The primitive tradition speaks of salvation from sin and death, from the demonic rulers of this age. If this tradition be taken as standard, then a nonhistorical theology is a non-Christian theology, and a non-eschatological ethic is a non-Christian ethic. If the kingdom-hope, around which the tradition clusters, be nothing more than a hoax, it is difficult to see what can be salvaged from the Gospel teachings. If it be a divine reality, however mysterious or paradoxical, it should remain definitive now as in the first century.

4. What are the implications of Form Criticism for the character of Jesus' ethic? In the first place, this study supports the initial anchorage of the teachings in eschatology. In the second place, it uncovers the pristine radicalism of Jesus' demands. Where it is possible to reconstruct the stages in the growing tradition and to unearth the earliest nucleus, that nucleus usually contains the most rigorous and absolute form of the saying. In almsgiving, men are called to give to everyone who asks; to sell all that they have and give to the poor. In obedience, the service of two masters is denounced and all efforts at compromise or balancing of obligations is repudiated. In forgiveness, the enemy must be forgiven without qualification or limit. In trust, a man must not be anxious even

for clothes or food for tomorrow. He is prohibited from judging other men, leaving all judgment in the Father's hands. Penitent, he must place himself on the level of the last, the least, and the lost.

Early Christians, of course, knew the difficulty of trying to live by such standards. They sought to modify their rigor, adding qualifications, allegorizing and spiritualizing the requirements, making exceptions to the rules, and restricting the more absolute imperatives to those who wished to be perfect. Form Criticism frequently succeeds in discovering these evasions and modifications. But in discovering them, it discovers the authentic echoes of a prophet's voice in the initial demands. For the community which modifies a stringent ideal does not create the ideal so modified. Form Criticism also helps in discovering the reason for this initial stringency: the context of crisis caused by the approach of the Kingdom.

The recovery of the radicalism and frame of reference of these ethical teachings necessarily influences their use. It inhibits me from trying to establish them as the basis of international law, as the rationale of a new economic system, as the pattern for scientific psychotherapy. I shall not expect men to accept these teachings as normative, apart from faith. As demands, they become effective only when they are heard by those who seek first the Kingdom of God and when they are clinched by the authority of the crucified Messiah. Nothing but confusion can result from advocating the adoption of these teachings as rules for social intercourse, outside their rightful context in revelation.

If such considerations diminish the "bombing range" of these demands, they increase their "pin-point" effectiveness. That they are not advanced as universal laws does not lessen their immediate and final authority for the Christian in his relation to God and the Kingdom. The Kingdom comes near to him at the point where these teachings reach their maximum reality. At that point they present man with a concrete decision which is fully possible, a decision which has ultimate import. One inference, then, which Gospel study tends to corroborate, is this: A recovery of Jesus' ethic awaits a repetition of the eschatological crisis in the consciousness of the disciple.

5. In experiencing the demands of the Kingdom at their greatest potency, early Christians experienced at the same moment the necessity of forgiveness. Confronted by the Kingdom, all men are sinners. But the Messiah comes to sinners to call them to repentance and to assure them of forgiveness. He eats with them, identifies himself with their sorrows

and joys, heals them, pronounces them justified. Gospel study accents the authenticity of these reports of Jesus' ministry among sinners.

It also accents the implications of this ministry. In associating with sinners, Jesus reversed the norms of righteousness and thus threatened the superiority of the good folk. He broke all "Jim Crow" restrictions and thus undermined the separateness of institutions. He leveled all the barriers by which men tried to externalize their invidious comparisons of wisdom, power, and virtue. Repentant sinners found his message good news; defenders of virtue, order, and propriety found his message most repulsive. But his mission to the sinners persisted in spite of danger.

6. Form Criticism does much to establish a direct connection between this work among sinners and the cross. More than this, it establishes the centrality of the cross in the tradition as a whole. It insists that the earliest preaching focused upon the passion story, and that early worship was, in some sense, a re-presentation of this story. It points out how post-Easter perspective colors the interpretation of pre-Easter events, how the teachings of Jesus are cast in a new light when seen against the background of the cross. As a result, there are very few units in the Gospel tradition that do not reflect the basic paradox; they are the words and deeds of a crucified Messiah. In them, as in the cross, may be seen the foolishness of divine wisdom, the impotence of divine power, the mortality of divine life.

Form Criticism emphasizes the early Christian awareness of the offensiveness of the cross. The closest disciples, the revered apostles, had themselves stumbled over the scandal. And they did not try to hide their blindness, but preserved frank confessions of doubts, fears, despairs, and betrayals.

Surely Form Criticism has been of influence in the contemporary reappraisal of the place of the death of Jesus in the gospel of salvation. It suggests that the cross will always be central in authentic tradition, and that it will hold this pivotal place in spite of the resistance of disciples who are afraid to face its full implications. It will always remain a stumbling block, its power to stimulate faith being matched by its power to provoke doubt. Form Criticism also underscores the fact that, in the early strands of memory, faith in the resurrection was inseparable from faith in the cross. There were tendencies, then as now, to elaborate doctrines of immortality which negated the stark reality of Calvary, blurring the actuality of crucifixion and burial. The apostles resisted such tendencies. Furthermore, the apostles knew that the meaning of

the resurrection of Jesus becomes accessible only to the disciple who dies and rises *with* Christ. For him, the radical demands of Jesus became an insistent invitation to take up his cross and follow in the Master's path.

We have outlined six common emphases in the earliest recoverable tradition about Jesus. Form Criticism serves to guide and to strengthen our expectations in this area. It makes clearer these aspects of the character of Jesus' ministry. There is another area in which the impact of this method of study has been felt, i.e., the relation between Jesus and his Church. In fact, it might be maintained that Gospel study yields much more knowledge of the Church than of Jesus.

The chasm between the Gospels and the rest of the New Testament is now seen to be largely imaginary. In the Epistles, one meets the Jesus of the Gospels; in the Gospels one meets the Christ of the Epistles. In fact, the sharp contrasts between the Jesus of history and the Christ of dogma, between the religion of Jesus and the religion about Jesus—these contrasts, once so popular, are evaporating. To be sure, it is still possible to detect points in which later faith corrupts earlier memories. But the existence of these contradictions need not condemn the later faith. They may reveal authentic struggle on the part of men caught in the vortex of conflict between the two ages. The oral tradition now imbedded in the Gospels is best seen as the distillation of the deepest experiences of the Church through two generations, a distillation that proceeds from countless, intimate interactions between the memories of Jesus and the life-needs of his disciples. To understand the intimacy of these filiations is to penetrate to new depths of meaning in the phrase: The Church is the *Body of Christ*.

This yields a new vantage point for defining and appreciating the Church. It helps to explode the prejudice that early Christians smothered the real Jesus under blankets of stuffy, sentimental superstitions, that they eagerly substituted wooden dogmas for living truths, that they spent their time in the idle construction of ivory towers and dream castles. It has been tacitly assumed that, if the tradition were left in the control of the preachers, they *must* have twisted it freely to fit their own pet notions. It has been supposed that Christian teachers would eagerly replace the pure ideals of Jesus with their own parochial moralisms. One might psychoanalyze this prejudice and ask why we are so skeptical of the integrity of preachers and teachers. But our concern, here, is to ask about the accuracy of the prejudgment. Does Form Criticism raise or lower the prestige of responsible first-generation leaders?

Some Form critics take great delight in dwelling on the parasitic growths by which early teachers adjusted the tradition to their own liking. Many examples of "hagiographic mistletoe" can be found. It would be surprising if this were not so. The complete absence of such accretions might well indicate unnatural and forced uniformity.

Granting the existence of many secondary amendments to the tradition, however, one should not overlook the evidence of stubborn faithfulness to the essence of the Gospel. Form Criticism reveals an amazing degree of fidelity. Notice again the six aspects of Jesus' mission. Notice that to each of these six there was great resistance in the early Church. It was in the face of such resistance that these memories were preserved. None was designed to make faith easier, to make the ethic more palatable, to make the message more rational or more appealing to the influential classes. None had the effect of increasing the complacency, security, superiority, or social prestige of the Christian. Each rather had the effect of making the Christian's life more strenuous, alienating him further from this age and strengthening his ties with the coming age.

Whenever I am inclined to act superciliously toward the Church, I am reminded that it is the Church which preserved this difficult tradition by which it is itself judged. It is the Church which points to a Kingdom which destroys and fulfils every law and institution of this age. It is the Church which keeps central in its architecture and liturgy the cross. The true Church, the Church which is actually the Body of Christ, is known by its preservation of these memories.

But if the Church is known by its fidelity to the cross, the cross is known by its power to judge the Church. Whenever, then, I am tempted by sentimental or professional attachment to the Church to romanticize or idealize it, I am caught by the story of Jesus' death at the hands of *churchmen*. Whenever I am inclined to treat church membership as an external and exclusive perquisite, I remember a tradition that exalts a lonely *Jew*. When I am inclined to separate righteous men from sinners by reference to human standards, I recall the story of that initial ministry to sinners. These are signs that the cross is again revealing, in its power to judge history, its power to redeem history.

It is thus that Form Criticism helps one to see a direct continuity between the vocation of Jesus and the vocation of the Church. It begins by distinguishing several stages in the rise of Gospel tradition. In the first stage, it pictures Jesus proclaiming God's forgiveness to sinners, a vocation that leads to Golgotha. In the second stage, it analyzes the work

of the apostles who, grateful for their own salvation, proclaim God's forgiveness to sinners, a forgiveness clinched by the cross. And in this vocation, the apostles hasten toward their own martyrdom. In the third stage, the historian finds a later Church producing written documents which enshrine the *kerygma* of the apostles. But this kerygma still proclaims that the meaning of all history is focused in the vocation of One who died to save sinners. In infinitely varied situations of work and worship, the Church continues that same divine vocation.

Admittedly, there are many changes from stage to stage. But these developments all take place within the continuum of a single vocation. The gospel repeatedly sets the task for the Church; part of that task is to proclaim the gospel. Jesus lives as a Messiah whose message of judgment and forgiveness continues to create the Church; the Church, as his Body, carries on his mission by telling the story of a Kingdom that comes near through the death of its King.

In what forms shall the Church proclaim this gospel? What forms are most appropriate and adequate for the preacher and teacher? On this question the study of oral tradition has much to say, for the forms which proved so effective in the initial instance still retain their effectiveness today. Recall the chief forms found in the Gospels: parables, passion story, poetry, paradigms, proverbs, beatitudes and woes, promises and threats. Analyze the total impact when these are listened to with ears made alert by the attitude of faith. Think, for example, of the response to the parable of the Prodigal Son or the passion story. Such narratives tell of events in which the auditor is prompted to participate; they call for dramatic re-enactment. They plunge him into a situation in which God addresses him directly through the word or deed of Christ. The listener is impelled to relate himself not to the apostle or teacher, but only to the One who can forgive and save. He is confronted with the problem of his own existence in such a way that he can deal with it only in terms of decision, action, suffering. He is summoned, not to affirm a propositional truth, but to repent. The decision is not easy, but neither is it impossible. The accent falls not so much upon correct concepts of God as upon faithful response to him. Either of these two narratives communicates a mood and a message different from that of a theological discussion of the nature of God, man, sin, and redemption. The scribe knows what the first commandment is; the disciple fulfils it. Impatient onlookers want to know the date of the Kingdom's arrival, or the number of men to be saved; disciples receive the Kingdom now in humility,

eagerness, endurance, and trust. It is well for preacher or theologian constantly to check his methods by those forms of communication which in the Gospels represent the survival of the fittest. Does he kill the message of a story by reducing it to a platitudinous moral? Does he transform a paradox into an innocuous truism? Under his care, does a beatitude become a vague generalization; does a woe become a conventional expression of moral disapproval?

Form Criticism also spotlights the function of a teacher in the Church as he seeks faithfully to transmit the tradition, all the while preserving the living nexus between the historical Jesus and contemporary followers. First-century teachers were responsible without becoming slavish imitators of their predecessors. The study of almost any unit of tradition shows with what freedom teachers applied the tradition to meet emerging needs. The doctrine of literal infallibility had not yet been born. But this freedom did not give them license to accommodate the demands of Jesus to their own advantage, to exalt their own self-importance, to substitute ingenuity and novelty for fidelity, to erect their pet notions into a final norm. The tradition does not even preserve their names; nor does it defend their human authority. Disciples are not encouraged to avow loyalty to their catechists, but only to the common Master. As a result, the tradition represents the choral response of the Church to the living Christ, rather than the solos of a few individuals selected for their vocal talents.

Today, as in the first century, the Christian seeks to live "by every word which proceeds from the mouth of God" and by every deed which enacts that word. God spoke and acted in Jesus; Jesus taught in parables and worked signs. Oral tradition is the primary means by which the word of the cross is proclaimed. The memories of Jesus come to life when spoken in faith and heard in faith. These living memories constitute the most frequent point of contact between the kingdoms of the world and the Kingdom of our Lord. They provide the prime occasion for rebellion or faith. They articulate the inner bond between his historical vocation and our destiny as his servants. As a method of analysis Form Criticism is not limited to the first-century tradition. It can become a valuable means for understanding our own vocations, our failures, and the source of that power which can redeem our failures.

EDITOR'S NOTE: Based upon a lecture given before the Department of Biblical History, Wellesley College, Wellesley, Massachusetts, April, 1945.

The Roman Catholic Church in Europe

ADOLPHE KELLER

FOLLOWING the last war a slogan went around the world to the effect that from the military point of view the French had won the war, from the political the English, and from the religious the Roman Catholic Church.

What will it be now? It is, perhaps, too early to tell because chaos and destruction and the iron curtain of the Russian army, behind which nobody can as yet see clearly, have hitherto prevented full and accurate information. Nevertheless, a first impression, at least of certain aspects, is available of the impact of the war on the structure and life of the Catholic Church on the Continent. We shall present here a summary of the Church's share in the resistance against totalitarianism, her present reconstructive efforts, her theological movements, and her relationship with other churches.

I. THE IMMEDIATE EFFECT OF THE WAR ON THE CHURCH

Before the war Catholicism had four strong pillars on the Continent: Austria, Poland, Italy, and Spain. In each of these the Roman Church was the state religion, having the privileges of a ruling power codified in concordats between State and Church, and enjoying a privileged influence on the life and thought of the masses. Likewise, there were strong Catholic minorities in Belgium and Lithuania, and in Hungary even a majority. In Germany there were more than twenty million Catholics; in France, according to Roman sources, nearly nine million; and in Holland and Switzerland three to four million. Three of these bulwarks were smashed or conquered in the totalitarian attack: Poland, Austria, and Italy. In the fourth, Spain, where Rome had a unique, privileged position based on closest relations between Church and State, the Church today is sharing with the State in the loss of exterior influences and in the diminishing chances of the Franco government.

The Roman Church has therefore suffered heavy losses on the Continent, at least in the field of politics, even in those countries where she had been the dominant spiritual and political power.

In *Germany* the Catholic Church tried first to save the situation by concluding a concordat with Bavaria and with the German Reich. A concordat is in the last analysis an elastic application of the "Codex Juris Canonici" to a given political condition in certain states. In dealing with the German government the Vatican evidently had resolved beforehand not to keep its promises. The inner falsity of such a compromise necessarily led to an open conflict. It stirred up, in Nazi circles, an even more vehement enmity against the Roman Church than toward the Evangelical. Hundreds of priests were imprisoned. A series of indictments was directed against monasteries in an attempt to ruin their moral reputation. The attack of the Gestapo was aimed even at high quarters. The Pope was not spared. Cardinal Faulhaber, Metropolitan of Munich, was summoned by the secret police and it is said that while he did not refuse to go, he insisted that he be allowed to go in full episcopal attire; that he would not use the proffered waiting car but would walk through the streets of Munich; and, finally, that first he would sign a paper placing a religious ban on the diocese. Whether the story is true or not, the Gestapo gave in and the Archbishop continued to defend his Church with unusual courage.

On March 12, 1938, the day after *Austria* fell, the writer of this article was to arrive in Vienna early in the morning for a conference. He learned by the morning paper what had happened the night before—that Chancellor Schuschnigg had resigned and that Hitler's army had already entered the country. Posters in the street, signed by Cardinal Innitzer, Archbishop of Vienna, exhorted the people to "obey gladly and willingly." In a visit to His Eminency, with whom I had formerly undertaken a joint relief action for Christians in Russia, I asked him whether these words were authentic. He had just visited Hitler in the Hotel Imperial. "What could we do?" said the Archbishop, and added that he hoped that the increase of Catholics in the German State by the incorporation of Austria would strengthen the Roman Catholic Church in the Reich and thereby mitigate church persecution. The Archbishop was mistaken. A few weeks later the Nazis entered the episcopal palace and threw out of the window not only the episcopal furniture but even a priest. The Roman Church in Catholic Austria soon suffered the same shameless treatment as she had in Germany.

With the fall of *Poland* in 1939, another pillar of the Church was gone. The Nazis attacked with special fury the intellectual élite and the

churches as centers of resistance. Nearly two hundred professors of the University of Cracow were put into a concentration camp where many soon died. Later, in the Polish Academy in Rome, I saw some twenty of the survivors. Cardinal Hlond went to Rome after having suffered severe hardships. It was a bitter disappointment for the Poles when the Pope, instead of taking up the defense of the Catholic Church in Poland, tried to console the Polish delegation, admonishing them to "have patience and to wait for the sun in the springtime like the little flowers in the meadows."

In *Italy*, a country almost entirely Catholic, a favorable peace between State and Church seemed about to begin when Mussolini concluded the Lateran Treaty of 1929 with the Vatican. The latter received seventeen hundred and fifty million lire indemnity for the Italian annexation of the Church State in 1870, together with conspicuous advantages laid down in a concordat. Mussolini bowed his knees in St. Peter's Church and made peace with the Vatican. But nobody was misled about this sham peace. Guerrilla warfare between State and Church, mostly in the field of education, began instantly. In spite of the Lateran Treaty and of every possible stratagem of diplomatic wisdom and adaptation, the latent conflict exploded frequently. But the Church could afford to wait. While she went along with the nation in the war against Abyssinia, in other ways she refused to bow to the system.

The Lateran Treaty of 1929 between the Vatican and Mussolini is provoking fresh discussion today. It seems doubtful whether the Concordat of 1929 will be approved by the constituent assembly. It is rumored that religious liberty will be declared and the former legal status of the Roman Church as the sole official state religion will be abolished.

Spain as a Roman Catholic state is of special interest. If ever the Church had an opportunity to make a political, social, and educational experiment, Spain could have been such a laboratory. The Revolution of 1931, the burning of churches and confessional schools, and the persecution of monks and nuns show that such an experiment had failed. In spite of the Church's charitable activities, the people held her responsible for her failures. The Spanish élite, who started the Revolution, were composed partly of Erasmians like Fernando de los Rios, Minister of Justice, now in America, and Luis Zulueta Escolano, Minister of Foreign Affairs and later Ambassador to the Vatican, who were not hostile to the Church as such. The book *Oracion di un Incredulo*, by Luis Zulueta Escolano,

showed that a Spanish revolutionary of this intellectual élite could be an anti-Jesuit or an anticlerical and at the same time have a deeply religious spirit, a love for Christ, and even a desire for an unpolitical Roman Catholic Church. President Azaña himself had translated George Borrow's *The Bible in Spain*. But this heritage of a liberal Catholic spirit was not recognized by the Jacobins of the Revolution nor has it been, since 1936, by the Franco reaction. Rather, the old intolerant and reactionary spirit of revenge and injustice was restored. This has been indicted with utmost vehemence by the French writer Georges Bernanos, who lived in Majorca and observed what Roman hatred and revenge against the revolutionary movement of liberation could be. During the Civil War, under Franco, the Roman Church regained many of her lost positions and her political influence, but what she gained in Spain she lost in international opinion because she had failed in her opportunity to become a power for peace and reconciliation. It is worth some attention that even Catholic leaders like Professor Lorenz in the "Aufbau" complain of the too-close union between Franco's political dictatorship and the old reactionary Spanish clericalism. The dictator abused the Church, says Lorenz, and bought her help by the grant of privileges preventing her from fulfilling her true spiritual task in Bible work, preaching, educational and social reform.

France, the oldest daughter of the Church, was a "prodigal child" who had left the Church during the anticlerical legislation of 1905. One effect of the present war has been that the Church has regained to a great extent her place in the heart and sympathy of the people and in the favor of the government. The French nation discovered the patriotism of the clergy when it was tested in the war and the moral values of the churches as seen in the spirit of resistance stimulated by both Roman and Protestant churches under German occupation. Certainly the Church was an inspiring force in the resistance movement. She came out of the war as a renewed moral and educational power with a tremendous gain of confidence. The new place of the Roman Church in the life of the nation may be seen by the position officially granted to her by Pétain and Weygand, and later De Gaulle, all of whom are faithful members of the Church. She had learned that the way to the heart of the nation is not through clericalism, nor hierarchial claims, nor confessional intolerance but rather through a spirit of brotherhood, of social reform, of humble service, and national union. At any rate, the people saw in Cardinals

Vernier and Gerlier, as well as in Pastor Boegner, spiritual leaders who had resisted the temptation of collaboration with the enemy and had maintained some of the best valiant traditions of the French spirit.

In most of these Catholic countries, as also in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the political downfall had, except for France, an immediate religious repercussion in church life. The Church, sharing closely in the political life of the nation, could hardly escape the loss of prestige, of influence, and of liberty which the states as such had to undergo. It did not increase the prestige of the Roman Church in the public opinion of the Continent and the world that several of the strongest Catholic states succumbed to the German assault, that the oppressing dictators were of Roman Catholic descent, or that the Church through leaders like Cardinal Innitzer and Archbishop Groeber, not to speak of the Concordat, was able at least in the beginning to reconcile ecclesiastical tradition and political adaptation. It did not look as if the Church would win this war.

2. THE CHURCH AND RESISTANCE

When the first shock of the attack on the Continent had passed, and calm thinking enabled one to see through the defeatism of the Munich period and the temptation to make peace with a most ruthless enemy of the Church, a reawakening of the spirit of Christian liberty took place in the Roman as well as in the Protestant Church. Prophets of resistance arose. In the aggressor country itself men like Pastor Niemöller and Karl Barth, then a professor in Germany, and Roman Catholic bishops like Count Preysing, Cardinal Faulhaber, and Bishop von Galen prepared the spiritual and theological weapons for a growing movement against tyranny, race hatred, violence, injustice, and the intolerable pride of a dominating master nation. The spirit of modern paganism, secularism, and racism had been fostered by such teachers of a ruthless will for power as Nietzsche, Lagarde, Müller van den Brook, Treitschke, and Rosenberg. The defenders of human liberty, of law and justice, and the true advocates of fundamental values of human society were found more often in the Church, Catholic or Evangelical, than in the universities. Einstein stressed this in a conversation I had with him in Princeton when he said that he, the Jew, had to admit that it was not the universities but the Christian churches which were the true defenders of liberty of mind and conscience.

This resistance movement did not start as a popular mass movement

or an open revolution, but as a reshaping of the old Christian message and its ideals of liberty, justice, fellowship, and the rights of human personality. The origin of the resistance was, on the Evangelical side, in confessions of faith promulgated by the Synods of Barmen, Dahlem, and Oeynhausen, which stated vigorously that for the Christian Church there was no other Führer than Jesus Christ, no other sovereignty than that of God, and that there could be no compromise with anti-Semitism and race pride. Thinkers and leaders of the Catholic Church like Adam, Pribilla, Guardini, Przywara, Grosche, and Mausbach returned to the great Catholic doctrines of the creation and redemption. God had made man according to his image—free, just, and to serve mankind—and he would not approve tyranny, the substitution of law by might, or the contempt of his eternal commands. These thinkers rediscovered in Roman dogma not only a theology but an anthropology directly opposed to the totalitarian debasement of man's divine origin and nature. Man, for these theologians, has to be the image of God. He is a humble servant and not a worshiper of usurped power. Man lives by grace, by the forgiveness of sin, and not by the fulfillment of lust for wealth or by hero worship. Again it became true that these ancient and venerable doctrines of the Church were a school of liberty, a protection of man against his own demonic forces, and a sound discipline for the eternal "rebel man." Ancient Christian theology and the rediscovery of biblical truths became a great liberating force in the political as well as in the inner life of man. The metaphysical and religious roots of this resistance reached much deeper into the eternal problems of mankind than the secular doctrine of the rights of man based on the humanistic and self-sufficient anthropology of the Encyclopedists and the Enlightenment.

The usefulness and efficacy of biblical truths in man's everyday struggle for liberty and justice have seldom become so manifest as when Christians, Catholic and Protestant, discovered in the theological arsenal of the Church the weapons for their liberation. Cardinal Faulhaber once said in a sermon: "We have not been redeemed by German blood, but by the precious blood of our Lord Jesus Christ." And the rights of man have seldom been defended with deeper arguments than when Roman Catholic and Protestant leaders like Cardinal Gerlier and Pastor Boegner in France, or Dutch, Swiss, and Norwegian churchmen of both confessions repudiated publicly the racial laws of nazism and anti-Semitism.

There was very little difference in the methods of resistance and

utterances of Catholic Church leaders in the various countries, or between Roman and Evangelical churches. Both found their defense in the Bible, the great Christian doctrines of the responsibility of man toward his Creator, the liberating effect of grace, the equality of human beings before God, the law of love as opposed to the will for power, and the conception of society as a fellowship of brethren. A comparative study of the literature of resistance in Germany, Switzerland, France, Holland, and Norway, so far as it could be published, or of official Church utterances and messages, shows a striking similarity in arguments for liberty, justice, and human dignity. Faulhaber and von Galen in Germany, Cardinal Roey in Belgium, Cardinal Vernier in France, Archbishop Hlond in Poland, the Archbishop of Westminster, and, after his political conversion, Archbishop Groeber of Freiburg, used substantially the same vocabulary as Protestants like Bishop Berggrav in Norway, Asmussen and Niemöller in Germany, Boegner and Maury in France, Kraemer in Holland, Barth and Brunner in Switzerland.

Catholic leaders in Germany have recently published vehement accusations against National Socialism. Some, like Archbishop Groeber who in 1933 spoke in favor of the new nationalism, have meanwhile gone through a real conversion. Groeber now lays the whole guilt on the system under which the Church suffered. The Church is therefore not to be accused—"she is always right, infallible." Catholics like Christopher Dawson attribute to this blameless integrity of the Church a really world-saving reconstructive force. The Evangelical Church, however, as in utterances by Bishop Wurm, or Asmussen and Bonhoefer, includes the Church in the German guilt and criticizes the Catholic attitude as a presumptuous idealization.

In a joint church conference at Stockholm the representatives of the various churches dealt with the future of the Church in Germany. Protestant delegates did not conceal their deep concern about the possibility of maintaining theological faculties and the level of religious education. On the other hand, Catholic representatives pointed with considerable self-assurance to their intact international structure, the stability of their doctrine, and their imperturbable position in defending historic Christianity.

In this resistance against a policy of violence, the oppression of the Jews and the persecution of the Church, a common front developed between Catholics and Protestants in Germany and especially in occupied

countries. The common suffering fostered mutual sympathy and also a fellowship in the moral defense of common Christian values. In Holland, France, and Sweden the Catholic hierarchy and the Evangelical leadership published more than once parallel messages and protestations against racial persecution, the deportation of workers, the suppression of law, the totalitarian educational policy, and the oppression of the churches.

In France this defense of common Christian interests led to a clandestine participation of Church leaders in the resistance movement, with Catholic priests playing an important role. In Germany, Catholic as well as Protestant theologians spread a network of secret cells of resistance over the country. The Roman Church as such may not have participated in the plot of July 20 against Hitler, but it is known that Mr. Gerstenmaier and some Catholic priests, as well as their superiors, were informed of secret plans to abolish the tyranny. At any rate, all over the Continent the Church maintained a spirit of resistance and encouraged the defense against foreign oppressors.

This even became a theological problem. Luther would hardly have approved such resistance against the leader of the State. However, Zwingli had claimed openly that a magistrate not fulfilling the will of God should be eliminated. So did Calvin who asked that the inferior magistrates should watch lest their superiors neglect to do the will of God. The Catholic Church, in principle, hardly repudiates even the murder of tyrants when they are incarnating satanic revolt against God's Kingdom.

In *Poland*, the Catholic hierarchy under Cardinal Hlond tried its utmost to gain the support of the Pope for the resistance movement. It was bitterly disappointed that the Vatican would not identify itself with the political protestation. When the history of this movement is written, it will be seen that the churches, Catholic as well as Evangelical, were the soul and inspiration for the resistance movement, and that they had warned their flocks against seduction by new nationalist ideals. Thousands gave their lives to save the remnants of Church life and worship and to feed the hungry with the celestial bread. The Church on both sides had seen that the spirit of totalitarianism was incompatible with the spirit of Christ. These were the words of the Oxford Conference and of many pastoral letters and of the Pope himself.

A special place in the resistance movement must be given to some of the best European Roman Catholic authors like Jacques Maritain, now

Ambassador of France at the Holy See, François Mauriac, Pierre Seghers, Paul Claudel, Beguin, Vercors, Bloy, Sigrid Undset, the Norwegian writer until recently in America, Pribilla, Muckermann, Hildebrandt, and others. Mauriac refers to a group in France as "*pòetes de la Résistance*"—men like Pierre Emmanuel and Arago—the hope of young France. A clandestine literature and a series of magazines and tracts were written and published in the catacombs in France and other countries. The movement brought together divergent groups, but the Roman Catholics had a distinguished share in these publications. It was "a myth and a pretext," a myth or symbol and rallying center for all who stood for liberty against tyranny, for the rights of man against the will for power, and for justice against that philosophy of violence taught by George Sorel, who had been the master of Hitler and of Mussolini.

3. THE PEACE WORK OF POPE PIUS XII

The voice of peace was not silent during the war. Of course, official peace talk or negotiations would have been considered as defeatism and repressed with utmost rigidity. But secretly the Pope, at various intervals, tried to intervene diplomatically in favor of a peace of understanding, and gave unceasing efforts to shorten the war and to suggest conditions for a just and lasting peace. Recently the Vatican published a "White Book" on the peace efforts undertaken by Pius XII. On April 10, 1940, Cardinal Maglione reported his conversation with Ambassador Alfieri, who was assailing the independent and defeatist attitude of the Vatican journal *Osservatore Romano*. The White Book reports also the exchange of letters between the Pope and Mussolini. The Duce had succumbed to the philosophy of success, and was supporting the campaign against Belgium, Holland, and Luxemburg. The Pope sent a message to each of the suppressed countries, witnessing to their liberty and praying to God for their restitution. In a protest to Minister Alfieri against a policy of violence the Pope said that he would not be afraid if, as a result, he "would have to go to a concentration camp."

In a special encyclical letter, "With Burning Sorrow," the Pope, then Pius XI, leveled a vigorous attack against National Socialism as an "arrogant apostasy from Jesus Christ, the denial of his doctrine and his work of redemption, the cult of violence, the idolatry of race and blood, the overthrow of human liberty and dignity." This vehement expression illustrates the radical opposition of the Church against National Socialism

in spite of the concluded Concordat. The Concordat of 1930, negotiated first with individual German States and then with the central Government, gave, in the mind of the Pope, a measure of protection to Catholics in Germany—a “juridical basis for their defense.” It was not meant to be an approval of Nazi ideology. And when the Concordat was not kept by those in power the Holy See multiplied its protestations to the authorities in Germany. But the special hostility of the Nazis against the Church did not diminish. The persecution of the clergy continued. Pius XII spoke of 2,800 Polish clergy imprisoned in concentration camps. In the summer of 1941, 840 German-speaking ministers were counted in Dachau of whom only 45 were Protestant. Similar persecution was suffered by Catholic priests in occupied countries. In Slovenia and Croatia Bishop Stepinac barely escaped the concentration camp. The Pope often complained of the frustration of his efforts to protect his flock from the most ruthless attack on the Christian Church in modern times.

Because the Vatican had assumed an attitude of neutrality in the war, it was extremely delicate for the Pope to come out with an open protestation against one or another of the belligerent nations. Pius XII in his manifestations and private utterances left no doubt that he could not approve a nation or its leaders who found themselves in flagrant opposition to the papal encyclicals, especially the encyclical against National Socialism published under the title: *Mit brennender Sorge*. The writer was granted a private audience by Pius XII in April, 1940, when he had to deal with the Vatican concerning refugee questions. The Pope showed great concern about what the war did to the Church and said he would spare no effort to lay the foundations for a just and durable peace.

4. THE CHURCH AND RECONSTRUCTION

This brings us to the question of reconstruction and the share which the Holy See takes in this world problem. Every such effort in the Catholic Church is, of course, focused in the Vatican. The basis of peace and reconstruction can be found in the encyclicals *Rerum Novarum*, *Quadragesimo Anno*, and *Summi Episcopatus* in which the Holy See defines the attitude of the Church in regard to the world, especially toward political, international, and social problems. These leading precepts have been developed in the Christmas allocutions of the present Pope. A comparison between the encyclical letters of the Pope and the ecumenical messages from Stockholm, Oxford, and Tambaram reveals a similarity

of propositions and practical aims regarding peace and reconstruction. Differences exist but more in the underlying assumptions than in the immediate practical claims.

The critical and negative attitude of the Vatican found expression in what the Pope said against communism, National Socialism, capitalism, and revolution. The positive side of these utterances is concerned with the eternal principles of liberty, justice, and human rights based on natural law. These principles are so much the common heritage of the whole Christian Church that an English statement signed by the leaders of both churches combined the five papal conditions for a just peace with five points pronounced by British church leaders—an impressive ecumenical document of far-reaching purport.

These papal points deal in detail with economic and social problems, with the sufferings of the proletariat and social reform, and with the Christian moral basis underlying such reform. They recognize private property and repudiate a social order built on a revolutionary state socialism. On the other hand, they lay down the eternal principles governing the responsibility of capital toward labor. Private property for the Pope is an element of order and human dignity. Social responsibility for property, however, is a claim of the Christian conscience.

Pius XII suggested in his allocution of 1939 that an international organization would be indispensable for the reconstruction of peace and a new world order. He frequently has supported the efforts made at international conferences to build up a new fellowship of nations based on justice and liberty. These utterances have gone so far as to acknowledge that the principles of democracy and religious liberty are necessary for a new life of the nations. This is a new note in papal allocutions suggesting that even the Roman Church, in spite of her conservatism, is adapting herself to the claims of the modern world.

It goes without saying that the Roman Church in the various countries will follow the position taken by the Vatican. But a vigorous reconstructive effort has hardly begun. The nations of Europe are still menaced by famine and epidemics and lack of housing. The tremendous task of building up new political, social, and economic systems will necessitate a much more comprehensive co-operation of all groups, political and religious, than ever before. Already we see opportunities for co-operation between Catholics and Protestants which open new horizons. Common need, rather than theological discussion, is bringing this about.

We may, however, anticipate that separate confessional aims will become manifest as soon as the material basis for a common life is laid.

Political reconstruction will come later, and in this there is no doubt but that Catholic political programs will be prepared for the peace conferences. This Roman policy will include restitution of great Catholic states like Poland and Austria. One hears of political maneuvers designed to establish a great Catholic Danubian state, with Bavaria, Austria, perhaps parts of Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

In *Belgium* the Roman political parties are opposed to the forced abdication of the King. An alliance between a monarchy and the Church has always been easier than that with a democracy of a socialist type, although Rome pretends to have made its peace with the democratic ideal.

The political future of the great *Latin Countries*, so far as Roman influences may go, is still uncertain. The communist forces in France and Spain are ancient enemies of any form of clericalism. We may not expect that Catholic influences around the headquarters of De Gaulle with its Roman sympathies will reach very deeply into the masses. The trial of Marshal Pétain hit the conservative element which had tried to save the Church and bourgeoisie, capital and the "Two Hundred Families" by an alliance with the enemy in order to escape the revolutionary communist forces in the country. *Spain* may reintroduce the monarchy which would be to the advantage of the Roman Church. *Italy* may become a republic with anticlerical influences if the great moral and political influence of Pius XII does not prove to be a bulwark for the House of Savoy. Recently Catholic groups expressed themselves in favor of an Italian republic. The Roman policy does not have a unified character in regard to the question of the form of the State. This can be seen in *Belgium* where the Catholic party is supporting the King while in Italy Catholic groups are now favoring the republic.

From a social point of view, the Catholic Church is advocating a move toward the left with a warning not to fall into communism or socialism, but to develop a program with a Christian spirit. The former socialistic Catholic parties, Marc Sangnier's Sillon in France and Don Sturzo's popular party in Italy, did not find grace in the eyes of the Vatican and were dissolved. It seems that the Pope is inclined to give strong support to "Catholic Action" with its comprehensive program of political influence and social reform, but under the secure guidance of the Roman episcopate.

5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ROMAN CHURCH AND PROTESTANTISM

The climate of Roman Catholic and Protestant relations is evidently changing. For four hundred years a conflict continued. At times, as in Germany under Wessenberg, it took milder forms, but often it broke out in religious wars and persecutions to sharpen ever and again passionate controversies and mutual attacks. Each church answered with a resolute "No!" when tentative efforts for mutual understanding of collaboration were proposed.

The last milestone in these discussions was the encyclical *Mortalium Animos* which was an answer to the ecumenical movement and the message of the Stockholm Conference. Failure to co-operate is also seen in the exclusion of Protestants from the British "Sword of the Spirit" movement, where the hierarchy has reserved the leading posts in the committee for Roman Catholics. On the Protestant side similar refusals to co-operate may be seen in the British slogan "No Popery!" and on the Continent in ultra-confessional manifestations, in polemic publications like the Swiss *Protestant* and the German *Evangelischer Bund*, and organizations like the Evangelical Alliance.

The nature of these relations varies from country to country. Nobody expects that Catholic countries like Spain, Austria, Italy, or Poland, will grant equal treatment to Protestants as long as they are considered infidels, destructive and revolutionary elements, troublemakers, and religious rebels. The religious legislation in these countries far from recognizes the principle of equality or religious liberty. The concordats grant to the Catholic Church a privileged position. The Italian Concordat of 1929 declared the Catholic religion the sole State religion. Other confessions, as Mario Piacentini shows in his book *I Culti ammessi*, are simply admitted or tolerated. An article concerning the religious conditions in Rome declared that the government was under obligation to prevent anything contrary to the sacred character of that city.

In Spain during the Revolution of 1931 the *Ley de Confesiones y Congregaciones Religiosas* declared religious liberty for the first time in Spanish history. But this was never realized, and with the counter-revolution such theoretical liberty was radically suppressed in spite of frequent protestations. Under Franco "Protestants" and "revolutionaries" were considered more or less identical, and the country was regarded as an exclusively Catholic nation.

In *Austria* the "Codex Juris Canonici," published in 1917, became more or less a part of the constitution. Corporative ideas of papal encyclicals were tentatively introduced into the constitution. For chancellors like Dollfuss and Schuschnigg, Christian meant Catholic, and according to the Bishops' Conference in Vienna in 1933, the task of Austria was to be a bulwark of the Catholic faith. It was understandable that in such homogenous states the principle *cujus regio illius religio* was for practical purposes maintained, and that even in modern times friendly relations between Catholics and Protestants have not been approved.

Better understanding was found in such countries as Germany, Holland, Sweden, Switzerland, and even France, where the Catholic Church had to live with sizeable minorities. Here intimate contacts, intermarriages, common studies, and co-operation in civic life could not be avoided. Clashes of ideas were followed by mutual discussion. Even before the war these mutual relations had improved.

This became evident, for instance, in a changing attitude of irenic-minded Catholics toward the Reformation and the Reformers. Formerly Catholic books on the Reformation or on Luther, like those of Denifle and Grisar, revealed a violent opposition, hatred, and denigration. More recently the German Catholic historian, Professor Lortsch, made a notable effort to do justice to the religious motives of the Reformation and to find a new understanding of Luther. In the Rhineland it became possible to form joint councils of Catholics and Protestants to solve interconfessional conflicts.

In Switzerland the President of the Federal University arranged a public meeting on confessional peace for Bishop Besson and the writer in which each representative, without concealing his own conviction, tried to explore avenues for mutual understanding between the churches. Bishop Besson stressed prayer, the practice of charity, and a certain co-operation in practical work.

In Sweden the churches exchanged friendly greetings on certain occasions, and in France Cardinal Gerlier and Pastor Boegner often signed their names to common statements or messages of general public interest.

The Vatican seemed to employ new methods for a better mutual approach. The Pope, in one of his books, speaks of "*fratelli separati*," and in his book *Discorsi e Panegyrici* which deals mostly with theologians of the Counter Reformation like Borromeo, Loyola, and Canisius, there is not one unkind word against the Reformation. Pius XII calls the Reformation "*una bufera*"—a tempest. That it was.

Specific irenic groups in the Roman Church like the monks of Amay in Belgium or men like P. Pribilla, the editor of *Stimmen der Zeit*, or Father Congar in France, or J. Maritain, the Ambassador at the Vatican, have frequent contacts with Evangelical circles, and co-operation in social encyclicals and in communal and social work is common, especially in countries with mixed population.

This should not be interpreted as a beginning of interconfessional brotherhoods. The Jesuits still support an anti-Protestant policy. In Switzerland they are forbidden to settle down permanently or to teach, but this constitutional article is not closely observed and a certain impatience with infractions has again become manifest in frequent protestations. This is especially true where Catholicism is stirring up confessional antagonism.

Three separate phases in the relations between the Roman and the Protestant churches may be mentioned: (1) In joint social and communal activity co-operation has developed rapidly since the war, especially in Germany. (2) In the field of worship and the inner religious life of prayer and devotion Rome shows much freedom in rituals. The "Octave Movement" for prayer and the devotional retreats in monasteries like Maria Laach, Beuron, or Feldkirch are often followed by Protestants. (3) In the area of doctrine, the historic intransigence remains unchanged. The points of theological controversy, however, between Protestants and Catholics have changed. The controversy has taken even sharper forms, especially in Switzerland, since Professor Leenhardt and the Reverend Baroni examined the historic attitudes of Rome toward the Evangelical Church as expressed by the famous theologian, Bellarmine, and the Council of Trent. These scholars show the deep differences between Protestants and Catholics, especially in regard to attitudes toward the Bible and grace. It must be said, however, that Pius XII has inaugurated a new Bible movement to bring the Bible nearer to the people. He has recommended to Catholic scholars biblical studies based on the Vulgate and the original Greek texts.

The present theological controversy is largely concerned with the questions of natural theology and the conception of man in the image of God according to the "*analogia entis*" in St. Thomas and Guardini. Protestant theology, especially that of the Barthians, is strongly opposed to any attempt to interpret grace as a natural process—*gratia non tollit naturam sed perfecit*. It does not hesitate to give the name of "Anti-christ" to any theology which allows a natural imminent creative process

and does not expect redemption exclusively from Christ. Another point of controversy is the nature of the Church where Catholic theology maintains a sacramental interpretation and a hierarchical organization. Protestant theology places the Church like individual man under sin and repudiates any undemocratic structure in an Evangelical Church. Protestants remind Rome what is written under the dome of St. Peter's Cathedral, not simply "*Tu es Petrus*," but also "*aliquando conversus*"—"when one day thou shalt be converted, strengthen thy brethren."

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I said in the beginning that Catholic-Protestant relations have been improving. This is evident in spite of theological controversies. Both churches have been tested in the face of the cross. Both have found in common suffering and in common heroic resistance a deeper mutual understanding and a stronger willingness not to stress exclusively their dogmatical differences, but to see the great common Christian heritage and to remember that ecumenical adage, *In necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus caritas*. How far a comprehensive and interpretative Catholic theology is able to go to meet other Christian conceptions is shown in Mensching's famous book *Der Katholizismus*.¹

The theological controversy is reflected today in a suggestive and deep-reaching Roman Catholic literature. Writers like Péguy, Claudel, Mauriac, Bloy, and Maritain in France, Sigrid Undset of Norway, and Gertrud Le Fort in Germany reflect Thomistic reinterpretations of doctrine in splendid books and poetry. Such plays as Claudel's *Soulier de satin* or *Annonce faite à Marie* are theological controversy in literary form.

It has become apparent that Protestants and Catholics have a common heritage. Their deepest dissensions are not seen in such superficial controversies as about saints, rituals, or even the spiritual leadership and primacy of the Bishop of Rome, or the hierarchical structure, but rather in those eternal controversial questions which have ever divided men and Christians. Can the finite hold and express the Infinite? Is grace the crowning of a natural and educational process that begins with divine creation, or is it an exclusive and personal act of God's unique gift and mercy imputed by Jesus Christ or infused by the sacrament to sinful men? Can fallen man co-operate with this grace or is it the sole gift of the merciful God? Is the Church the good and perfect society, or does she also stand in need of God's pardon for her manifold shortcomings?

¹ *Der Katholizismus*. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1937.

It is most impressive that today such discussions find an audience in the theater as well as in the Church. They penetrate thus into secular circles which the sermon cannot reach.

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The relationship of the Roman Church to the *Eastern Orthodox Church* is all the more problematical because contacts have been interrupted by the war. The situation of the Catholic Church in Soviet Russia is a most perplexing problem. The hostility of the Soviet toward religious propaganda of all communions was directed against the Roman Church with particular acuity. Fear of political influence is evidently the main motive in this attitude. The religious policy of the Vatican is to offer the Eastern Church as much liberty in ritual as she desires, but to be intransigent in regard to jurisdiction and doctrine. Likewise Catholic policy has been to encourage numerous "bridge-churches" between Rome and Byzantium—Uniat churches. These have existed in many Orthodox countries (especially since 1592 in the Ukraine) and they combine Orthodox ritual and church custom, such as marriage of priests, with Roman dogma and the supremacy of the Pope. The Eastern Church looks with great suspicion on this Roman proselytizing activity within their sphere. The fact that the ecumenical movement repudiates such proselyting, quite apart from certain denominational missionary activities of single Protestant bodies, may account for the reason why the Eastern Church prefers relations with the ecumenical movement to those with Rome from which it differs less in respect to dogma. An Orthodox patriarch like Myron Christea of Roumania, however, is always conscious of the historic relationship between Rome and Byzantium. The present Russian Patriarch, who is rapidly becoming a dangerous rival to the ecumenical Patriarch, may stress the existing differences more strongly than hitherto, and espouse therewith the hostile official anti-Roman policy of the Kremlin. It has not yet become reliably known what the mission of Pater Murlemsky meant for the renewal of official diplomatic relations between Rome and Moscow. At any rate, in the *Institutum Orientale* Rome is training prospective missionaries in preparation for the advance of Catholicism in the East as soon as doors are opened. Rome has a similar agency for missions among the smaller Oriental churches in the Uniat Order of the Mechitharists in St. Lazzaro near Venice. She evidently had hoped that the conquest of Abyssinia might offer new opportunities for a missionary advance at the expense of an old Oriental church. Whether

a concordat between Rome and Moscow will become possible depends largely upon Stalin's attitude toward Western civilization and the recent change in his religious policy. At the moment it would not appear that Solov'ev's vision of a union of three church types—that of St. Peter (Roman Catholic), St. John (Orthodox Catholic), and St. Paul (Evangelical Catholic), under the leadership of the Vicar of St. Peter—has come nearer to its realization. The reconciliation between Stalin and the Russian Patriarch has strengthened visibly the self-consciousness and importance of Russian Orthodoxy and thereby the whole Eastern Church in its attitude toward Western Christianity. This has already become a new problem for the ecumenical movement.

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Much could be said about the relationship of Roman doctrine, piety, and religious spirit to modern consciousness as expressed in present-day secularism, relativism, collectivism, and scientism. The modern mind, as in the philosophy of Heidegger, is aware of our fundamental spiritual crisis and is searching for an authority for a disintegrating world. It is conceivable that the modern mind might look to the Roman Church as a last refuge, an unconquerable fortress protecting the human soul when assailed by demonic forces and despair. But the advancing spirit of a new era is directed rather toward a fuller realization of the democratic idea which is not easily combined with a religion of authority. It is more likely to be directed toward a prophetic and mystic expression of religion, toward an imminent conception of faith—a religion of the soul and the spirit, of universal love, and immediate union with God than toward a sacramentarian and institutional one. Rome is meeting these tendencies halfway by a positive attitude toward democracy and religious liberty, by its interest in the psychological aspect of the religious phenomenon, and by favoring far-reaching social reforms.

Nevertheless, for both Rome and Protestantism, the problem of how the Christian message can meet the spirit of a secularized and self-centered world is perhaps the deepest problem of the present time.

Interpreting the Time

AMOS N. WILDER

. . . . O
quiet form upon the dust, I cannot
look and yet I must. If these great patient
dyings—all these agonies
and woundbearings and bloodshed—
can teach us how to live, these
dyings were not wasted.

—Marianne Moore, "In Distrust of Merits."

IN THE poem¹ from which these lines are quoted, one which many have agreed is the greatest poem to have come out of the recent war, Miss Moore deals with the experience of our time at the only level where any significant interpretation is possible. At this depth we no longer argue about war guilt in the usual sense, though that has its place. At this depth we are not sentimental, for horror and compassion are not sentimental. At this level we are not bitter, except at ourselves. At this level we do not first of all assign responsibility, we accept it.

. . . . They're
fighting in deserts and caves, one by
one, in battalions and squadrons;
they're fighting that I
may yet recover from the disease, My
Self; some have it lightly, some will die. . . .

And the strange thing is that a meaning in the very fighting appears at this level, a positive meaning. Here where there is no longer any danger of construing the war naïvely and foolishly as a crusade or what not, it becomes possible to offer the wound-bearers and the desolate some understanding of what they have had to do and to bear.

. . . . With set jaw they are fighting,
fighting, fighting,—some we love whom we know,
some we love but know not—that
hearts may feel and not be numb.

. . . . Some
in snow, some on crags, some in quicksands,
little by little, much by much, they
are fighting, fighting, fighting, that where
there was death there may
be life.

¹ *Nevertheless*, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1944. pp. 12-14. By permission.

But of course that justification is only theirs in any full sense who enter into a like mood of horror and compassion and the same clairvoyance and candor as to our common default.

I

Is it possible, from a Christian point of view, to interpret the war, not only negatively — i.e., as a judgment — but positively? Without seeing it as a crusade can we read a positive meaning into it that can in some measure minister to the bewilderment of many and satisfy their hunger for a deeper understanding of the costs involved?

"How is it that ye know not how to interpret the time?" Jesus had in mind both a negative and a positive interpretation of his time. He saw judgment at work and at hand, but he also saw redemption at work and at hand. But the approved interpretation of our time in much liberal Protestantism is largely negative. We see judgment but we shrink from affirming any creative aspect in present events. It is true that Jesus had in view quite a different kind of situation. But whatever the forms of evil in his day, he saw more than judgment at work.

Religious leaders have had good reason to suspect any positive interpretation of the war. They properly avoided any suspicion of construing the war in a romantic fashion. But they leaned over backward and left men with a pitifully meager message in their bewilderment and desperation. It is not to be wondered at that the average man, whether in or out of uniform, turned to secular sources for his best understanding of whatever meaning was to be found in the events of the day.

It is one thing to diagnose the time and another thing really to interpret it. Many people today can say that the times are out of joint, or even say, "thou ailest here and here." But to interpret the time is to say *why* things are as they are, to see the meaning of events, tragic or otherwise, and to show whither events tend—indeed, to declare the purpose underlying them.

On what grounds does anyone presume to interpret history? What kinds of evidence are relevant? What precedents, what criteria, what insights will help us avoid superficial judgments? To see the import of current history, surely it is not enough to be a historian or a sociologist, or a widely experienced diplomat or political scientist. The realism derived from these studies and contacts is essential, but it is notorious what contradictory conclusions are reached by such experts even when they

assess the same data. Some further wisdom is necessary, and it is to the insights of religion, particularly of those religions that have been uniquely concerned with history, that we must go for it.

One could suggest in order a progressive series of disciplines or wisdoms leading to greater and greater precision and adequacy in this undertaking. It could be put this way. If we wish to grasp the full reality of, say, Middletown (or, in the large, our Western culture) we begin with the sociologist. We progress one step further in our understanding of Middletown (and *pari passu* of Western culture) when we turn to the novelists, the serious novelists, that is, who have evoked that further dimension of its life which the novel can compass. We progress a step further with the poets, particularly with the "modern" poets who have been initiated into the subtler forces and cultural maladies of the time. Poets have a kind of antennae that others lack. They are the deep-sea divers. They are the sensitive ones. They register. Thus the sociologist says that Middletown or the Western world is sick and points to the disorder in the social forms. But when you read some of the modern poets you *know* that the society and the poets with it are sick and you can feel what the maladies are. And despite their participation in the disorder the poets have also elements of health, of reaction, of criticism. Even so we may get only diagnosis in the poets rather than interpretation. Wallace Stevens, one of our four or five best poets, and a most fastidious one, has made a shrewd diagnosis of our time. "We live," he says, "in an intricacy of new and local mythologies, political, economic, poetic, which are asserted with an ever-enlarging incoherence." This is a typical and true testimony to our disorder. But what about the meaning and purpose in this disorder? There we must take one step more and go on to the insights and heritage of religion.

In the forty-first chapter of Isaiah there is a dramatic scene where, before all the peoples, God challenges the astrologers and soothsayers of the nations to interpret the time: indeed, He challenges the pagan deities themselves in the persons of their idols to interpret events—to say "what the score is," in the modern phrase.

Let them bring forth, and declare unto us what shall happen: declare ye the former things, what they are, that we may consider them and know the latter end of them; or show us things to come.

There follows a great silence. The idols cannot interpret the time. And then God pours scorn upon them.

Behold, ye are of nothing, and your work is of naught.

It is so today. There have been many who have attempted from inadequate insights and with poor success to interpret contemporary history. We have had the culture-historians: the Spenglers and the Paretos. There has been "the wave of the future" school. The Marxists and the Fascists have predicted the course of civilization. And closer to us have been various democratic and liberal analyses and hopes. Among religious groups various anticipations have until now been confounded, whether of the adventists or the utopians. Many such assessments of the course of events have largely gone astray. Their sponsors have not known man well enough. And they have not known God well enough. Some have looked for peace where there is no peace and have found themselves confronted by a strange God who cries out, "I will overturn, overturn, overturn!" And others have announced utter downfall and disintegration, only to hear God exclaim, "Behold, I create a new thing."

Despite all the difficulties and the presumption of the undertaking we shall offer an interpretation of the time and an interpretation of the war from what we understand to be a Christian point of view. It is not so presumptuous as it may appear because we shall base it not on our own insights or the conflicting insights of modern culture-study, first of all, but on the insights of the Jewish-Christian faith. For this faith is the only one—and one can say it fairly—that has been seriously interested in history.

One enters upon this subject, of course, with some reluctance, remembering the inconclusive controversies during the earlier stages of the war over the Christian's relation to it. Christian readers and congregations heard more than they wanted to about some of these matters: the question of pacifism, the problem of the conscientious objectors, the rights and wrongs of this particular war. And then there is the memory we have of all the foolish things that were said by churchmen during the earlier war.

Thus a kind of impasse was reached some years ago in Christian thinking about war and many Christian preachers gave up wrestling with the issues in any fundamental way. It was enough to further remedial agencies of all types, to fix attention on the making of peace, to offer a pastoral ministry to those who bore the greater costs, and to recur to the theme of the war as a judgment of God upon a "secular" or a "pagan" age, though this last theme was not particularly well calculated to hearten

and clarify the bereaved or the victims, whether civilian or military. But liberal Protestantism cannot maintain a conspiracy of silence about war or treat it as a taboo topic, whatever the fear of saying the wrong thing. Great branches of the Church, the Catholic, the Orthodox, the Anglican, many sections of the Reformed or Calvinist churches, and the larger part of the traditional and fundamentalist bodies in our country, have had no hesitation in putting a positive construction on the action of the Allied nations in their struggle against the Axis. Our very scruples and differences at this point are deprived of half their force if we evade the issue or lodge in a purely negative interpretation. And even if we fix on this thesis of judgment, what distinction do we make? Are all peoples equally responsible? Are any of the countless sacrifices vicarious? What ethical and religious value—is there none?—is assigned to those aspects of our resistance and our armed action that proceed out of scrupulous and chastened and public-spirited motives?

We cannot always evade these issues. They must not be left as too dangerous to touch. They mean too much, both to ourselves and our neighbors. If the Church, if the pulpit, is supposed to offer guidance in the moral life and in the understanding of God it must be vocal and it must be frank in these matters. Why should the man in the pew and the man in the street be turned over to the columnist and the voices of the crowd for his philosophy?

We propose in what follows to offer an interpretation of the time and of the war, but to offer it in no dogmatic or controversial spirit. We realize how delicate the issues are and how sensitive many consciences are with regard to them, and, indeed, what dangerous ground we walk on. But let this proposal be considered among others.

II

The reports that came to us from the armed forces were all much the same. If our men were asked what they were fighting for, they had no clear answer. There was no sentiment about the enterprise. There was, we are convinced, much tacit idealism, but it was baffled and inarticulate as a result of the general lack of understanding. This generation, we are told, was brought up to be skeptical of fine words. High-sounding causes are supposed to have been exposed and "debunked." In the former war we had our crusade, they will say: see what came of it. The prevalent mood has been one of little enthusiasm. One chaplain wrote

that we could have afforded to have had a little *more* sense of a cause, if it had been properly safeguarded. If a legitimate motive for the undertaking had been at hand, our men would have found the personal difficulties more manageable. The statistics as to psychoneuroses would have been less disturbing. One thing at least that we should have done in our army was to have frank discussion under good leadership as to our present world scene and America's place in it, and even as to the ethical issues raised for the individual. Such schools of citizenship and of larger understanding have had an important place in the British and the Australian forces. But the general consensus is that our men saw the war mainly or only as an ugly job that had to be cleaned up as fast as possible so that they could get home. And with such a philosophy great heroisms were accomplished. But one wonders if with such a philosophy we shall see patient continuance of sacrifices and a sense of larger responsibility now that the war is over.

The recent film *Woodrow Wilson* brought back to many of us the mood of our American participation in the first World War. There after a fashion we could see the drama of our generation re-enacted. The sentiment and the idealism—unless the reader chooses to call it the propaganda—behind our American action are vividly presented. There are many of us who have never changed our minds so far as concerns essentials with regard to Wilson's interpretation of that war. Nor were we disillusioned by what followed, save with respect to America's laying down the task it had assumed.

The present writer was in uniform and in service abroad with the French before the close of 1916, and saw service later in the ranks of one of our regular army divisions that was among the first to go to the front. And his convictions have continued that Wilson in the main was right, that that war was not fought in vain, that our friends did not die in vain. It is sometimes said that the average American soldier in the first World War was just a pawn, that he was propagandized into the war, that the ideals that were blazoned abroad were only lures and baits to mobilize innocents to the defense of vested interests and economic privilege. Evidently no action of such dimensions takes place except as a convergence of complex causes and motives. But the interpretation of that war, implicit in such books as Dos Passos' *Three Soldiers*, was far from the mark. It was an understandable protest from a generation of American youth against part of the picture. There *were* cynical economic interests, there

were munition interests, there were imperialistic motives both among ourselves and our allies, there were abuses in the military machine. But the defeatism of Dos Passos' book rose out of the shocked naïvete of an America that knew very little about the world, whose provincial perspective was limited to its own national or sectional interests, and whose rather mediocre freedoms, not to say irresponsibility, had ill-prepared it for any kind of discipline. They took the necessary limitations on personal liberty and caprice consequent upon military service as a kind of affront. And they had neither the world view nor the deeper appreciation of America's calling, in the light of which the compromising abuses of which they made so much could be seen as secondary. In any case their reaction was not typical. It is my testimony that in his heart of hearts the dough-boy of that war, "the unknown soldier"—though inarticulate about such matters—had his own tacit idealism and his own confused commitment, and it was this that had everything to do with the whole spirit of our American action and participation.

The repudiation of Woodrow Wilson, again, arose out of complex motives. There were many who were sincere in their wish to keep out of necessary compromises with the imperialisms of other peoples or to stay out of responsibilities for which they thought America was not prepared. But provincialism was the chief factor. Under Wilson a momentary realization by the nation of our place in the world had been attained, but this was not sustained. We repudiated the great impulse as the following lines indicate, written apropos of the election of 1920:

Now we indict the temper of that hour,
Now we abandon the unburied slain,
In panic at the unwonted light we cower
And stampede to our midnight ways again
While plead and clamor for that glorious morn
The suffrage of the dead and the unborn.

After that war we had disappointments, it is true. In the making of the peace we were confronted with unpleasant realities. After the intense hopes that sustained our war effort there ensued a reaction and a disenchantment. We not only recognized that we had perhaps been naïve at some points, overoptimistic or even cheated, but we lost our assurance in the fundamental validity of the faith that had been ours. But such apocalyptic visions—and the foreshortening of history that accompanies them—are not delusive. Witness the early Christians. Witness the Puritans of the time of Cromwell and Milton and our own Pilgrim

forefathers. In the costly hours of struggle we are granted these deeper assurances of ultimate attainment, and we foreshorten the process. The new world, the warless world, is, we feel, just around the corner. We are granted something of the poet's gift "to see eternity in an hour." The realism that follows—the Restoration of 1660, or the security demands of France in the twenties, or in the same period the neglect by Britain of political in favor of economic considerations, or the reassertion by America of its insularity—this realism should not have been allowed to disqualify the prior insights. And today we must sustain or repossess them.

For though the hostilities had to be renewed a second time, it is possible to accept this also without disillusionment. The fact is, our world in the twentieth century is going through costly growing pains. The readjustment that all the nations must make—among themselves and within themselves—is a major one, and an immeasurable price is being and will be paid for it. A new world is coming to birth and an old one is dying.

III

There are two verses in Isaiah, separated by many chapters, which answer to each other—and which together define our situation perfectly.

This day is a day of trouble, and of rebuke and of contumely; for the children are come to the birth, and there is not strength to bring forth.—Isa. 37:3.

Shall I bring to the birth, and not cause to bring forth? saith the Lord.—Isa. 66:9.

That is: God will not suffer his purpose to miscarry. We live in a time like that envisaged in these prophecies, when the great cause seemed to miscarry, but the prophet reminds us that there are invincible, irreversible forces working for its success.

O wait upon the ancient miracle
Ever renewed; discount the eternal boon!
Feel through these years some tide of purpose swell,
Otherwise great, now in the world's mid-noon.

These infinite tasks are portents of a Work
Afoot among us toward transcendent ends;
Behind these ruins and these hungers lurk
Strategies unsurmised and secret trends. . . .

We can, indeed, find a meaning in the cruel picture of our time—we can even find a meaning in the war—something to live by and struggle for through these trials which may continue in new forms now that the

war is over. And there is hardly anything more important for truly religious-minded men to do in the years that lie ahead now than to show the meaning of events, to interpret the time. The loads that men and women are carrying today are heavy, but what makes them cruelly heavy is the present confusion and sense of meaninglessness. And where the load comes heaviest is on those parents and wives and brothers and sisters who gave those dearest to them to war service, yet without seeing any clear meaning in the distress and sacrifice and heartbreak involved. If it is hard for us who count ourselves men of religious faith or for us who have, on the whole, more privileges and some stake in life as it is ordered, how much harder it is on the countless multitudes outside the religious institutions and on those on whom life bears more hardly at any time.

The Church and the Synagogue must give men this meaning and this hope, and they can. The Bible comes out of just such baffling historical experiences as those of our day. The prophets were men who interpreted the course of public events, especially of disasters, for their people. "Verily the Lord will not do anything except he reveal it to his servants the prophets." In the teaching of the Bible we have the clues we need to understand our times and to give warning and good courage to men.

As we have said, one side of this has been fulfilled by our religious leaders in these days. The Bible teaching as to God's judgments has been made clear. We are ready to recognize in a general way that what men sow they reap. We do not make God responsible for the war, we make men responsible. We differ as to where among men the chief responsibilities lie, but, on the whole, we are ready to take Abraham Lincoln's view expressed in his Second Inaugural Address. Lincoln saw the Civil War as in some sense an atonement for the sins of the nation, teaching us to acknowledge that "the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether." And Julia Ward Howe in "The Battle Hymn of the Republic" saw God "sifting out the hearts of men before his judgment seat." In some sense we must say all this today, not only or particularly about our own nation, but about our whole international scene.

But, as we have said, this is a negative interpretation. Is it possible to give a positive interpretation of events? There are few today who will try to work up a case for the war as a crusade. But after all, some will say, how can Christians find *anything* good in the picture, especially

in the war itself and our part in it? Can one read any meaning into what our soldiers and sailors and airmen had to do? Let us face this frankly. No one has any illusions any more as to what modern war is. We don't need to dwell on the atrocity stories. The routine of war itself is enough to envisage. And in this struggle it seems as though war had been bent on showing the whole gamut of its hideous possibilities. War in every continent, at every longitude and latitude, in every climate, in every season, on land, on sea, and in the air, in the desert, in the frozen north, in the jungle, in the swamp; amphibian warfare, trench warfare, war of movement, siege warfare or fifth-column warfare; war on civilians, biological war, war by deportation, by starvation, by atomic war.

It seems as though this war had been bent on caricaturing itself, on taking the widest variety of fantastic forms possible, on outdoing the mad imagination of a Goya or a Wiertz. Men wrestled with each other in the suffocating green hells of Malay. In subzero temperatures on the steppes of Russia they hunted each other while they were all but inanimate with the cold. The armies swept back and forth over the Sahara Desert in sandstorms and blistering heat that made living all but unendurable, let alone war. Duels that might have been described by Jules Verne were fought under water or between submarine and submarine-chaser. Engagements took place on the peaks of the Caucasus 15,000 feet above sea level or on the summit of the Apennines to which men had to drag their mortars and machine guns by ropes. What passion there is in man to motivate him to such titanic feats and to such resource and endurance! And day by day the war exhibited its countless atrocious scenes: the wounded unrescued, the life rafts that never reached the shore, the hospital ship bombed, the prisoners too weak to keep up with the line of march. And there were the scenes we dare not contemplate of the hand-to-hand conflict, the desperate grapple of foes where the animal instincts of survival were all that were left. And one need not add the by-products of war: civilian heartbreak, the irreparable harm to the children, and the legacies of all this in the years to come.

To remind ourselves more vividly of what all this means or should mean, to enter into the experience of horror and compassion which, again, is the only level at which we dare presume to interpret the time, we quote the following lines of Edith Sitwell in her poem "Still Falls the Rain (The Raids, 1940. Night and Dawn)":²

² *Street Songs*, London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1942. p. 1. By permission.

Still falls the Rain—

Dark as the world of man, black as our loss—

Blind as the nineteen hundred and forty nails

Upon the Cross.

Still falls the Rain

With a sound like the pulse of the heart that is changed
to the hammer-beat

In the Potter's Field, and the sound of the impious feet

On the Tomb:

Still falls the Rain

In the Field of Blood where the small hopes breed and
the human brain

Nurtures its greed, that worm with the brow of Cain.

Still falls the Rain

At the feet of the Starved Man hung upon the Cross.

Christ that each day, each night, nails there,

have mercy on us—

On Dives and on Lazarus:

Under the Rain the sore and the gold are as one.

It is well to look at all this, and feel all this. And yet, having done so, we can still find a meaning in the war. And not just the meaning that it is a judgment.

For one thing, some would insist that by our armed action we prevented worse things. Those who had sons and brothers in this hurricane of evil can find some meaning there. This world is a world that has to have its police. The dykes have to be maintained against the floods. Civilization has to keep the dykes in repair. It is an ungrateful task for the generation that is called on to perform it, but there it is, a hateful and dangerous task of engineering that has to be collectively brought to its issue.

These beneath the waves toil at the primeval sea-walls

Whose courses were laid against chaos.

These repair the moles erected of old against the ravining deep.

These descend where the nethermost piers of history are
building

And place their lives if need be at the foundation of all
the ages of glory to come.

No one, we have said, should look upon the war as a crusade, but some can find a meaning in it as they see our people joined with other peoples in reinforcing the levees or the break-waters against the raging floods. But of course many questions are begged by such a picture of the matter,

and many will refuse to accept it as a Christian solution. These disorders that we would check—perhaps they rise out of injustice and have right on their side. These dykes that we erect against them—are they not perhaps just the defenses of our own privilege, too easily identified with a true order? And is our common policing so clearly restrictive in character, or does it inevitably take on the character of aggrandizement? Such questions every soldier and every citizen must answer for himself and every nation for itself. Despite the ambiguities much can be said for this whole view of these wars. There is little police action of any kind that is wholly free from unworthy motives. And in areas where no legal or juridical institutions obtain, the beginnings of law must have some features of the arbitrary and the suspect.

IV

But there is a deeper view of the matter. And this is one that recognizes how universally involved all the nations are in the evils of our times and their causes. From this point of view we do not make such sharp distinctions between the guilty and the guiltless. No doubt there are villains in the world, but the more deeply we enter into the situation the less inclined we are to separate ourselves or our nation, to whitewash ourselves or our nation. When our sons or our daughters go wrong it is not their fault alone; it is our fault too. When our brothers or our friends go wrong, we are in part to blame. We cannot dissociate ourselves from the madnesses or neuroses of our brother nations! From this point of view I say let us stop judging and decide to look at the whole picture and ask what we can learn from it.

Single and complex,
 Unique and multiple
 Is the life of man
 And the intertwined lives of all men.
 Therefore I say that there's no height, no depth,
 Achieved or failed but I have shared in its doing.
 Ay, there's no outcast, no lost and broken creature,
 Whose shame I feel not.
 . . . where falls the lowest, meanest wretch,
 There fall I.^a

Now when we look at things at this deeper level we find a new meaning in the war and in our times generally. We begin to see that

^a John Bunker, *Revolt*, New York: Campion Books, Ltd., 1940. p. 20. By permission.

the great struggle of our age was not that between the Axis powers and the United Nations. No, the deeper struggle is that between an old world that is dying, and a new world that is coming to birth by the power of God. "*Shall I bring to the birth, and not cause to bring forth? saith the Lord*"—that is, the new world is being brought to birth by God himself—and nothing can stop it. God has put hungers and dreams into the hearts of the peoples, and they are growing ripe for fulfillment in our time—and God says there shall be no miscarriage! And this new world overlaps both sides in the war, just as the old one does. The World War is only a symptom of a deeper crisis. The fact is, there is a common impulse among the peoples of the world, a reaching out toward more liberty and a more abundant life. It takes different forms in different lands, and it finds its foes in every land. It takes a different form in the lands of our enemies. There it has been harnessed and hoodwinked by the dictators, and spends its force in a misguided nationalism or National Socialism. But even there, it will become more aware of itself, more intelligent about its true goals and its true leaders, as it casts off its false ones. Similarly with regard to communism in its various expressions. Its underlying energies can be distinguished from the forms and dogmas in which it has been channeled. Thus the late Serge Bulgakoff, Dean of the Russian Academy in Paris, declared: "Communism has arisen on the basis of a search for the truth of life, for the Kingdom of God on earth, with an apocalyptic tenseness of faith in the future, and a sincere desire to realize it, and we may hope that this will for the future is not displeasing to God, and will not be turned to shame."⁴

The fact is, that even in the democracies this impulse of the people is inarticulate and confused. Yet it is a mighty movement and it has been finding itself in the war. John Bunker describes it:

There is a vast rumbling,
A sound as of mighty upheaval:

.
Subterranean tremors
As of a buried giant stirring his limbs
Slowly, powerfully.

Deep, deep is the commotion,
Elemental agony
Of earthquake and mountainous wreckage
Seeking new forms, new combinations:

⁴ Cited in *Christian News-Letter*, No. 232, p. 2, April 18, 1945.

A roar as of many waters
Laying waste and cleansing;
A riotous onslaught of fire
Consuming and purifying.⁵

In the democracies this blind impulse, we say, is more aware of itself; but here too it is thwarted and blind. Indeed, the conflict between the old world and the new is fierce right here, in our cities, in our parties, in our national economy, and in our world outlook.

What were the youth of our homes and our churches struggling for? What did our fathers and sons and brothers die for? Not just to keep the dykes up against the anarchy of Nazism. No—for a much greater goal—and this one more positive—namely, to set forward the birth of the new age. And each according to his convictions: the soldier in his way, the civilian on the home front in his, and the conscientious objector in his! And fortunate were they if they understood this, and if they supported their tasks and their lots, not with cynicism and not with a mere sense of being helpless pawns, but with a purpose to bear their parts in the throes that will usher in the new day, and with the determination that these costs and efforts shall not be wasted or turned aside but shall have their full fruition in a new world. For we are the witnesses in our day of the birth pangs of a new order that is a new order, indeed. It needs to come in the totalitarian states. And our overthrow of their present masters hastens it. And it needs to come in the Allied Nations and in the democracies. It needs to come here in our midst. And the tragedies of this apocalyptic hour—the costs at the front and the costs in the homes of our towns and cities—the public disasters and the private anguish—the convulsions of peoples and the endurances of individuals—all this *can* be the birth pangs of the Peoples' Peace. But those who best serve it will be those who battled not for an Allied victory first of all, though this may well have been necessary—but for the new age of all the peoples. Their struggle is a struggle that continues whether in peace or war. It will go on now that victory is attained. It is a struggle against any and all kinds of pride and callousness, whether in others or in ourselves. And we cannot be good soldiers in this cause until we have scoured and scored our own hearts, as Miss Moore implies in her last stanza:

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 2.

Hate-hardened heart, O heart of iron,
 iron is iron till it is rust.
 There never was a war that was
 not inward; I must
 fight till I have conquered in myself what
 causes war, but I would not believe it. . . .

Volunteering for this larger struggle, against foes both within and without, we identify ourselves with all the best aspirations of men that have not yet been satisfied. We link ourselves up with the needy, the disfranchised, the thwarted. Again we can identify ourselves with our brothers wherever they be, in the words of John Bunker:

The hungry children of the poor, in the night I
 have heard them crying,
 And the crushed, the broken ones, their groans
 have come to me through the dark.
 Therefore I cannot say to the famished thief,
 "Take not."

Nor to him maddened with injustice, "Refrain."

The Negro in the slums, in the hovels, in the jails,
 Hoboing, drinking, singing, fighting, laboring,
 Beaten, starved, degraded, slaughtered—
 I have felt his anguish, I have tasted his bitterness.

And you, O Jews!

Eternal wanderers, eternal seekers and dreamers,
 Was it not said of you, "I will bless them that bless
 you"?

And did not the word go forth, "And him that
 curseth you will I curse"?

What pain is like to your pain and what grief is like
 to your grief?

Yet I too, being human, belong to your fellowship
 of sorrow

And I too, being man, have trodden your desolate
 path—

O Jews, O tortured ones, O brothers of Christ!

*Whom God chose, where is he that shall
 reject them?*

Whom Christ forgave, who is he shall condemn?

Tell me not of distance, speak not the word "stranger."

The shackled slave on the sandy track to Morocco,
 he is my brother,

And the ravished Chinese maiden in the valley of the
 Yangtze, she is my sister.

In the salt mines of Siberia my kinsfolk labor,

And blood of my house runs in the veins of the
 Mexican peon.
 Before such kinship what matters the count of miles
 And what barrier can hold apart sons of the one Father?
 (Am I peculiar? is my heart unique?
 What I feel do not all men feel
 In their blood, in their soul's secret places?) *

"Did not he that made me in the womb, make him?"

These are the kinds of things this war was about. These are the kinds of things that underlie the crisis of our whole period. But these are things with which God is concerned. The coming of a new day in which answers are given to these needs is what history is about. It is what God intends. We can hear God saying today to the burdened peoples of the world as he said to Moses, "I have seen the plight of my people who are in Egypt, and I have heard their cry under their oppressors; for I know their sorrows, and I have come down to rescue them from the Egyptians." God is indeed a "God of deliverances." And it is for causes like these that He gives us strength. It is thus that we find meaning in the separations, the burdens, the anguish of these days. For us who see things in this way there will be tragedies, but they will not be meaningless tragedies. There will be grief, but there will not be bitterness. There will be bewilderment, but not cynicism. There will be undeserved suffering, but no cry for vengeance.

Meanwhile we shall not promise men a new world immediately. We know that the day of brotherhood may be postponed. A friend, who well over two years ago was in military service overseas, wrote to the present writer in a sober and disabused vein as to the future. We cannot expect, he said, that the Four Freedoms will be achieved after this war any more than Wilson's Fourteen Points were achieved after the last. Yet that realism is no excuse for cynicism or for a sense of futility. It merely means that after the conclusion of hostilities we shall still need devotion and sacrifice and faith to support them. It is true, the day of brotherhood may well be postponed. But that does not unsettle our confidence. At least we shall have made our vows.

This day is a day of trouble, and of rebuke, and of contumely; for the children are come to the birth, and there is not strength to bring forth.

Shall I bring to the birth and not cause to bring forth? saith the Lord.

* *Op. cit.*, pp. 21-22.

“Spiritual Letters”—A Theological Reprint

Archbishop Fénelon (1651-1715)

Considered by many to have been one of the noblest characters and talented writers of his day, Fénelon is today perhaps best remembered by the many letters which he wrote exhorting to “a pure and unselfish love for God” and Christian perfection. He combines a strong bent for mysticism with a remarkable insight into practical affairs and conditions. His felicity of expression has been rarely matched and his letters, since published in numerous editions, are treasured among the classics of Christian devotional literature. The following extracts are from his *Letters to Men*, London, 1873.

“**A**LMOST all who aim at serving God do so more or less for their own sake. They want to win, not to lose; to be comforted, not to suffer; to possess, not to be despoiled; to increase, not to diminish. Yet all the while our whole interior progress consists in losing, sacrificing, decreasing, humbling, and stripping self even of God’s own gifts, so as to be more wholly his. We are often like an invalid who feels his own pulse fifty times in the day, and wants the doctor to be perpetually ordering some fresh treatment, or telling him how much better he is. This is very much all the use that some people make of their director. They move around and round in a petty circle of easy virtues, never stepping beyond it heartily and generously; while the director (like the physician) is expected to soothe, comfort, encourage, foster delicacy and fastidiousness, only ordering little sedative treatments, which drop into mere habit and routine. Directly they are deprived of sensible grace, which is as the milk of babes, such people fancy all is lost. But this is a plain proof that they cling overmuch to means, overlooking the end, and that self is their main object. Privations are the food of strong minds: they invigorate the soul, take it out of itself, and offer it as a living sacrifice to God; but weak people are in despair at the first touch of privation. . . . They are willing to let God do what he will with them, provided always it be something great and perfect; but they have no notion of being offered as a sacrifice to be consumed by the Divine flames. They seek to live by pure faith, yet want to retain all of their own worldly wisdom; to be as children, and yet great in their own eyes. But what a mere spiritual chimera this is!

* * * * *

“Christian perfection is not the harsh, wearisome constraint which

you imagine. It requires us to belong to God with our whole heart; and when once that is the case, whatever we do for him becomes easy. They who are God's are always happy so long as they keep an undivided will, desiring only what he desires, and willing to do whatever he requires. . . .

"What God requires of us is a will no longer divided between him and any creature; a will supple in his hand, neither asking nor refusing anything; accepting all he sends unreservedly, and never seeking what he refuses under any pretext whatsoever. . . . Learn, then, to despise earthly things for God's sake. I do not say forsake them altogether; those who are already leading a good, well-regulated life need only to alter their heart's motive. They will do much the same things as before. . . . But the difference is that they will now do, in order to serve and please God, that which before they did to serve and please the world and themselves.

* * * * *

"There is but one way of loving God, which knows no bargaining with him, but accepts his very inspiration with a free and generous heart. All such as make some profession, but yet hold on to the world with one hand, run great risk of being among those lukewarm Christians of whom God says that he will 'spue them out of his mouth' (Rev. 3:6). He cannot suffer the cowardly souls which say to themselves, 'Thus far will I go, but no further.'

* * * * *

"God's ways are pleasant and satisfying to those who seek them in love. . . . The more you do for God, the more he will do for you; and every step you advance in the right road will fill your heart with fresh peace and consolation. The very perfection of which people are so much afraid, for fear it should be an irksome restraint, is only perfection insofar as it increases the will to do right. And in proportion as our work increases, weariness and tedium disappear; for one is never wearied of doing that which one likes to do. When one does an irksome thing out of strong love, that love softens the hardship, and makes one willing to suffer. One would not be relieved by any shortcoming of that love; it is rather a pleasure to sacrifice one's self to the beloved object. And so the nearer we approach to perfection, the more we are satisfied to follow that which we love. . . . It is true that this satisfaction is not always a sensible and lively one, such as we experience in worldly

pleasures; but nevertheless it is very real, and far superior to any the world can give; and that because sinners always crave that which they have not, while those who are moved by the love of God desire merely that which they have. Their peace may sometimes be dry, and even tinged with bitterness, but yet it is more grateful to the soul than the excitement of passion. It is a peace which makes a man at one with himself, a peace never broken or disturbed save by unfaithfulness. . . .

* * * * *

"To whom does St. Paul speak, do you think, when he says, 'We are fools for Christ's sake, but ye are wise in Christ' (I Cor. 4:10)? To you and to me; not to people who know not God, or are unabashed in evil ways. Yet he speaks to us by way of working out our salvation, but who nevertheless shun the folly of the cross, and seek to seem wise in the world's eyes; to us who are not alarmed at the sight of our own weakness. Where St. Paul felt himself weak we imagine ourselves strong, and in spite of good intentions, we must confess to being in contradiction to the great Apostle. . . . Let us consider the matter, and examine ourselves to see wherein we differ from God's true servants.

"Let us 'be followers of Paul, even as he was of Christ' (I Cor. 11:1). He offers himself as the follower of the highest Example. So no more concession to the world or to self, no more indulgence to passion, to the senses, or to spiritual sloth. The practice of virtue does not consist in words; we shall never reach the Kingdom of God by means of them. No, it consists in strength and courage, and violence done to self; violence whenever we need to resist the world's stream which hinders us from doing right, after having so long led us to do wrong; violence when we must needs give up something which proves that we are deluding ourselves with a false idea that we have given up all that is superfluous. . . . In short, that violence to self which results in the holy indifference of a Christian who has no will save that of his Creator; who refers the success of all undertakings to him while prosecuting them heartily himself; who works hard, but without anxiety; who delights to gaze upon God, and is not afraid of his eye; who trusts that Eye will rest on him to correct his faults, and who does not fear to trust in his mercy for the punishment of those faults. This is what I would have you and myself to be, and I pray you so to abide, that amid all the trials and worries of a worldly life you may be at peace, and thus may we hope that somewhat of the life of Christ may be seen in us."

The Church and Social Action

ANSLEY C. MOORE

THOSE who have made great contributions to the stream of moral and spiritual truth have usually discovered some basic truth, or perhaps we should say they were discovered by some truth, and they came to feel that this truth was the kernel of the gospel. It was the Incarnation for Athanasius. It was justification by faith for Luther. It was the sovereignty of God for Jonathan Edwards. For us today it is the Kingdom of God, the community of love. Walter Rauschenbusch, in *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, puts it this way: "To those whose minds live in the social gospel, the Kingdom of God is a dear truth, the marrow of the gospel. . . ."

Let it be said at once that for my part, at least, I dream of a new social order *within* history. I work for a community of love here and now. I pray with a young Christ, "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven," and I mean just that.

But what a task! Look at the mountain of social evil which, by the help and grace of God, we must tackle. Sherwood Eddy and Kirby Page in *Makers of Freedom* pointed it out twenty years ago and their picture is still an accurate one:

Economic perils due to gross inequality of privilege disgraceful housing conditions concentration of vast financial power in the hands of interlocking directorates, widespread industrial strife and violence the steady growth of class consciousness, the deliberate stimulation of new physical desires on a great scale by advertising, industrial waste, the dehumanizing effects of monotonous toil the rapid spread of materialism; international dangers arising out of the increasing destructiveness and deadliness of modern war, the growth of industrialism intensification of competition between the various nations for food, raw materials, markets and fields of investment, exaggerated and irresponsible nationalism, and militarism; racial perils due to discrimination, exploitation, lynching, and mob violence; political perils due to graft and corruption the denial of civil liberties, indifference of voters moral dangers due to crime and lawlessness, a million drug addicts, two hundred thousand prostitutes, eight million victims of venereal diseases, sordid commercialized amusements obscene literature, the deterioration of the home, the increase in divorce. . . .¹

Let us observe in passing that one of the most difficult tasks im-

¹ New York: Doran, 1926, pp. 299-300.

aginable is that of organizing a Presbyterian church for social action. You can stand *a* Presbyterian church or *the* Presbyterian Church on its collective ear by suggesting the changing of a single word in its Standards, but you can talk yourself hoarse about poverty, disease, hunger, racial injustice, and alcoholism, and the average Presbyterian church remains calm and composed. Most Presbyterian churches are like that New York woman who protested to the city government about the noise in front of her house when they were digging the tunnel for a new subway. When asked why she objected to the noise, she replied, "It has stopped my canary from singing!" Presbyterians look after their own canaries and bother little about social problems. The reason is that our constituency is largely in the upper middle classes where these problems affect us less than others.

I. THE CHURCH'S RECORD

That the Church and individual Christians often have been apathetic to social problems there is no question. W. E. Garrison in *The March of Faith* summarizes this apathy in a few short sentences:

John Wesley could simplify the rules of Christian economics to this: "Get all you can; save all you can; give all you can" An early nineteenth-century British statesman said, with unconscious humor: "Things have come to a pretty pass if religion is going to interfere with private life." Froude asserted that the characteristic impulse of the representatives of religion was "to leave the present world to men of business and the Devil." And it was after 1865 that an American theologian, prominent in the Middle West, said that "men should make money according to the laws of business and spend it according to the laws of God."²

This blindness of individual Christians and of the Church as a body, however, should not lead us into the error of thinking that the Church has done nothing about these matters.

In every generation preachers of the gospel have found patterns for preaching on social questions in the Old Testament prophets, particularly in such passages as this one in Amos, "Let justice roll down as waters and righteousness as a mighty stream." In the first century there were great social evils such as poverty, slavery, and prostitution. Upon these our Lord made no frontal attack, and he organized no pressure group looking toward their elimination. Latourette in *The First Five Centuries* discusses whether or not the apocalyptic elements in Jesus' sayings were heightened by his followers after his death, and then adds:

² New York: Harper, 1933, pp. 147, 148.

Whether present or future, long deferred or imminent, to his mind the Kingdom of God clearly had implications for social relations. The members of the Kingdom were to act towards their fellows in accordance with certain principles. Chief among these was love. . . . However, he did not directly oppose slavery or war as such, nor institute any campaign to abolish prostitution. . . . Yet from no other single individual have impulses gone out which have contributed to so many of the efforts which men have made to rid society of what they have deemed social ills.³

One would think that the early Christian communities tried to transform the Graeco-Roman world. They did nothing of the kind. They were accused of that aim at Thessalonica: "These that have turned the world upside down are come hither also." The early Christians expected a revolution but not by their own efforts. "It was to be in sudden, apocalyptic fashion by their returning Lord."

The finest summary I know of what the ancient Church (A.D. 100-311) did in the realm of social problems is found in Schaff:

Under the inspiring influence of the spotless purity of Christ's teaching and example, and aided here and there by the nobler instincts and tendencies of philosophy, the Christian Church from the beginning asserted the individual rights of man, recognized the divine image in every rational being, taught the common creation and common redemption, the destination of all for immortality and glory, raised the humble and the lowly, comforted the prisoner and captive, the stranger and the exile, proclaimed chastity as a fundamental virtue, elevated woman to dignity and equality with man, upheld the sanctity and inviolability of the marriage tie, laid the foundation of a Christian family and happy home, moderated the evils and undermined the foundations of slavery, opposed polygamy and concubinage, emancipated the children from the tyrannical control of parents, denounced the exposure of children as murder, made relentless war upon the bloody games of the arena and the circus, and the shocking indecencies of the theatre, upon cruelty and oppression and every vice, infused into a heartless and loveless world the spirit of love and brotherhood, transformed sinners into saints, frail women into heroines, and lit up the darkness of the tomb by the bright ray of unending bliss in heaven.⁴

It was in the third period of Church history (A.D. 311-590) that Christian morality began in a small way to rule civil and political life. The more enlightened heathen emperors as early as the second century began to follow principles of equity and justice. Christianity by this time was pressing for the universal rights of man and opposing the exclusive national spirit, the selfishness, and the absolutism of rulers. In many of Constantine's laws Christian teaching can be found. One historian of the period put it: "Henceforth we feel beneath the toga

³ New York: Harper, 1937. I, 52, 54.

⁴ *History of the Christian Church*, New York: Scribner, II, 385-6.

of the Roman lawgiver the warmth of a Christian heart." The influence of Christianity is plain upon the *Codex Justinianus*, 528-534, which became the universal law of the Roman Empire and the basis of the legal relations of the greater part of Europe.

When we come to the medieval age we find the Church taking certain positions regarding social questions. Says W. E. Garrison: "The medieval Church, for example, condemned usury . . . as definitely as the Church of the third century condemned war. . . . The Italian, Benvenuto da Imola, put the dilemma of the medieval Christian businessman in a nutshell when he said, 'He who takes interest goes to Hell; he who doesn't goes to the poorhouse.'"⁵ Notable achievements have been made in modern times. Whether it be individual Christians acting on the impetus from a socialized conscience, or the organized body of the Church, the results are impressive. Wilberforce's lifelong struggle against slavery led in 1833 to the abolition of the slave trade in the British Empire. When Alexander Hamilton was killed in a duel with Aaron Burr, a crusade against dueling was led in America by Eliphalet Nott and Lyman Beecher. As early as 1811 the Presbyterian General Assembly was thinking of temperance, and slavery was attacked early in the nineteenth century by the churches of America.

W. E. Garrison, in his book cited above, has an excellent chapter on "The Church Discovers the Human Race," in which he gives a rapid survey of the Church's achievement in this field in the past three quarters of a century. He mentions such notable events as Dr. Parkhurst's investigations of the connection between vice in the Bowery and New York politics and the effect of airing these findings on Madison Avenue on Sunday mornings; Jane Addams' Hull House work; Walter Rauschenbusch's teaching regarding social righteousness and corporate sins; and the effect of Charles M. Sheldon's *In His Steps*.⁶ Add to all of this the official and the unofficial pronouncements of denominational agencies and their actions to implement their social vision; add all of the efforts of the interdenominational agencies in behalf of wages, shorter hours, child welfare, employment of women, social insurance, labor organizations, penal reform, race relations, civil liberties, international relations, temperance, etc., and the record of the Church is impressive. Just one example of this type of interdenominational co-operation, given by Gar-

⁵ *The March of Faith*, New York: Harper, 1933, p. 146.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 152, 153, 157.

rison, will suffice: Some years ago the Interchurch World Movement and the Federal Council doubted the steel industry's contention that the abolition of the twelve-hour day would wreck the industry. An investigation was started by these interdenominational bodies, and the eight-hour day resulted.⁷

Add it all up and you are a bit wearied when another magazine, to boost its waning subscription list, offers a prize for the best article on "Why the Church Is Failing," or someone bobs up with the question, "Why doesn't the Church *do* something?" It is true that the Church has often "dealt in palliatives," reluctant to go to the root of social evils. It has often hidden its head in the sand and naïvely taught that "God is in his heaven, and all's right with the world." But often, very often, the Church has looked both personal and social sins squarely in the face and has proceeded to do something about them. Its record is not too bad, but it is not good enough.

2. THE THEOLOGICAL BASES

It has been pointed out numerous times that our interpretation of Christianity is today undergoing radical changes under the triphammer blows of modernity. John Bennett, in an essay on "The Social Interpretation of Christianity" in *The Church Through Half a Century*, says that the social interpretation of Christianity is now entering a new phase, and he gives three reasons why we are being forced to rethink both the theological bases and the practical program of our social Christianity: The world-shaking events following World War I; "the influence of European theologians whose thought starts with disillusionment concerning the human situation . . .," and "the challenge of Marxism. . . ."⁸

What, then, are the bases from a theological point of view upon which the Church must base its social action?

One point of emphasis basic to real social action, in my judgment, is the possibility of the Kingdom of God being built on earth. If the Kingdom cannot come, then we are wasting our time when we pray: "Thy Kingdom come . . . on *earth* as it is in heaven." This point is not to be labored, but it is clear that those who look for the coming of a new order only after the end of the age, and who, further, proclaim

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

⁸ New York: Scribner, 1936, p. 113.

that the world's morals will get worse and worse as time goes on are simply cutting the central nerve of Christian action. We must hope and pray and work for the coming of a new day when Christian morality rules the public and private relations of men else the ground is cut from beneath our feet as we push forward. We who have been brought up in the traditional interpretation of Christianity are not fooled by a childish optimism regarding man's inevitable progress, for we know the curse of sin and its damning effects. Yet we know the purposes and the power of God, and we who would change the social matrix should emphasize the *possibility* of God's family being built here and now, not catastrophically, but gradually by the renewal in Christ of individuals, and by group action seeking to fulfil the law of love.

Another point of emphasis basic to any theology for social action is that sin is sin whether in individuals or in groups. Bennett quotes Shailer Mathews as saying, "As never before there is need, therefore, of a sturdy insistence upon the sinfulness of sin."⁹ Those who attack the social emphasis conveniently overlook such statements as that. In speaking of the seriousness of sin, Bennett says of Walter Rauschenbusch: "He saw that sin is crystallized in institutions and large-scale social forces, that it is transmitted through social tradition as well as through heredity. He saw that humanity is caught in a vast network of organized sin which he called the 'Kingdom of Evil.'"¹⁰ We who would prod the Church to social action today must not underestimate the enemy. The enemy is sin. And the remedy is Christ. The remedy is the same whether the sin is enthroned in the individual or crystallized in social institutions. The point here is that sin is sin, wherever it is found, and that Christ is big enough to redeem both individuals and their corporate life.

Another basic assumption in a theology for the social emphasis is that in order to change society we must seek the regeneration of individuals by the Holy Spirit. Changing groups in superficial fashion without going to the roots of sin in the individual heart is worse than folly. It does not follow, however, that we are to stop with the conversion of the individual. If every individual in the world accepted Christ as Lord and Saviour we still would not have an earthly Kingdom of Heaven! There would still be group actions which would discriminate; there would

⁹ *Op. cit.* p. 120.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

still be social forces which would damn human life—we see this happening within the Church every day where all supposedly have become Christians. We begin with the individual, but we do not end there.

Still another basic teaching which must be in our creed, if we are to change the social order, has to do with the cross of Christ. Just as Christ's suffering brings redemption to us through our faith in him, so we must suffer vicariously that redemption may be brought to society. Any who would redeem mankind in a world such as ours must suffer, and it is through this suffering that we can be channels for God's redeeming love. As Williams Adams Brown has put it, "The righteous suffer for the wicked that the wicked may be saved."

In passing, may I say that I resent being pigeonholed. I repudiate the identification of interest in social action with theological heresy. Because I believe in the inspired Word of God, I have a great dynamic for social action. Because I believe in the sovereignty of God, I have more impetus to act. Because I believe in the sacrificial death of Jesus Christ for the sins of the world, I am the more impelled to give myself in any way possible. Because I have a great gospel, a full gospel, I am constrained to seek new paths for serving my Lord.

In closing this discussion of the theological bases for the Church's social action, let me give four "must nots": We must not be extremists. We must not let disillusionment over the total world situation drive us to some "crackpot" idea about the end of things. We must not deal in palliatives—our preaching must have the effect of dynamite, not opium. We must not confuse programs with God. Our demand for reform must be based upon the Word of God. If God is not in our efforts, they will avail nothing.

3. A TECHNIQUE

The Lake Geneva Conference of 1937 adopted the following definition of Christian social action:

Christian social action is intelligently planned individual or group activity undertaken with a view to supporting, modifying, or basically changing the contemporary social order in such ways as will make our social institutions just and co-operative for the redemptive purposes of Christianity.

We must realize that there is a difference between social service and social action. We are not concerned here with the former, which is simply ambulance service for the social order. What we are speaking of is offensive action against the evils of society. The difference is the same

as that existing between the activities of the medical corps in modern warfare and the mechanized unit which forms the spearhead of the attack.

The great social reformers usually have been men who have fanatically pursued some one social problem. It was slavery with William Lloyd Garrison. It was ignorance and poverty among Negroes with Booker T. Washington. With Susan B. Anthony it was woman suffrage, and it was social justice with J. K. Hardie. Amid the multitude of duties in the ordinary parish, it is perhaps wise for us to limit ourselves to working at one of these great sores on the body of society.

In this discussion we are not concerned with a technique for implementing the social vision of interdenominational agencies or even with denominational social action. It is our concern here to see what the minister can do personally and through the various organizations within his local church.

We may begin with a question I heard raised recently in a discussion group: What *else* could the Good Samaritan have done? He was responsible certainly for the society which permitted such tragedy to befall a traveler on the Jericho Road. We could list his further benevolences, as someone has suggested, which might be classed as social action: He could have publicized the traveler's fate. He could have made his own outraged feelings known and thus fulfilled the scriptural injunction, "Be ye angry" (Eph. 4:26). He could have protested to the local synagogue saying to the priest (gently), "In looking for the lost sheep, don't forget to look at the pasture also!" He could have asked Rome for fewer taxgatherers and more police. He could have learned the average age of criminals in Palestine and persuaded some group to do something specific and regenerative for that age-group. He could have prayed and then hammered away at the problem in any intelligent way which occurred to him.

Specifically, what can the modern Samaritan do in the local church? In answering this question I shall indicate some things that we in Mobile have done together—lines of action which any minister can follow, remembering always to emphasize a particular need rather than the obligation to do something about social ills.

1. We can stimulate groups in the Church to study social problems. There is a new adult education program which can be fostered by the director and the minister. There are many electives which can be put into the church-school curriculum, short courses which deal with the

major social questions of the day. These can be taught by the Sunday school teachers at the regular Sunday school hour. The objection that this would be substituting "modern problems" for the Bible can be met by emphasizing the fact that these courses simply apply the teachings of Scripture to everyday life.

2. We can organize our young married couples (the most neglected group in the church) for a supper meeting after which a study can be led by the minister. In acquainting these young parents with community needs, resource people such as the state toxicologist, the public-school superintendent, welfare workers, public-health officers, and others can be brought in to give a picture of the local situation.

3. We can foster a local council of churches which will participate in such activities as the following:

a) Give support to the local schoolteachers in organizing a branch of the American Federation of Teachers. Attendance at the Board of Education meetings by ministers gives the teachers moral courage and deters the cynical board member from taking advantage of them.

b) Foster the National Preaching Mission in which many of these problems can be presented by national leaders in such a way that they will be heard.

c) Sponsor Christian Teaching Missions to which nationally known figures can be invited, or provide courses with credit for teachers of the local church schools. Our Teaching Missions draw about five hundred local church-school teachers and workers, and we have two each year.

d) Make friendly gestures toward labor by inviting to the council meeting local labor leaders, and also the more widely known labor people who happen to be available. Later, when some laborite is lambasting the Church, this person will speak up and say, "Wait, I know some church people who are interested in labor!"

e) Organize daily vacation Bible schools in the new housing projects with a view toward reaching the children who might be delinquents in the tomorrows.

f) Move quickly to start Sunday schools and chapels wherever there is a need, for there is no social action comparable with the intelligent preaching of the gospel in its entirety which emphasizes the basic duty of Christian morality once the stand for Christ is taken.

g) Arrange centers for service men and women where there is companionship on the Christian level, food, telephones, writing materials,

and reading matter. This is the positive answer to the "juke joint." The old way was to wave one's arms in the pulpit and flay the liquor interests. The better way is to provide a wholesome place for these boys and girls to go. Many men in the service say they go to the "juke joint" for three reasons: it provides them a place to sit down, music, and somebody to talk to. For many, the drinks are relatively unimportant.

4. We can organize what might be called an "adolescent committee" for the purpose of studying what is happening to the adolescent in our area. Members can be drawn from the Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., P.T.A., Boy and Girl Scouts, the churches, the U.S.O., the public schools, and others. This committee, after gathering the facts as to the local boy-and-girl situation, can furnish speakers for civic clubs, radio stations, parent organizations, and church groups informing others as to what is happening to the youth of the city. This committee can meet with the mayor regarding the problem of juvenile delinquency.

5. In our local churches we can have our women's organization appoint a secretary or chairman for Christian social action. In my own church our secretary for Christian social service, as she is called, has our auxiliary study a different community problem each month, such as health, education, Negroes, housing, etc. The circles of the auxiliary rotate in visiting some local social institution, such as the Florence Crittenden Home, a venereal disease clinic, or a Negro school, and report to the monthly inspirational meeting of the entire group. The second year we expect to launch a program for action based upon the knowledge gained from these visits.

6. We can occasionally get our official boards to write a letter of protest, or commendation, or to move in some quiet way in the field of social action. Presbyterian sessions are not trained to think along these lines, and they are reluctant to act.

7. We can set up an interracial commission, if there is not one already in operation, or we can co-operate with the existing one. This should include both white and colored people. When local racial tension breaks out into conflict, this commission can meet, get in touch with the right people, and let them know that the group is watching to see that the fair thing is done. Attendance at some of the Negroes' public meetings on the part of white people creates good will and encourages Negroes to come to us as church leaders when trouble arises.

8. Young people's groups can be stimulated to study these problems

and, occasionally, to act in some matter which concerns them where the pathway along which the group may move is clear.

Other lines of activity will occur to the reader. Any action looking toward changing the social order must be gradual to be permanent. Angus has said, "There are no violent caesuras in history." It must be non-violent to be Christian. It must be rooted in history to be sane. It must be grounded in Scripture to be of eternal significance. I believe that word of Sorokin's in *The Crisis of Our Age*:

Every important aspect of the life, organization, and the culture of Western society is in the extraordinary crisis. . . . Its body and mind are sick. . . . We are seemingly between two epochs: the dying Sensate culture of our magnificent yesterday and the coming Ideational culture of the creative tomorrow. We are living, thinking, and acting at the end of a brilliant six-hundred-year-long Sensate day. The oblique rays of the sun still illumine the glory of the passing epoch. But the light is fading, and in the deepening shadows it becomes more and more difficult to see clearly and to orient ourselves safely in the confusions of the twilight. The night of the transitory period begins to loom before us, with its nightmares, frightening shadows, and heartrending horrors. Beyond it, however, the dawn of a new great Ideational culture is probably waiting to greet the men of the future.¹¹

You and I will find the right technique, in that coming day, if we can somehow stay close enough to the masses to feel as an ever-present ache the tragedy of the "grapes of wrath"; if we can put our feet occasionally on the "tobacco road"; if we can keep in touch with "the good earth" and hear the low wail of the poor in childbirth, the working man and woman in Millet's *Man With the Hoe* and Thomas Hood's *Song of the Shirt*. If we can stay down where the masses live and not become an intellectual or a spiritual aristocrat, then we can alleviate human suffering, and we can implement our theological convictions with appropriate social action.

Dreams are they—but they are God's dreams!
 Shall we decry them and scorn them?
 That men shall love one another,
 That white shall call black man brother,
 That greed shall pass from the market-place,
 That lust shall yield to love for the race,
 That man shall meet with God face to face—
 Dreams are they all,
 But shall we despise them—
 God's dreams!

¹¹ New York: Dutton, 1942, p. 13.

Dreams are they—to become man's dreams!
 Can we say nay as they claim us?
 That men shall cease from their hating,
 That war shall soon be abating,
 That the glory of kings and lords shall pale,
 That the pride of dominion and power shall fail,
 That the love of humanity shall prevail—
 Dreams are they all,
 But shall we despise them—
 God's dreams!¹²

Here are two pictures of the Church in action: A few months ago a gigantic convoy of ships was ploughing its way through the angry waters of the North Atlantic. It was four-thirty in the morning and German submarines had just begun to attack. Every man on every ship had his hands full at his battle station. On a four-thousand-ton freighter in this convoy, in a little cubby-hole cabin, a chaplain of the Church of England knelt at an improvised altar to partake of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. Realizing that there was a movement beside him, he opened his eyes from his prayers, and there were two men on their knees beside him at the altar. When he finished praying, there were ten pairs of hands thrust in his door, asking for the bread. There was no time for prayers—guns up on deck had to be manned. He placed the bread in ten hands and the men were gone. The remainder of the service was said for them *in absentia*. This is one picture of the Church in action.

The other picture is of a country churchyard at night. Electric lights had been installed, and five hundred people have gathered for a softball game. It had been that way all summer long. There is a roadhouse near this country church. Night after night the young minister saw the youth of the neighborhood packing that roadhouse to dance and drink. He decided that a positive answer was the only right one, so he organized softball teams. The owner of the roadhouse said to him one day: "Preacher, you don't do like the other preachers they've had here. They all preached about me and my business. I notice you haven't said a word about me. Well, preacher, with your method I've had to close up my roadhouse and come to your ball games!"

All of us would agree that our Lord was present at the Lord's Supper on that freighter in the North Atlantic. I believe that the Man of Nazareth would have been found also at the softball game.

¹² Thomas Curtis Clark in *Quotable Poems*. Chicago: Willett, Clark & Co., 1931, I, 83.

The Hidden Church and the Churches in Sight

H. RICHARD NIEBUHR

MEN who love the Church always find it confusing and painful to contemplate the contradictions between the reality they love and the religious organizations which are called by the same name. It is painful because these organizations seem antithetical and even inimical to what the Church means. It is confusing because the Church is so closely bound up with them that one cannot serve it without working in and through and for them. The confusion is the more distressing and the pain the more acute in a time when the failures of human institutions and the greatness of man's need direct attention more than ever to the Church, increasing our longing for its appearance and our desire to establish it. In this situation both the reinforcement of our confidence and the reformation of action wait upon the clarification of thought, and it is necessary that from many points of view, with the aid of many instruments of analysis, that the relationship of the Church to the churches be re-examined and reinterpreted.

If there is to be genuine clarification it is desirable, surely, that we do not slur over and minimize, as we so easily do, the real contradictions which obtain between the Church of faith and the so-called churches, that is, all those local, national, and international organizations which form part of our weekly if not daily experience. The Church of faith is the one to which Christians refer when we repeat our creed and say, "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church" or "in the one holy Catholic and Apostolic Church." It is the Church which we have in mind when we hear the Scriptures read, attending to Jesus' words about the rock on which he will build his Church or to Paul's parable about the body and its members. We sing about it in our hymns, saying that "The Church's one foundation is Jesus Christ, her Lord," rejoicing in the glorious things which are spoken of her and affirming our love of "the Church our blest Redeemer saved with his own precious blood." It is one and holy and universal and Christian. But the churches which we organize, support, and defend against adversaries, whose doings are reported in the daily newspapers and weekly magazines, which form as

intimate a part of our civilization as stores and schools and barber shops—these are another matter. It is quite unnecessary to remind ourselves again of their disunity and their lack of universality. They are not only divided but divisive, splitting our human societies into incompatible segments. Every village, city, nation, and the whole planet itself bear witness to the fact that the churches are not one and are not making mankind one. Their lack of holiness has been remarked upon age after age, within and without; it has led to reformation after reformation and schism after schism with the consequence that newly constituted groups became guilty either of a new secularism or a new self-righteousness—that caricature of holiness to which profaneness is often preferable.

The name Christian can indeed be applied to the churches but only in a very special sense; it is a family name rather than a descriptive adjective. The churches claim descent from Christ and seem entitled to that claim in a manner analogous to the one in which some "Mayflower" descendant is entitled to claim a Pilgrim as his ancestor. In his case it may be estimated that he had some 512 ancestors living in 1620; choosing that one of this number who is most honorable, he claims him as his progenitor to the neglect of 511 other forbears. So our churches, the religious organizations of the Western world, have multitudinous ancestors but they hang only the picture of Jesus Christ on the walls of their homes. Their physical and mental equipment, however, shows how various is their heritage. Our religious rites, our intellectual systems, our forms of organization, our codes of conduct and all the other features of our common life have come to us from many sources and we find it impossible to show how these features are in reality all derived from Jesus Christ—either after the flesh or after the spirit. As a religion our Christianity is a highly syncretistic thing which has borrowed or received elements from many quarters. And what is true of Christianity in general is true of all its particular forms. It is not hard to trace the ancestry of the Roman Catholic Church to other fathers besides the apostles nor to discover that the Protestant churches are the product of other forces besides the gospel; the sects which have flourished in all times usually claim a virgin birth but it is not difficult to discern that they were conceived with the help of a mundane paternity co-operating with the spirit of Christ. Roman Empire and Roman law, Greek philosophy and Gnostic speculation, mystery religions and household faiths, feudal policy and Germanic ideas of law, rising individualism and new industrialism, na-

tionalism and capitalism, technology and science—all these and many more have so conditioned the churches that not one of them can credibly maintain that the only or even the chief influence in its life is that of Jesus Christ. If moral characteristics such as humility, obedience to God, and self-sacrifice are taken into account, the problem of the relation of the churches to Christ does not become less difficult. The contradiction is great. When we think of the Church we think of that society of which Christ is the Head and of which he inspires every part; when we think of the churches we think of organizations which have many different heads or principles—papacy and papal infallibility, bishops and apostolic succession, congregational authority, the Bible and literal inspiration, reason and rationality, liberal thought and aspiration after human welfare. We may and must call the churches Christian, but when we do so we mean that they are representatives in one way or another of that syncretistic thing, the Christian religion, rather than societies which derive their being from and represent Christ only.

There is a danger that in dwelling on these contradictions we forget the complementary factor—the close interrelation between Church and the churches. Antagonists of the latter are often surprised that, when they use the ammunition which reformers of the churches have supplied, these same reformers appear as the champions and defenders of the attacked societies. It is inevitable that this should be so, for in the churches the Church does seem to come to some sort of appearance and, what is more important, it seems that through the churches the greatest service can be rendered to the Church. To be sure, the claim of the churches to be the sole representatives of the Church on earth must be denied since often other societies appear as fairer representatives of the spirit of the Church than religious organizations do; the functionaries of the family, school, or state may minister more effectively in the manner of Christ than do the functionaries of the churches. Nevertheless, the presence of the Church is so tied up with the activity of the churches that we do not know how to separate them. How can the family be for us part of the Church if its life does not begin in and accompany the life of the churches? How shall friendship give us assurance of the presence of the Church if it does not possess the symbols and the common language of the churches? How shall we build and serve the Church without the prayers, works, and services of churches? It is through the churches that continuing testimony is borne to the unity of the human race in

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Christ, to the reality of reconciliation and forgiveness in the world, to the glory of our destiny in God. Through the conservatism of the churches there shines something of that infinite conservatism of the Church which seeks to save every life, physically and spiritually, and through their radicalism appears the great radicalism which challenges the absoluteness of every principle save that of loyalty to God. There is a grand intermixture of the conservatism of fear and of the radicalism of pride with this conservatism of the gospel and this intransigence of prophecy; but the Church and not only the world appears in the churches. Though the worship of the churches is shot through with self-worship, pride, and unconscious atheism, yet it remains as almost our only reminder in the whole of our environment of the presence beyond the veil of things of the one, transcendent, infinitely glorious and good source and goal of all being. The preaching of the churches is often anxious, defensive, and more secular than newspaper editorials; yet it cannot but contain echoes of the gospel of a Creator who is infinite love and of a salvation from evil that is universal, eternal, and complete. The charity of the Church, confused though it may be with the demands of the institution and its functionaries for a share of the social wealth, yet proclaims the note of Christian neighborliness and answers the question "Who is my neighbor?" as no other society—class, family, or nation—can answer it. Where the cross is found, even the red cross of warring nations, it is at least vaguely clear to men that every man is neighbor to every other. It is unnecessary to multiply reminders of the way in which the life of the churches is tied up with the Church. The fact is clear. We do not know how to aspire after membership in the Church without joining the churches nor how to build the holy Catholic society, the universal fellowship of reconciliation, without increasing, reforming, supporting, and defending those contradictory organizations—our religious institutions, these Western counterparts of Shintoist and Hindu cults.

II

Many efforts have been made to understand this paradoxical relationship and to devise a corresponding strategy of action. The simplest solution of the problem will always have some vogue despite its absurdity. It is the solution which is advanced by the Roman Church and by many another less powerful organization; doubtless we all tend to adopt it at times. It consists in identifying one's own religious organ-

ization with the true Church and ascribing all the contradictory features to other religious groups. So the Syllabus of Errors and the decrees of the Vatican Council and the writings of many a Roman theologian, like the dithyrambic utterances of leaders of gospel tabernacles, assume with ridiculous cocksureness that one's own religion and church is the true religion and true church and even that the particular organization in question has the right to define what is true Church and what is not. What feats of self-deception are necessary in order that one may ascribe the attributes of unity, catholicity, holiness, and Christianity to an organization which one knows as intimately as any priest or preacher knows his society is hard to guess. Perhaps not many representatives of the churches are really deceived by these claims and assertions; but they tend to maintain themselves in a state of intellectual confusion in which the ridiculous nature of the claims does not become apparent. Yet it is evident that this solution of the problem of the Church and the churches crops up again and again and leads to ever new foundations or institutions in which at long last the true Church is to be realized. A reading of the "autobiographical" sketches of religious groups in the U. S. Religious Census volumes indicates how recurrent and prevalent the error is. With respect to the unity of the Church, for instance, it is interesting and sad to read how many new splinter groups have been started for the sake of realizing the unity of the Church by founding a new and separated religious institution. So there is a group of churches of God which states that "to accept any specific title would imply that they are a sect, which they deny, sects or divisions being condemned" in Scriptures. Another organization states that its *distinctive* view is that "sectarianism is anti-Scriptural" while a third began its separate existence because it believed that "sects are unscriptural and unapostolic" and that "the sect name, spirit, and life should give place to the union and co-operation that distinguished the Church of the New Testament." Such statements as well as ideas prevalent in the churches in general point up another form of this common error—the belief that at some time in the past religious organizations truly represented the Church in its unity, holiness, and catholicity. Yet nothing is more evident from a reading of the New Testament than the fact that the empirical organizations of Christians in Jerusalem and in the days of Paul were shot through with strife and secularism. The error of explaining the relation of the true Church to the churches by assigning the characteristics of the former

to one of the empirical organizations is persistent and protean. Its persistence is doubtless due in part to our common sin of regarding our own kind of religious rite and organization as preferable to all others. It is due also to the inherent difficulty we encounter in separating the finite from the infinite. In any case this way of explaining the relation of the Church to the churches leads only to greater confusion in thought and action.

A second, frequently used way of dealing with this perennial problem is to assign the being of the Church to the realm of ideality while the churches are regarded as belonging to the realm of sense experience. A. C. Headlam in his book *The Doctrine of the Church and Christian Reunion* offers a clear-cut example of this mode of explanation. He writes, "Our explanation of the term 'one,' as applied to the Church, must be similar to that which we gave to the terms 'Holy,' 'Catholic,' and 'Apostolic.' It, like them, presents an ideal. When we say that the Church is 'one' we mean that Christ intended it to be 'one,' as he intended it to be 'holy.' . . . We must always have that ideal before us. Every step toward Christian unity makes Christianity fulfil its mission more perfectly."¹ The explanation is plausible so far as it goes. Within the Christian churches and within that great mass of religious movements which we call the Christian religion men do feel the presence of imperatives to unite and to be holy and to make Christ their head. In this sense the one, holy Catholic Church is the ideal which is to be contrasted with the actual estate of the religious organizations. But the explanation does not help us very much. If in a somewhat Platonic sense it means that the empirical churches are imperfect, sensible representatives of an eternal reality, the difficulty is that the churches are not only imperfect but contradictory to the essence. If it means, as Dr. Headlam has it, that the one Catholic Church is the moral ideal in the minds of men associated in religious organizations one must object that while this is true it is only a part of the truth. The difficulty is just this, that in the churches there are so many ideals besides the ideal of the Church. The ideal of the Roman Empire, more or less holy, haunts part of the religious movement called Christian; the ideal of Calvinist theocracy which was not so much theocracy as hierocracy is present in another part of that movement; the ideal of isolationism and of surcease of responsibility is always present in the sectarian sections of the churches.

¹ Second Edition. London: John Murray, 1921, p. 217.

When unity is desired it is often wished for as a means to the end of greater power, as so many expressions about the need for church union today indicate. When holiness is praised as an end to be sought, it also is wanted because its presence would bestow greater influence on the churches. In all of this confusion there is no special indication that the one holy Catholic Church is the special ideal in the minds of the churches and churchmen. The principle is present without a doubt; it is strong enough to give men in the churches a bad conscience; but that it is the dominant ideal which directs their actions is contradicted by daily experience.

Another and more important consideration makes it difficult to accept this explanation of the relation of the Church to the churches. For Christians the only holy Catholic Church is not an ideal in the first place but an object of faith and love and an anchor of hope. It is an object of faith on which we rely as we do upon a friend, not as we depend—if ever we do depend—on an ideal in our mind or in a realm of essences. An ideal church depends on the churches for its realization; the Church of faith is more real and dependable than the churches; the latter are trustworthy only insofar as the former appears in them. This Church of faith is one in no ideal sense but in the real sense that it unites us with all our fellow men and that it unites all men in loyalty to one God. It is one in the sense that it brings us into harmony and unity with the Creator and with Christ and with the Holy Spirit and that all these are present in it. To believe in the Catholic Church is to depend on the fact that nowhere upon earth and at no time shall we or our children or our neighbors be left without ministers of the grace of Christ and without witnesses to faith. It is a universal Church not as an ideal can be ubiquitous but as a reality on which we count is universal. This Church is the society of those who never lose faith, never succumb to despair, never drop the flag of the world, never abandon their companions in the darkness. It is the holy company of those who receive a constant forgiveness and cleansing of their sins and who in measureless gratitude for measureless love forgive as they have been forgiven. It is the group of fellow workers in our time and in all times to come on which we rely to supplement and correct and remake our work so that it will be fit for eternity. It is the Christian Church of which Christ is the center, the brain, and the heart; he thinks in it and it feels as he does; his mind works in its searchings after truth and his self-forgetfulness

inspires all its actions. Such a Church is not an ideal. It is not the sort of thing we can strive to bring into existence, for it is before us. This Church is our Mother. To think of it is to become aware anew of the painfulness of the contradiction in which our religious organizations stand to it. They are not imperfect beings tending to realize this character in their further development; they are beings of a different order of existence, more like wayward children than like the Mother.

There is one more explanation of the relation of the Church to the churches which must be considered. Protestantism, especially early Lutheranism, sought a solution for the problem with the aid of a formula ultimately derived from Augustine. There were two churches, it declared, a visible church and an invisible one; the invisible church is the Church of faith; the visible church is the human institution. But the relation of these two churches was never clearly worked out. Upon the one hand the contrast was used offensively to deny that the Roman Church with its high visibility was equivalent to the Church of faith; on the other hand, it was used defensively to maintain that the evangelical churches possessed the notes of the true Church: preaching of the gospel, rightful administration of the right sacraments, and discipline according to the Word of God. In part the distinction was one between the Church known only to God and the church known to men which is full of hypocrites and therefore not true; in part it was the distinction between the work of God and the work of men, since the invisible church is the company which God has chosen out of all times and places to be his holy people, while the visible church is the preachers' and elders' institution in which care must be taken that right doctrine is taught and right order prevails. Though the formula of the visible and invisible churches is suggestive it is also somewhat confusing. Insofar as it assumes that the Church of faith, the invisible company of the elect, is made up of scattered individuals, it seems to be in downright error, misconceiving the nature of society and of the Church in particular, which is not simply a society of saved men but the saved society of men.

III

Partly in continuation of this Protestant doctrine, but more upon the basis of biblical studies and of sociology of religion, it may be possible to formulate the outlines of a doctrine of the Church which will do ampler justice to the complex elements than the foregoing theories can

do. Two ideas in particular seem to be called for in order to understand the situation: First, the Church is an eschatological society, or, as we may better say in our times, it is an emergent reality, hidden yet real; and secondly, the religious institutions called the churches are subject like all the rest of this secular society of ours to a constant process of conversion; they are not the converted parts of society but the parts in which conversion makes its appearance in religious form.

The Church of faith is an eschatological society, that is to say, it belongs to that order of existence which can neither be described in temporal terms nor abstracted from the temporal. To say that Jesus is the Christ is to speak eschatologically. He is risen and yet he is not among us; he is the ever-present one who has come, yet we wait for his coming in glory and power, whether after the fashion of literalists or liberalists. Jesus Christ has come and all the world is different; Jesus Christ has not returned and the world is still lost in darkness; both statements are always made sooner or later by Christians. For they live between His first and second coming, in the revolutionary epoch of human existence when the old is passing but the new has not yet come into appearance. One cannot speak of Christ merely as an ideal though he is that; he is a Christ of faith on whom we rely as present power. Yet we say:

O Son of man, to right my lot
Naught but thy presence can avail;
Yet on the roads thy wheels are not
Nor on the seas thy sail.

Likewise the Christian life itself is an emergent reality of which Christians must say with Paul that it "is hid with Christ in God," invisible to themselves and others, yet something to be counted upon. Is not the Church a reality of this order? It is the society which is at the very edge of coming into existence, more real than all the communities which are passing away; but it is not to be seen. It is an emergent as mind was an emergent through the long ages when it was the most powerful thing in the world but had not yet become conscious of itself and was in that sense invisible, being confused and confounded with sense and the physical. The Church is the society of that new order of creation in which all things shall become and are new. We may say that that order has been coming into being for a few thousand years but that its outlines cannot yet be discerned, or we may say that the order so far transcends our present existence that we must speak of it as belonging to eternity rather

than time. In any case what we mean is that we stand at the edge of the new and are so close to it that we count upon it. In one sense it is not yet at hand, but in another sense everything else has passed and only this new world of God with its Church of faith is real.

The revolutionary situation in which Christians stand requires many paradoxical statements for its description. It is not true that the revolution which makes all things new has not yet taken place and that men must wait to the end of time for the realization of the promises. But neither is it true that the revolution has taken place, that mankind has been reborn and that all things have been re-established in the glory intended by the Creator. These churches and states, these codes of morals and these creeds are not the institutions of the new world of God which are to be defended against all adversaries. They belong to the old life that is passing away, but no substitute forms of church or state, of moral code or creed, can take their place and be regarded as the institutions of the Christ. All these things are somehow of the same order and the Church which is emergent is of a new order and a new kind. Under the circumstances a double attitude is always called for and possible to Christians: an attitude of confidence and joy in the Church, an attitude of sorrow and repentance in their churches and for their churches.

A second item in a satisfactory theory of the Church is the idea of conversion. Conversion, or the turning of the mind and heart toward God in Christ, toward obedience and faith, is not so much the isolated event which some sorts of religion tend to make of it as a process which accompanies the whole of the Christian life. It is continuous and ever-renewed in view of the fact that we fall away again and again into anxiety and polytheism and atheism and in further view of the infirmity of the divine goodness toward which we are turned. Moreover, conversion is the very heart of the Christian faith, for it is the change of mind which the reception of the gospel of the Kingdom brings with it. Such conversion is antithetical to substitution. In the Christian life human *eros* is not supplanted by divine *agape* but the divine *agape* converts the human *eros* by directing it in gratitude toward God and toward the neighbor in God. The community of the family is not supplanted by a monastic society but the hearts of fathers and children and husbands and wives are turned toward each other in reconciliation because of the divine forgiveness. The gospel restores and converts and turns again; it does not

destroy and rebuild by substituting one finite structure of life or thought for another. And this strategy of the gospel applies to the religious institutions and organizations of men. As Jewish synagogue and Roman basilica are changed into churches in a physical sense so the religious societies of men are subject to the long process of internal rebirth whereby they are turned from the little gods to the One beyond all gods, from despair to happy confidence and from defensiveness to loyal helpfulness of the brothers. Our Christian churches, so-called, are like ourselves, just human entities on which God has taken mercy and which he is converting to himself. In them and through them we sin and falter as we do in and through our families and our states. But in and through them we can serve the Church of our faith as we can nowhere else. The preaching of the gospel, the administering of the sacraments, and the provision of a decent order—these are not the signs of the presence of the great Mother of us all, the Church of God, but they are the duties we can perform in order to minister to that Church and to declare our faith in its presence.

Such reflections about the emergent nature of the true Church and about the continuous necessity of converting our religious organizations do not give us final satisfaction. They do not assuage the pain we feel as we contemplate the contradiction in our life. But since we live in hope and not by sight we learn a certain patience in this situation too and rejoice in the Church even while our tears fall for the churches and for ourselves as churchmen.

The Treatment of German War Criminals

RAYMOND GIBSON

I. THE WILL TO VIOLENCE

ONE of the hopeless things about thinking that is being done on the problems of settlement with Germany is the degree to which the concentration upon the enormity of guilt has obscured the conditions which have brought that guilt about. It is impossible to understand and solve the problems of the settlement with Germany if our historical perspective begins with the uncovering of the extermination camps and other instances of Nazi brutality.

The will to violence, the gradual increase in the depth of the pride of power of the German nation must be seen in a historical context where alternatives were possible which could have altered cataclysmically the course of events leading to the present debacle. An understanding of the participation by victor and vanquished in the choices made which led to the war is necessary before allocating the responsibility for those choices.

The order that is demanded of the peace and the foundations of justice which must undergird that order can be comprehended only when we understand the historic forces with all their demoniac dimensions which made the present chaos supplant the past semblances of order. We must understand the breakdown of order. Only such an understanding can prevent continued chaos and establish minimal justice and order in the future. Yet it is not enough to limit the consideration of the present problem to modern history. It must be considered in the light of a philosophy of history which interprets the total history of man.

The attack upon man by man in this century is not a German trait alone. True, it is one of the outgrowths of the will to power. It is also the blind striking out of peoples who could see no meaning in order as it existed. In Germany it was not a people's movement to power, though the people were mobilized behind the movement to power.

It is easy to condemn, to allocate the sole cause of the present situation to the German masses for not resisting anything less than democratic government. This is as simple-minded when viewed polit-

ically as when conceived in purely human terms. We must remember that many of the people were dependent upon the state for a daily wage, for their very lives; that these people had been rescued from the maw of inflation only a few years before. There were the concentration camps facing the dissenters. The German nation had lost its soul. The vanguard of the republican cause was weary. The chasm between the leaders and the people grew ever wider.

The will to violence grew out of the will to power. The will to power grew out of a maze of historical complexes, the least of which was not the lack of power. The lack of power and the greed for power, the rise to power and the greed for inordinate power—inordinate power and insanity in the direction of the power controlled—typified the German ascendancy of this decade. Yet it is not something peculiar to Germans which found expression. A simple instance of this is the fact that many of the sane, civilized, bourgeois nations were hoping that this power could be directed against communism. As such, and viewed on a world plane, the will to power was not so peculiarly German as those who assign total guilt to Germany would like to admit.

The will to power is not a German fruit alone. And those who found an expression of a will to power in Germany found it in the hierarchy of power that the Nazis had created, not in the German people as a whole. The people followed, or were driven. The German applause (partly in fear) was in a sense an expression of the will to power of the German people. But we can still allocate the major part of the will to power to those who manipulated political power and those who willingly administered that power in the nation. There was a relatively greater and evidently more effective expression of the will to power and of the will to violence which grew out of it among the Nazi overlords than in Germans by and large.

2. THE WILL TO JUSTICE

If modern man has a will to violence, he has also a will to justice. And as an inordinate amount of the will to power found its expression in the German nation, now the will to justice is most acutely felt in the concern that right be established, although this needs many qualifications.

The expression of the will to justice varies from the attempts of partisans to kill those who have killed, to the attempt to formulate new

forms of law by which the new forms of lawlessness can be punished.¹ Yet each has the marks of futility upon it. Each is confronted with the fact that the evil is beyond the possibility of justice in any real sense. If the partisan kills enough Nazis to achieve justice in minimal terms, he has himself become a Nazi and thereby doubles the existent evil. New law forms presuppose the ability of governmental forms to carry them out. As yet we have no international forms of government from which this overall justice can be administered.

There is certain to be overt expression of many types of the will to justice. This can be expected in particular communities, in national policies, and in attempted international policy. If one thing can be said of them individually and collectively it is that they will not be adequate for the situation confronting those who administer justice.

The failure of the attempts to realize justice lies not so much in the inadequacy and ambiguities of one politic against opposing ones as in the human situation.

Any view that holds the ills to be caused by a particular political form, or which sees the solution to those ills in establishing world *forms* of democracy, demonstrates a superficial understanding of the true depths of the problem and the nature of the ills involved. We are dealing with a situation in which the basic concepts of our civilization are in process of rapid decay.

Though there can be no real rendering of justice in a definitive sense, there must be an expression of the will to justice. That expression should be directed so that the relative achievements of justice are not corrupted by a will to revenge, nor a new will to power substituted by the party which is supposedly rendering justice. And justice must not be rendered only with eyes to the past. It must take into account the fruits of that justice in the future. It must deal not only with past evils but it must at the same time be creative. It must create order, not just a new hierarchy of political domination.

The essential fallacy in the victor's being the plaintiff, prosecuting attorney, jury, and judge, lies in just this possibility. Justice is always corrupted somewhat by the ambitions of the judge, and the will to justice may degenerate into the will to power. This is not a solution; it is further complication of the problem.

¹ Reference is made to the excellent study by Sheldon Glueck, *War Criminals, Their Prosecution and Punishment*. New York: Knopf, 1944.

3. GERMANS—NAZIS?

Much of the current discussion about the treatment of the Germans centers in the primary distinction to be made between Germans and Nazis. No other point is being so controversially treated, and rightfully so, for the guilt cannot be assigned without ascertaining who the guilty are. The differentiation between Nazis and Germans, if possible, would simplify the situation by restricting the number who are guilty, and by our knowing better who they are. There is usually hope on the part of those who differentiate between Nazis and Germans that some help can be expected from the Germans in dealing with the Nazis.

There is a group of writers who ascribe the guilt of the German nation to Germans irrespective of whether or not they have been connected with the Nazi regime. This is superficial and some of it nothing more than an expression of hatred for the Germans. One such superficial historical analysis is by F. J. C. Hearnshaw, a British historian, who says, "The story of Germany is the story of a people always warlike, always aggressive, an Esau among the nations, a rogue among elephants. It is also the story of a people torn internally by truceless feuds, lacking in unity, devoid of political sense, addicted to violent crime and bottomless treachery, a constant source of disturbance in the heart of Europe."²

Louis Nizer, New York attorney, has made the same mistake. "The criminal gang is a whole nation, and no reliance can be placed on German repentance or newborn realization of past error. . . . The German people have ever been arch-conspirators against civilization. Hitler did not create a new movement, he inherited an old one—as old as the German people."³ Among other errors Nizer compares the Hanseatic League to the Nazi fifth column.

William Shirer says, "They're all guilty—punish them."⁴ This is the motif of the later writings of Emil Ludwig.⁵ A position that lies between this view and the simple optimism which completely differentiates between the Nazis and the Germans in general, is the position taken by Lord Robert Vansittart.⁶ Though he rejects racialism and national character as an invariant factor, he does see national character

² *Germany, The Aggressor Throughout the Ages*. New York: Dutton, 1941, p. 271.

³ *What to Do With Germany*. New York: Reader's Press, 1944.

⁴ William Shirer, radio commentator and writer for the *N. Y. Herald Tribune*, in an article in *Look* magazine, January, 1943, entitled "They're All Guilty, Punish Them."

⁵ *How to Treat the Germans*. New York: Millard, 1944.

⁶ *The Black Record*. London: Hamilton, 1941; and *Lessons of My Life*. New York: Knopf, 1943.

determined by such things as isolation, education, and climate. He is aware that there are good Germans, but says that they have done nothing politically. He would advocate a program whereby the military defeat is followed by occupation, demilitarization, and re-education. He overlooks the fact that there have been approximately two million Germans in concentration camps for "political" reasons.

There is a body of writers who distinguish between Nazis and Germans in general and become uncritical of Germans. Among them are Louis Lochner, E. H. Carr, Paul Hagen, Julius Braunthal, G. Seger, and S. Marck. Their optimism roots in their misconception that nazism was something foisted upon the majority of Germans who were tricked by an unscrupulous minority. H. N. Brailsford commits this same error, yet he is clearly conscious that there is a measure of responsibility which can be assigned to the Germans in general.⁷

The evidence points to a more reasonable view which holds that though there have been liberal forces in Germany these have been inactive. As the Allies marched into Germany the evidence became increasingly complex. There were reports of Germans fanatically holding to their Nazi creeds while others seemingly were liberated from the yoke of the Nazis. Both of these become the body of Germans that we considered as Germans in general. The problem is far more complex than we had imagined. Both strains are found among the youth. The issue of *Inside Germany Reports* which dealt with the question of "Youth of Germany—A Lost Generation?" shows the conflicting forces found in what had been considered as Hitler's strongest point—the group which grew out of the German youth program of indoctrination. It is just this sort of thing that makes the attempts to define guilt in terms of group participation in a party or organization an oversimplification. The Russian trials of criminals in Berlin have been short; yet it can be said for them that to date they have been individual trials, and men have not been condemned en masse for the crime of identification with the Nazi party or other group affiliations.

There is a distinction to be made between Nazis and Germans. That distinction is not definitive in terms of the guilt assigned to the defeated. It is reasonable to expect that the preponderance of the guilt will and should be assigned to the individuals who have been in the hierarchy of power, those who have expressed most effectively the pride

⁷ *Our Settlement With Germany*. New York: John Day, 1944.

of power, and with that power have sinned against the laws of God and man. It is true that many, and perhaps most, of the criminals will have been connected with the Nazi regime. But it is not right to define guilt in terms of that membership only. And views that have expressed this error display a too-simple solution to the problem of determining guilt.

4. THE WILL TO UNITY

Man has a will to unity. This prompts him to establish community. There has been an ever-widening and increasing complexity of inter-relatedness which has created greater unities. This natural cohesion has been given order by the establishment of law, whether that law was clearly formulated or tacitly assumed. "All his (man's) activities in history are involved in the paradox of creativity and destructiveness, arising from his ability: (a) to affirm and to break the unities and forms of natural cohesion; (b) to affirm them excessively so that they become forces of anarchy; (c) to create higher rational unities and realms of coherence but to corrupt these in turn by insinuating partial and narrow loyalties into them."⁸

The present century faces the breaking into the will to unity on the national level by the will to unity on the world level. It is a paradox that the sadistic and insane destruction of the existing measure of unity of the nations was an attempt on the part of the Nazis to establish a unity of their own in the form of a superstate. Had they succeeded, they would have attempted to form a world unity under their domination.

The attempts to establish justice, to deal with that part of mankind which is in revolt, to cut out the "eye which has offended us," are expressions of the will to unity which will find expression in the forms of law that deal with the war criminals. Yet a will to unity can never be satisfied. Partial fulfillments will come as law measures are developed which deal with the war criminals from a higher perspective than that possible than if they were dealt with by their victims only. The most adequate human solution for the problem would be an international commission for their trial, using an international administration of law which has been agreed upon as international law. This evidently is not being done. The existing forms of international law are not adequate to deal with the complexities of the present situation.

⁸ Reinhold Niebuhr: *The Nature and Destiny of Man*. New York: Scribner, 1941. I. 38.

If we put the question: Which kind of punishment would be most adequate in the case of culprits like Mussolini and Hitler whose crimes are crying to heaven, postulating the wrath of God, we must answer, any penalty decreed by man would be utterly inadequate. Deeds so monstrous and so prodigious as those which injured the freedom and happiness, the health and hopes of millions of innocent people seem to be immeasurable. No measure taken by human courts, however hard and harsh, can correspond to the scientific brutality of the concentration camps. When the Italian partisans hanged the dead body of Mussolini in a public street, his head downward, we feel this was an incommensurate and helpless expression of the profoundly true insight that the execution alone did not satisfy the demand of just retribution.⁹

As much of the will to unity which expresses itself in the will to justice as can, should be expressed in orderly fashion and in accordance with the ordinances of law. This is the mediating position between the will to revenge and the will to forgiveness.

Lacking an international law backed by international sovereignty necessary to enforce its execution, the majority of enemy war criminals should be prosecuted and punished by the countries in whose territory or against whose nationals they have committed their atrocities. There should be international co-operation looking toward the day when there can be international sovereignty. The United Nations should initiate frank discussion with the neutral states looking to just and sensible agreements in the matter of establishing some form of international law.

It is unfortunate that the solution will have to be worked out in terms of what is possible politically and in light of the ambiguities of the situation. The working out of the problem will entail measures that would not be needed for the satisfactory treatment of the guilty in a less complex situation. If the victors did not have the urgent problems of rehabilitation, reconstruction, and feeding of the millions that are on the verge of starvation, then more time could be given to the treatment of the war criminals, and more effort spent on corrective measures. Yet much of this is impossible. The necessity of not having the more dangerous of the war criminals around will make it practically necessary to remove them from the scene. This is in vindication of "law." Yet it should be done in fear and trembling. We do not know that that "law" is the best that we can enact under the circumstances. All law stands under the ultimate perspective of God. The power of man to punish man is not enough. The nature of real punishment is something

⁹ From an address by Dr. Richard Kroner in James Chapel, Union Theological Seminary, New York city, May 11, 1945.

that retribution can never ensure. It is possible to punish in a final way only when the punishment is from a Divine source.

This is the condition necessary for the re-creation of the unity of mankind. Only when the repentance of the guilty has been accomplished can minimal unity be attained. It would be overly optimistic to expect this unity to be achieved in any complete form. Yet the unity achieved in part will come about in its fullest sense by the partial realization of this means.

5. A CRITIQUE OF PROGRAM

It is not so important to outline the program that should be followed as it is to consider some of the proposals that have been offered and some of the methods that have been used in the treatment of German war criminals to date. Of these the problem of capital punishment is more clearly defined than the problem of compulsory labor. The former can be treated in summary fashion; the latter will take more attention.

Courts are being operated by the liberated countries under criminal law of the respective countries. Likewise there have been many military criminal charges and military trials. The problem of defining and enacting a unified program in this sphere has been impossible. On the whole it is safe to say that where there is a choice between justice of this kind and "lynch" law, the former is preferable. The only thing that can be said in favor of "lynch" law is that patriots participate in it and help rid their country of their overlords. In doing this they avoid the feeling of having the execution of justice imposed by outsiders or foreign invaders. There is a constructive long-term value in this. It would be more feasible if it did not at the same time break down respect for the workings of military justice. It is necessary that some, and probably most, of the traditional forms of justice be adhered to.

In connection with the law administered by these courts there should be attempts at an ever-broadening scope of the law, the object being to achieve international law at the earliest possible date. The greatest spur to this should be the inadequacy of the present attempts to deal with the problem on the part of particular communities.

The proposals for labor battalions are being carried out in Russia. The French have asked for two and one-half million workers to rebuild France. There have been several good statements on this problem in recent publications.¹⁰

¹⁰ Reference has been made to Glueck and Brailsford.

If there are to be labor battalions going to Russia and to France, there should not be a spirit of vengeance in the program. Yet this will be difficult to avoid. The convicted war criminals should comprise these labor battalions, even though the crime for which they are convicted was not against other nations but against Germans, as by participating in administration of concentration camps, SS work, etc. It should be remembered that the will to justice can be corrupted and become the will to power by a new hierarchy of overlords.

The Germans will have to help. The evidence that has come out of Germany indicates that there are at least a few liberal-minded Germans who would work with the United Nations. While this is not a revolution against nazism as some predicted, yet these elements of liberalism should be given the greatest encouragement possible. The most antagonistic Germans that are not found guilty of such crimes as would necessitate their being killed or sent to labor battalions should be isolated. Political necessity will demand that more Nazis be executed than we would like to admit. This is the judgment of man. Again and again it must be reaffirmed that that judgment is done in the knowledge that it is only partial justice, and that man stands in danger of his own destruction in dealing with the problem, for he is never sure that he is the instrument of God. Yet he knows that God's vengeance and justice is sometimes partially realized through human efforts, though he can never equate these partial achievements unequivocally with the will of God.

If any final justice is to be established, it must come from God. The highest participation in this justice lies not in a sentimental succumbing to the relative justice of men, nor a bowing out of the scene because "we are all guilty." Nor is it the vengeance of new power expressing its pride. The treatment of the German war criminals must be approached with an attitude of man's own inadequacy in establishing absolute justice. The will to unity and the will to justice must find their expression in and through this precarious way.

Wanted: The Recovery of the Christian Paideia

E. G. HOMRIGHAUSEN

THERE are many indications that Protestantism is astir with a new interest in Christian nurture. This agitation is due to the desperate contemporary situation which is revealing the stubborn predicament of humanity as well as the true nature of Christian realism. The older liberalism, upon which so much of the theory and practice of "religious" education is based, is no longer able to meet the situation or square itself with the historic nature of Christianity. Important as its insights are, liberalism must be "surpassed." And since religious education was the last of the Christian disciplines to feel the impact of liberalism, it has been the last discipline to feel the impact of the new theology. It should also be added that the present chaotic situation in many churches, even though little affected by modern religious educational philosophy and methodology, is ineffective. It is not only the theory and practice of modern religious education which is today called into question, but the state of Christian nurture in the churches. There is no single theory of Christian education in existence today which is motivated by a consistent theology. Much of the religious education in the average church is poorly done in a piecemeal fashion. There is plenty of activity, to be sure, but it seems to lack unity and purpose. The older agencies, which were brought into existence on the basis of needs, are no longer adequate to provide Christian nurture. They served their purpose and their day, but they are no longer sufficient.

We face a new situation which demands a reconstruction in Christian nurture. What is needed is the recovery of the Christian *paideia*, or way of nurture. However, this recovery will require more than a piecemeal reform. No improvement of the existing agencies of the churches will be of much help. We will have to begin at the deeper level of evangelical Christianity itself. The need is for a theology which will undergird the Church's task of Christian nurture with a sound unified approach. A fundamental conversion is necessary on the part of Protestant leadership, both ministerial and educational. When once the nature of evangelical Christianity has been determined, and its relation

to the Church clearly discerned, then, and then only, can we start the serious task of Christian nurture, for Christian nurture is of the essence and task of the Christian Church.

I

Christianity is a totality and it expresses itself through *the* Church. It is the Church, not the Sunday school or the home, that educates! From the very beginning, Christianity has had a *paideia*, that is, a way of nurture. It is the very nature of the Christian faith to preach, teach, and perform a number of other necessary tasks. These are functions *within* the Church. A study of Christian history reveals the fact that the Christian movement has always had its educational function. Whatever agencies the Church may have initiated in order to do its educational work were originally related to the Church. It was only when the Church became complacent or untrue to its divine function that extra-church "churches" came into existence to correct and re-form it. It has not been until modern times, and especially in America, that this educational wholeness, or *paideia*, of the Christian community has been disintegrated. Specialized agencies have often been led by those who have lost their conception of the totality of Christianity.

In colonial American Christianity, practically every Church had its schoolhouse and its schoolmaster, and both were financed by the Church. The Church could not think of Christianity without a school and an officially recognized teaching personnel. The home, the Church, the school, and the college were all "Church." The Christian *paideia*, which existed from the very beginning of the Christian movement, obtained. Parents brought up their children in the reverence of mind (*nouthesia*) and the divine way of nurture (*paideia*) (Eph. 6:4).

However, in America, communities took over responsibility for the elementary schools. Church academies practically ceased to exist because of the development of high schools. States climaxed the educational system by providing universities and higher institutions of learning of various kinds. When this happened, the cultural ethos was as yet saturated with Christian assumptions. Protestantism, after a struggle, acquiesced in the new arrangement, in the uneasy confidence that this was a Christian nation and that Christian ideals would pervade these schools through personnel and subject matter. The Church would take care of religious education while the community would take care of secular education.

Being deprived of their schools, the churches welcomed the Sunday school. It became the school of the various communions. While it was officially adopted by the churches, it was in fact a parallel Christian educational organization promoted by laymen throughout the new frontier regions. This development was typical of American Protestantism. Many churches started as Sunday schools. But little direct guidance was given to them by official churchmen. Lutherans, Episcopalians, and Roman Catholics carefully and reluctantly incorporated the Sunday school into the Church, whereas popular types of Protestantism, more interested in a democratic and individualistic expression of the Christian community, allowed the Sunday school greater freedom to develop independently. The Sunday school did its work well, because it was supported by the Christian home and staffed by spiritually dynamic and literate teachers. In England it was a pioneer in popular education. In America it was the first interdenominational venture of the popular churches. It was undergirded by a zeal to teach the Bible and evangelize its pupils. Confessional doctrines and the sacraments were given little specific consideration.

II

Now that the frontier has largely disappeared, the denominations have become more established, and the cultural situation is more complex and secularized, the Sunday school is faced with a different situation. It is no longer able to do *all* the educational work of the churches. And what it does can no longer remain unexamined by the churches which are faced with a difficult educational task, a task which demands a theology and a mature strategy. The Sunday school cannot continue as a detached agency of the Christian Church, especially in a day of theological revival, secularized culture, and widespread spiritual illiteracy; nor can it continue to do its work without a serious re-examination of the nature of the Church and the Church's faith. It is not without reason that serious but earnest criticism has been directed against the Sunday school. It has been called a "menace" to Christianity because of its independence from the main stream of the Christian tradition and because of its inadequacy in teaching the Christian faith. The problem is aggravated because its denominational and interdenominational leadership, in some instances, has prided itself on its autonomy. It has also been seriously influenced by the new education and liberal theology. Both of these stand, perhaps unconsciously, for a churchless type of Christianity, or a Christianity that

easily lends itself to a predominant interest in life and work at the expense of truth and order.

There are other criticisms of the Sunday school, to be sure; but these deficiencies are secondary. The Church ought to have a school on Sunday, but it needs more than a "Sunday School." The major problem is in the relation of the School's particular function to the wholeness of the Christian community. This relation alone can give it a sense of importance and provide it a place *within* the Christian *paideia*.

The Sunday school was not the only extra-church agency to come into existence on the basis of a need. It was soon supplemented by young people's societies, missionary societies, choirs, vacation schools, weekday schools, and various other organizations. Most of these worthy enterprises were initiated outside the official Church; they were largely tacked on to the Church after their establishment; they *ignored Christian catechetics almost entirely*. In the process they often maintained their autonomy and went into a working relationship with the Church. This autonomy still exists even in those agencies which are within the Church. Many factors entered into this growth of educational agencies, such as the changing cultural situation, the secularization of education, the separation of the Church from the State, the decline of home training, the increase of unchurched population. In short, American Christianity invented new means to reach the unreached and to teach more adequately those who were reached. And the shame of it all is that most of these agencies were initiated by leaders other than those who represented the official Church.

III

However, good as these agencies were and still are, the problem which they present is not in their activities, but in their fragmentary nature, their lack of relationship one to another, and often in their jealous concern for their vested interests. Each one of these agencies regards itself as Christian in the fullest sense of the word and as autonomous. Even the "Church" is often regarded as the province of the minister who there conducts worship, administers sacraments, and preaches sermons. Leadership, curriculum, and program, even though co-operatively related today, are still administered with a lack of understanding of the real meaning of the Church and the relation of subordinate agencies to it. As a result, the Christian *paideia* is atomized, and our children suffer because of this chaos.

The leaders of these various agencies cannot be fully blamed for this state of affairs. The blame must rest equally upon official churchmen who lacked a full doctrine of the Church, who failed to see the emerging needs which the changing cultural situation presented, and who failed to give guidance to laymen who were eager to meet the situation with new agencies. The time has come when repentance must begin all around. These competing leaderships must sit down together in prayer and creative thought in order to arrive at a common conception of the nature and intention of the Christian faith, the Christian Church, and related Christian realities. Only thus can a true Christian *paideia* be born.

IV

This problem has been aggravated by an unwholesome evangelism. American Christianity is characterized by this phenomenon. It has produced significant results in our church and national life. The nurture of the old-line churches of Europe has often been inadequate; it relied too much upon knowledge and tradition. It feared the heresies of individualism, emotionalism, and sectarianism. American Christianity, in its *popular* forms had little confidence in the slow processes of home and church nurture; it embraced an individualized evangelism. There are still a great number of Christian leaders who feel that we can do the work of the Church solely through this type of Christian activity. However, we must admit that, in many instances, this type of unwholesome evangelism, or revivalism, has helped to secularize America. It put an emphasis upon individual conversions without a corresponding emphasis upon the historic intellectual, liturgical, and ethical aspects of the communal Christian faith. It worked havoc with the Christian doctrine of the Church. It also did little for children, and what it did was often harmful.

Individual evangelism *cannot take the place* of the Christian *paideia*. Evangelism and nurture belong together, and they belong *in* the Church. If the various agencies of the churches today need integration into the Christian tradition, the cult of *independent* evangelism needs that integration too. It has fragmented Christianity by associating it with only one aspect of the Christian experience. It has given a false conception of the Christian life to converts, because it ignores, or even antagonizes, the Church. This ministry of evangelism is of the Spirit, indeed, and as such it belongs in the Christian community of which the Spirit is the

creator and continual sanctifier. Let there be evangelism today—everywhere and with all the means at our disposal! But, let us by all means see to it that those who are evangelized are related to the Christian community and nurtured in its faith, heritage, and disciplines! And let the evangelism be undergirded by the wholeness of the Christian faith, which is the faith of the Church.

V

The next steps in the solution of this problem must be taken by Protestant leaders. The minister is the teaching elder in most denominations, and his attitude must change regarding his responsibility as the chief teacher in the local congregation. Further, he must see the place of the educational method in evangelical Christianity. While the teacher, or leader, is essential in communicating Christianity, he is *not* the center of the process; he is a *servant* of the Word which (or who) aims to reach persons for their transformation and development in spiritual stature. Protestantism dare not be clergy-centered or clergy-dominated; it must be Christ-centered and person-directed. Everything that is done in a church may be regarded as possessing a nurturing intention. And because this is so, *all* church work is of necessity evangelizing and edifying. Christian education is not an "extra" in which certain "inferior" people engage; rather, it is the way in which Christianity is soundly and solidly advanced. As such, the minister would do well to re-examine his many duties, select and perform well those tasks which are important, and do all things in the light of the *intention of Christ for persons*.

The pulpit, according to this conception, becomes Protestantism's greatest teaching agency. It is not a place from which a minister preaches about things that interest him, or upon scattered topics which are unrelated to the Christian faith or the total drive of the Church's task. A clergy-centered church inevitably becomes a church no stronger than its minister; besides, such a church inevitably becomes man-centered, or tends toward a type of authoritarianism. The ministry is to be respected for its high office in the Church, but that respect surely cannot rest solely upon the office, but upon the task of the office which the incumbent is bound to fulfil. The *paideia* of evangelical Christianity can return only as those who are responsible to it understand it, and *are obedient* to it. The minister is *also in* the Christian *paideia*, as is his pulpit message, his pastoral calling, and all of his other duties.

VI

There is need for a type of educational leadership within Protestantism which possesses a definite status. As it now stands, directors of Christian education are largely servants of the minister. Their work is not clearly defined. In many instances they are engaged in everything from pastoral calling to secretarial service. Directors should be given a type of ordination; some official recognition and status should be formulated and respected. Church work is *Church* work, although there are different ministries in the Church. The director of religious education must not regard his work as distinct from parish work. There may be differences of function in parish work, but there can be no difference on the matter of the nature and intention of the faith which binds all Christians together in the Christian community's task. Further, it is highly essential that ministers and directors of religious education secure their fundamental training in the Christian faith in the same institutions, or in schools with a similar religious outlook. Christian colleges and theological seminaries will have to see eye to eye on theology if this problem is to be solved! Much of the division between educator and minister in Protestantism has been due to the fact that each is trained in a different pedagogical and theological tradition. Theologian and pedagogue become one in viewpoint and purpose as they share common convictions regarding the Christian faith *in the Church*.

VII

The Christian home needs rehabilitation. The Church is prior to the Christian home; it is the Mother of the Christian family. Families do not make the Church; to say this is to deny the divine nature and function of the Church. Church homes are *in the Christian paideia*. This implies an adequate training of youth for Christian marriage and home-making. Protestantism has suffered from mixed marriages, which not only prevent couples from being truly united in God, but which also produce unstable environments in which dependent children are reared. Religious individualism, so characteristic of American romanticism, has vitiated the evangelical *paideia*. Churches must help new homes to establish the family altar, to select helpful books for parents with growing children, and to encourage families to attend a church that is centered in *homes* and not merely in individuals.

VIII

The total curriculum of Protestant denominations needs unifying and revamping. Why should the curriculum change so rapidly when the great realities of the faith remain ever the same? To be sure, there is need for changes in expression and application from time to time; but the intense desire to deal with the contemporary needs and the problems of childhood and of youth has tended to slight the central message of the Bible, the tested convictions, and the established symbols of the Christian community through the centuries. The curriculum needs to be unified, simplified, and to issue from the Christian community's beliefs, worship habits, symbols, ethical principles, literature, historical personages, struggles, triumphs, and the like. And all of these need to be related to contemporary living. The curriculum ought also to be published in substantial textual form. Even in the handling these materials should communicate stability; they should be printed on the best paper and illustrated with the finest artistry which is in keeping with the nature of evangelical truth. The curriculum must be such that Christian education is conceived of not merely as the task of the Church, but of the whole Christian community, including the home. Those who write the comments on the lesson outlines must become as literate about the meaning of the Christian faith as they are about ways of writing down a lesson to the interests of the child!

The content of the curriculum must be consistent! We cannot be true to the Christian *paideia* if we teach little children about a Jesus of history, and adolescents about the Christ of faith! No one can deny the element of growth in the grasp of the child, but to teach two kinds of Christianity to a person results in confusion. If we are under a mandate to teach Christianity, then we must teach *Christianity* and not certain parts of it, nor dare we teach those parts in diluted or falsified form.

IX

The Christian *paideia* must be related to public education. This requires *co-operation* on the part of all the religious forces in every community, since it is quite impossible for the schools to deal with individual churches or specific communions, unless the community is small and spiritually homogeneous. Even then, the religious freedom of minorities is to be respected. Through co-operative efforts, the public schools can be approached and helped to offer time to the churches for religious

educational work. School and church leaders may consult with a view to ascertaining how the schools can incorporate all religious aspects of our culture into their curricula. These elements are the rightful heritage of every American child and the essential foundations of the democratic way of life.

But, it ought to be remembered that the responsibility for the *Christian paideia belongs to the Church!* Since our schools are not godless there is no justification for Protestant parochial schools, except in the rarest situations. To take the Church's children and influence out of the schools is to make them more secular and to deny our responsibility toward the public schools and the community's *paideia*. No Protestant will seek to force the public schools to assume a role in the Christian *paideia* which they cannot fulfil. We cannot expect the schools to do the work of the Church nor can we make the schools scapegoats for our sins of commission and omission. The Church can do much better than it does in nurture with the time at its disposal whether on Saturdays, Sundays, summer vacations, or afterschool hours in church and home.

Parochial schools should be established only as a last resort, and only if and when the schools of the community have become totally irreligious, atheistic, or indifferent to a nonsectarian theism based upon the reality of God, his moral law, man's responsibility to that law, and the place of religion in our historic and contemporary culture. Since the public schools are largely Protestant products, it behooves the evangelical churches to exercise a greater concern for their religious character.

We cannot agree with Roman Catholicism that the Church and the State are to be separated but united in the Church. Nor can we agree with sectarianism that the Church and the State are to be radically separated. This type of sectarianism inevitably makes for a secular state. Nor can we believe with the Erastians that the Church and the State are to be united in the State. We have seen the effects of this totalitarianism in our times.

Rather, Church and State have separate existences in the divine economy. The Church cannot expect the State to be a Church, nor can the State expect the Church to be a state. However, both are in the economy of God! It is the Church's business to witness to the State and the community, to provide Christian citizens who through their vocations will temper, savor, and preserve the State. The Christian *paideia* is the *Christian paideia*, and those who are responsible for it will never regard any kind of nonsectarian religion taught in the schools as

theologically adequate. But this does not mean that we cannot co-operate with the schools, or with other religious groups, if thereby room is made in the schools for the teaching of minimum religious elements in our social heritage, either through specific courses of a nonsectarian kind, or through personnel and curricular references to the place of religion in man and his history.

X

Confessional differences in the various churches cannot be overlooked. Our efforts at Christian education have sometimes been weakened because we have skirted theological differences. As a result, theological depth has suffered because of breadth. After all, denominations still possess peculiar religious traditions and interpretations. Each denomination has a distinctive *paideia* of its own. Co-operation is essential and right in this day of ecumenical Christianity, but there are limits to what can be done educationally by the churches ecumenically! We are in a stage of transition from denominationalism to ecumenicity. It behooves all communions to become more truly Christian. The more they investigate their heritages, the more they will be led to that unity which exists in the central stream of the Christian tradition. Only *the* Church can save the churches! It is necessary to work at the problem of the Christian *paideia* from different angles, namely, that of the local church, the denomination, the community churches, the churches in the state and in the nation, and the world Christian community. The actual implementation of the Christian *paideia* is primarily a task of the *local* church and the *churches in a particular community*. There *are* levels of co-operation; but we only weaken our work when we fail to take these levels into consideration, for the simple reason that all the churches in a community simply cannot do the work of a local congregation, nor can the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ deal with the relation of the Christian churches in a specific community to their public educational system. Communities, too, vary greatly according to their religious institutions, their populations, and in other instances. Christian unity in the Christian *paideia* operates on different levels, and there is a limit to the type of Christianity which can be taught on each level.

XI

Finally, evangelism will be an essential element in a Christian *paideia*. There is a place for the direct evangelization of those who have never known the Christian *paideia*, or for those who have had only

a casual exposure to it. But this direct evangelism will not be divorced from the *paideia*, for it will insist that those who have made a public decision for Christ as Lord and Saviour will be immediately initiated into, and assisted to become creative members of, the Christian community.

However, there will be a continuous evangelization for those who have grown up in the Christian *paideia*, with a view to bringing children and youth to an ever-growing voluntary acceptance in faith of the heritage in which they live and move and have their being, the center of which is Jesus Christ. True Christian nurture implies solicitude on the part of the teaching community, and decision and commitment on the part of the individual member. The community and the individual are thus held together—but in tension. A false Christian nurture may produce formal Christians, or Christians who accept the external form of the Christian faith without an inward knowledge which is born of intellectual grasp and whole-souled allegiance. The child will grow up as a member of the Christian *paideia*, but he will also be led to know that *he* has *become* a believer by personal decisions, one or several of which have been crucial. In fact, the Christian *paideia* deliberately creates tensions within the life of growing children so that they may know that even though they belong to the Christian community they do not thereby become *naturally* or *automatically* Christian.

The fact of sin as taught in the Christian *paideia* cannot but make even the children within the covenant aware of their need of redemption and of hearty trust in the God who created, judges, and redeems them. The Christian *paideia* is saved from Bushnell's tendency toward naturalism by the reality of sin and the constant stress on the need of forgiveness, both within the individual and the Christian community.

This conception of the Christian *paideia* is historical, it is Christian, it is psychologically and sociologically sound. It must be saved from its tendency toward formalism and mechanical conditioning. To do so, evangelism cannot be regarded as an aside within it but as an absolutely essential element which not only brings adolescents within it to a public profession of faith, but as a continuing element in the lifelong nurture of all Christians.

A Batch of Books—A Review of the Quarter's Fiction

JOHN C. SCHROEDER

"THE crisis in Explanation has found its most violent expression in the ethical crisis and its political projection. Its root is the paradox of the individual whole which has to function as a social part; and again of social wholes—classes and nations—which have to be integrated into a whole of a higher order. This integration can never be achieved by Wellsian exhortations addressed to the intellect alone. It has to emerge, facilitated by a 'vertical' approach which brings to the dry concepts of part-ness, love and all-oneness the igniting spark of experienced reality. Neither the saint nor the revolutionary can save us; only the synthesis of the two." So Arthur Koestler concludes *The Yogi and the Commissar*, a book of essays, political, literary, and philosophical. Koestler's own life reflects the political violence of our time. He has been a communist; he has almost lost his life in concentration camps; his novels are virtually firsthand reportorial accounts of life in Russia and in Spain. Though an intellectual, his convictions and activities have thrust him into the hot core of our feverish world. He is typical of our turbulent age, a thoughtful, sincere, and disturbed man. He wants to change his world. He wonders whether we shall get a better social order through the Yogi's way of internal change or through the Commissar's control of society by external pressure. He subjects both to acute analysis introducing not only political and philosophical but also modern scientific criteria in his attempt to resolve his dilemma. He is never content with superficial diagnoses but tries rather to include all of the factors in the complex modern equation. He finally appeals to a synthesis of the two orders—an inevitable declaration perhaps, but one which actually is an arbitrary attempt to resolve his difficulty. Have not these two positions been the poles which have energized the current of human history? It is hard to understand what it truly means to say that they must be synthesized. Among the essays are some on Stalinist Russia where he condemns the regime on ethical as well as on political grounds. The literary contributions offer interesting insights into the decadence of intellectual Europe. One entitled "The Reader's

Dilemma" will make every book reviewer shudder. What impresses me most about Koestler is that he is a noble man who, in spite of hard thinking and sacrificial devotion, remains confused and disturbed. He is too intelligent to accept easy diagnoses of our predicament and too honest to offer easy remedies. When one wonders about the postwar world and what it will do to people, one concludes that he may be typical of the sensitive intellectuals who are the victims of a revolutionary age. His troubles are social and his dilemmas come from his inability to comprehend all that he sees and feels.

In sharp contrast there is Scott Fitzgerald's *The Crack-up*. He represents the sensitive sentient victim of the last war. I know that cosmopolitan New York is not America and that Fitzgerald's own life was not typical of the generation which came to maturity during the twenties. But from *This Side of Paradise* to *The Last Tycoon* he caught the spirit of the age and had he lived, he might have become one of our great novelists. Visiting with some of my young friends about the problem, I was assured that this generation would never repeat the tawdry history of the jazz age. Fitzgerald's three essays—"The Crack-up," "Handle With Care," and "Pasting It Together"—are sad self-revelations of the personal moral bankruptcy of a talented man who actually was very serious about treasuring his talent. He knew how to tell a story and he tried hard to understand people. Unlike Koestler, his concerns are personal rather than social. True, Fitzgerald hated the false standards of a plutocratic world and held them up to bitter scorn. But he did not think in terms of classes or of political groups. Just when he might have written a great book, he found that he had nothing to live by or live for, nor could he find it even though he consciously searched for it. "But don't let me suggest that the change from a rather overstuffed world to a comparative asceticism was any Research Magnificent—I only wanted absolute quiet to think out why I had developed a sad attitude toward sadness, a melancholy attitude toward melancholy and a tragic attitude toward tragedy—why I had become identified with the objects of my horror and compassion." He had so closely clung to his world that he could never trust his wings to get above it. He was a worker and respected his work. He had no illusions about his identification with the idlers of whom he wrote. There are many pages of excerpts from his notebooks, which reveal both his devotion to his craft and his capacity for acute observation. He was interested in people

rather than in nature; the opulent rather than the poor; vacuous idle women and febrile cosmopolitans. Such people, more than we are ready to admit, set some of the patterns of American social life through the movies and the magazines. Fitzgerald understood them and could turn a phrase about them. "To record one must be unwary." "The laugh generated by Fred Stone's 'I'm so nervous' in *The Wizard of Oz* justified a whole generation in cultivating nerves." "A girl who could send tear-stained telegrams." Edmund Wilson, "who for twenty years has been my intellectual conscience" compiled the book which is an extraordinary personal record of a man who represented a generation which cracked up. Will the next two decades find reflection in Koestler or in Fitzgerald?

Then I suppose you have been reading many books about the war. *Green Armor*, unconnected and disjointed though it is, introduced me to all the misery of the Pacific campaign when jungle fighting and the horror of life in New Guinea and the Solomons passed almost unnoticed. Mr. White, a New Zealander, tells the story of the early days in Port Moresby when a few Australians with little equipment had to hold the town against the regular visits of enemy planes, and then recounts his own adventure when he joined the troops who sought first to defend and then to retake the jungles in the Owen-Stanley Mountains. It is an incredible tale of the waste and the horror and the misery for white men in the jungle. He describes a lad with one leg blown off, having dressed the stump himself, trying to make his way back through the fetid swamps. The boys had been sent in with no knowledge of the kind of fighting and the kind of struggle they would face. What the Allies learned from the New Guinea campaign forced them to change their strategy and this tale reveals something about the price paid. Later on, Mr. White was a correspondent with American ships. One chapter in particular called "The Silent Invader" is a most dramatic episode when a destroyer goes in at night to keep its rendezvous with Navy Scouts and Raiders who had been left on the island alone to reconnoiter. These boys, whose duty was both so romantic and hazardous, will have startling tales to tell when they come home. I've already had the excitement of hearing a few of them.

Bill Mauldin's *Up Front* describes what G.I. Joe thinks and what he does. The cartoons are sometimes amusing; more often their humor is bitter. But they are never unkind. The text is an honest revelation

of a boy who knew his comrades and admired them. He does not like swank or brass hats or sentimental versions of heroes. He knows the boredom, the cruelty, the courage, and the cost of war and what it does to Willy and Joe. They have a terrible time and they go through their bitter days with patient humor and kindly fortitude. The veterans I know who have been in the infantry swear by this book. "This is it." "Here's what it's like." Mauldin, apparently, knows the soldier, and the boys who have done the slogging identify Willy and Joe.

As for recent novels, most of them have seemed to me too-sentimental or too-hurried or too-anxious to settle a problem. But *Interim* has both maturity and serenity as well as a sure and beautiful style. A British artillery sergeant named Roger tells the story of his occasional visits with the Quindles—a household of oddly assorted people. There is a father, mother, son, and daughter, a refugee couple with their baby and various people who drift into the household's kindly, shiftless hospitality. Only gradually does the pattern of relationships among this assortment become clear as though the reader had to take time to come to know them. Quindle himself is a saint, caught between his love for China where he had worked as a medical missionary, his affection for his querulous wife, and his true if undemonstrative concern for his two grown children. Some of the most interesting sections of the book for me were conversations between Quindle and his friend, a Roman padre. There have been so many books recently which have idealized the priest, that I confess to have derived some satisfaction from Quindle's impatience with the facile assurances of orthodoxy and its mechanical way of solving human problems. But Quindle, always kind, has his most severe crisis in his relationship with his smug wife. She says, "I was always wrong to think you might care for me as much as you care for China." "It isn't that, it isn't just my love for China. It's love for something larger and China is the place it leads me to. . . . I keep thinking and thinking of the millions since the day of Golgotha who've made their lives a bridge across the wastes of hopelessness. I can't pay for that with my small change, my pride won't let me. We're not required to be heroic now; no one's asking me to suffer contempt or torture. Surely I can't give less than the whole of my strength. When the battle they've left to me is such a paltry one, I can't clear out of it without a torn limb, without a smear of dirt or blood on my body." Then his relationships with his son and daughter are subtly and tenderly drawn. The

people in *Interim* are alive. They are good people, struggling people who face real issues and deal with them in fumbling human fashion, but always with the fortitude of those trying so hard to be honest with themselves. The style of the book is exceedingly good which makes it very different from most of the hurried and careless writing which has come along recently.

Of course, I couldn't resist the sixth of Upton Sinclair's version of contemporary history. This is history in homeopathic doses. I have followed Lanny Budd since he was a little boy—through the mazes of decadent society, the chancelleries of Europe, the trials and tribulations of the munitions makers, the seances and superstitions of the great who fashion history. Lanny Budd is as unreal as Superman. He always "gets his man," turning up at every crisis to observe and to record. While he presumably is a free moral agent, his role as a super spy for F.D.R. enables him to be a friend to all the world—Goering, Hitler, Laval, Churchill, members of the underground, the Reds and the "plutes." Each of the volumes continues in the same pattern with its intimate revelations of the minds of the mighty and of the great, who become very ordinary and very common as we follow Lanny into their intimate circles. But while Lanny is most unconvincing, the books are most convincing. The story is like a continuous newsreel of events everywhere during the early years of the war. Mr. Sinclair must maintain a monumental clipping bureau from conventional as well as radical newspapers. All of this material is sorted and digested and organized with some considerable imagination. So in *Dragon Harvest* the story of the intimate affairs of the great is unfolded to make a coherent and an interesting narration of the events which pick all of us up, to shatter our lives and to make us wonder about our race.

Another novel which attempts to help us understand our times is the story of an American dictator in *A Lion is in the Streets*. It is patently Huey Long and his adventure in the Magnolia State, even though the allegation is denied on the title page. Miss Langley tries to account for the man not in economic or sociological, but in personal terms. His story is told through his wife's experience. Verity Martin was a schoolteacher, born and reared in Pennsylvania, who met and was overwhelmed by the lusty, strong, passionate peddler who had come from poor white stock. He seems credible, this hill-billy, who, quoting the Bible and twisting it to his uses, charms and excites the poor of the little

villages and towns by a promise to redistribute the wealth. How his power grows and how he shrewdly manipulates people and occasions is most convincingly developed. His wife loves him, as do many women who are attracted by his romantic self-confidence. But she is honest enough to see how his love of power gradually corrupts this passionate but naïve man until he is caught in the violence and fraud which his own greed has manipulated. The story moves on from the carefully organized political machine, to an alliance with the gangsters, the sellouts of the people, the levying of taxes, and the persecution of all opposition to the inevitable assassination of this creature who had reached the place where he could rationalize any action for his own advantage. The tropic quality of some of the people is a little too hot and damp and the melodramatic crisis a little fantastic. But how else can you account for the emergence of a man from utter obscurity to the power and demonic corruption of a dictator? Such men have started from humble beginnings and have ended with all of the illusions of a Caesar. They can't be appraised only in terms of statistics and economics. They are men of deep passion and ruthless self-confidence. Their illusions corrupt men, but their illusions are also the sources of power. This novel is not an unsuccessful attempt to portray the inner life of one of them.

The Yogi and the Commissar, and Other Essays. By ARTHUR KOESTLER. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945. pp. 247. \$2.75.

The Crack-up. By F. SCOTT FITZGERALD. Collected and edited by Edmund Wilson. New York: New Directions, 1945. pp. 347. \$3.50.

Green Armor. By OSMAR WHITE. New York: W. W. Norton, 1945. pp. 288. \$3.00.

Up Front. By BILL MAULDIN. New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1945. pp. 228. \$3.00.

Interim. By R. C. HUTCHINSON. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1945. pp. 186. \$2.00.

Dragon Harvest. By UPTON SINCLAIR. New York: The Viking Press, 1945. pp. 703. \$3.00.

A Lion is in the Streets. By ADRIA LOCKE LANGLEY. New York: Whittlesey House, 1945. pp. 482. \$3.00.

Book Reviews

Experience Worketh Hope. By ARTHUR JOHN GOSSIP. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945. pp. 200. \$2.00.

After an interval of more than ten years another book of sermons has appeared from the pen of one of the greatest preachers of our generation. It is primarily "A Message for Tense Days," and comes out of a life vibrant with the gospel of Christ, concerned with little else, moving up gallantly and confidently under the lengthening shadow of the cross against the threat and pressure of the years. The same power of imagination that peopled and pictured his earlier work makes itself felt in this; the same vividness of illustration, the same thrust and liveliness of style. One could no doubt dispense with many of the numerous quotations of both poetry and prose; but not with the old insistent sanity and passionate realism; not with the old inescapable directness of address and cumulative concreteness of expression; not with the old surging knowledge and tireless use of Scripture.

If anything seems different, it is the increased awareness of the contemporary scene. Bertrand Russell stalks on and off, with Walter Lippmann, Jung and Freud, Eddington, MacMurray, T. S. Eliot, and Aldous Huxley. There is the conscious immediacy of that sermon on "The Spiritual Danger of Being Unimportant." Another, "On the Imitation of Christ: a Warning," treats of the use of force. A third deals with "The Terror and Hope of the Times," and a fourth with "The Sense of Sin, and the Man of Today." Everywhere is the clear imprint of a world gone bankrupt, where the New Testament is strangely at home again, and no room is left for fancy: only the stark facts will serve.

And Dr. Gossip stays by them. He is far more intent throughout on the necessity of religionizing our morals than he is on that somewhat less significant task of moralizing our religion! In no sense is he anywhere an exponent of the social gospel; nor is he either at any time a disciple of Neo-Orthodoxy. In outlook he retains a good deal of the optimism of the much-abused liberal; but with him it never stems from any illusions on the subject of human nature: it stems from his all-pervading sense of the sovereignty of God over human history. He knows his Bible, and he knows his theology; and he preaches them both, through himself and out, to an audience not so naïvely unfamiliar with either as must be assumed, I am afraid, of the average Protestant congregation in America.

His method is textual, though not rigidly so; the processes of his mind intuitive, rather than logical; the movement of his thought discursive, and not always too closely articulated. There are times indeed, and they are more frequent than in the past, when he is betrayed by his very gifts into a lack of clarity, into overdramatization, now and then into repetitiousness and verbosity, unable to come on the nouns for the press of adjectives round about.

But there is no denying his power. It springs from the unfailingly sound and evangelical content of his message; from the keenness and particularity of his insight; from his firsthand acquaintance with the human heart, and such a tide of compassion as moving seems asleep. Preaching like this, honest and apostolic, not of ideas but of Christ, even if it were stripped of its genius, would go far to redeem the pulpit of our day from the charge of mediocrity that so justly lies against it.

These are not elaborate essays on timely topics: they are the witness of God concerning his Son, beaten out on the anvil of a life that itself fairly rings to every stroke of the hammer. You cannot get away from them unscathed or unmoved: from their "deliberate speed, majestic instancy." You may "clap your resolute hands to tight shut eyes"; but you will not "keep out this accursed light." It makes you stir uneasily, "like an old dog that whimpers" and twitches at a dream: You cannot wait around any longer with your "snivelling complaints," "a circle of wolves sitting on their tails, ululating miserably to the skies." There are heights, and you have to climb; "holding on with hands and feet, and the very curves of your body." There are vast horizons: and the "myriad twinkling glory of shimmering waters" comes in over the "unlovely flats"; "laps persistently against you, coaxing, plucking, urging, enticing to the cleanness and adventure of the open seas."

On almost any sultry summer's day, tiny, sharp-billed hummingbirds poise themselves motionlessly in the drowsy air; then dart from flower to flower, as if all but bewildered by Nature's endless profusion of savor and loveliness. I cannot help feeling that there is like bewilderment here: but somehow it seems to be the bewilderment of angels and archangels on the wing before the face of God!

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The Moral Theory of Evolutionary Naturalism. By WILLIAM F. QUILLIAN, JR. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945. pp. xiii, 154. \$3.00.

In the ivory towers and market places of the twentieth century there is a persisting heritage of nineteenth-century evolutionary ethics. When one finds commonly the appeal to "nature" as implying "the survival of the fittest" in human affairs, and among learned circles a continuing naturalism, one is reminded how much the voice of Darwin is still heard in the land. This book, therefore, is a pertinent one. Mr. Quillian makes a careful analysis of the explanation of human conduct at the hands of the evolutionary naturalist and of his attempt to construct a new morality. Among men like Darwin, Clifford, Stephens, Guyau, and Spencer, a common enthusiasm for the new messiah of evolution, so startlingly successful in its explanation of biological phenomena, led them with rejoicing to extend its magic formula to the moral life. They pointed to the continuities of man and animal in "social instincts," acquired and transmitted by natural selection. They found it plausible to account for the special "moral" prerogatives of man (conscience and the sense of obligation) in naturalistic terms. Having explained the origin of morality thus, it was but an easy step to their pronouncement of a new commandment, a new "norm" for ethics: the good equals that which is conducive to the health and survival of the social group, the bad is the opposite.

But this impressive thesis Quillian finds full of misleading subterfuge. The main criticism he makes is that the evolutionary naturalist derives the normative "ought" from the descriptive "is." In reality, thinks Quillian, the distinctly moral norms must be derived from other than merely the descriptive analysis, in naturalistic terms, of human behavior. The "fittest" biologically is not the same as the "best" ethically. Rigorous logic would not countenance such sly assumption. Fortunately, the author's criticism is more than a search for fallacies. He counterposes to the evolutionary naturalist a theological answer to the question of moral norms. Man's truly moral capacities, his free and responsible selfhood, the unconditional character

of moral obligation, give him a unique thralldom and discontent requiring a divine source and object.

One can be grateful indeed for the painful care with which Quillian has built his stone-on-stone explication and criticism of evolutionary ethics. The book suffers somewhat from the fact that the scaffolding was left up when the building was done. Its lines are obscured under belabored summaries and repetitions. Nor can it be said to be marked by soaring prose. But these are minor matters which might irk only one who reads while he runs. Quillian's essential criticisms of evolutionary naturalism, while not original, are cumulatively convincing. The concluding case he makes for the theological basis of ethics is sketched in very broad strokes, but it represents the soundest vantage point from which the ethics of naturalism can be reckoned with, and a nobler morality derived.

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The Way of At-one-ment. By W. J. PHYTHIAN-ADAMS. London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1944. pp. 127. 7s.6d.

This book, written by the Canon of Carlisle, is "offered to Anglicans and Free Churchmen who are working for Reunion." It is concerned with the doctrines of the Church, the ministry, and the sacraments, seeking to ground them securely in biblical teaching and then to employ the resultant point of view both as a critique of, and a unifying factor in, the current practices of Protestantism.

Chapter I attempts to lay bare "the Pattern of Sacred History." The author rightly says that the current confusion in biblical study has arisen "because we have all lost sight of the Providential unity of the Bible as it was grasped and expounded by the writers of the New Testament." This unity is to be found in the saving activity of God which was "effected in two stages . . . each with its Covenant and elect people." That which God worked in Israel was seen by the writers of the New Testament to be repeated with power in the events of their own day, in the new age in Christ. There was now a new *Israel*, a new *deliverance from bondage*, a new *Covenant*, and a new *Inheritance*. "This had God done when he went first to choose him out a People; *this* he had promised through the prophets to do once more at the end of the age; and *this* he had actually done, or was in process of doing, under his new Dispensation of Holy Spirit." Pythian-Adams coins a new word to describe this correspondence between the two Testaments, namely, "homology"; and it is an interesting and vital point to remember. One wonders, however, whether "homology" is more than half the answer to the question of the Bible's basic unity? There is a real "correspondence" in this sense, but there is also a fulfillment. "Homology," by emphasis, may lose sight of the latter, whereas the latter is usually interpreted to omit the former. I should prefer not to oversimplify, but to use both terms.

Chapter II deals with "the Royal Priesthood." It presents the theological meaning and significance of the priesthood and sacrificial system in the Old Testament and its "homology" in the New. The author rightly maintains that the essence of the "sacrificial system is the communion of Israel with the Glorious Presence within the Veil." Its purpose, therefore, is "At-one-ment." In the New Testament the Church becomes the new Temple, mediating "At-one-ment" (reconciliation); repentance, faith, and a life subject to the all-embracing

law of love are the offerings; and the new Israel, the Body of Christ is the Royal Priesthood who "shall reign for ever and ever" (I Pet. 2:9-10; Rev. 22:3-5).

The remaining four chapters of the book deal with the modern Church and the application of this biblical theology to its life and practice. The main contention of Chapter III is that both Catholic and Protestant churches have forgotten that they are the new Israel, and that the function of "At-one-ment" is communion. The Catholic Church, with its emphasis upon salvation through the sacraments, and the Protestant churches with their attention upon repentance, faith, and sanctification have both failed to do "justice to the corporate sense which pervades the doctrine of the Church." For this reason, "the Reformation has stopped short of final victory. It has recovered the true meaning of faith and grace but it has never caught sight again of Israel." Chapter IV traces the significance and development of the ministerial offices in the early Church and the beginnings of sacerdotalism. Chapters V and VI deal with the ministry, the Word, and the sacraments in the life of the modern Church. The Catholic Church regards the ministry as primarily the ministry of the sacraments in which the priest, regardless of his nature as a person, is the indispensable and permanent instrument of the sacrificial act of Christ, that is, of the means of grace. To this the Reformers opposed the conception of a ministry of the Word in which the minister is the "nonexclusive agent" or "organ" of the oral and visible Word of God. Both, according to Pythian-Adams, are onesided, since neither desires a ministry which is both personal and instrumental. (At this point, the author's case against the Protestant conception seems less than convincing to this reviewer!) As regards church organization, the author presents an excellent critique of the Episcopacy in England and offers suggestions as to how it should be revised in line with biblical theology. His conclusion is that when *rightly understood* the Episcopacy "is the only possible form of government for the Church of Christ." He thus writes as a "low churchman" in defense of a purified Anglican system. It occurs to the reviewer that the Methodist and Presbyterian forms of government, for example, might also be defended with these same arguments, provided *they* were rightly understood and in a purified form! The author performs a most excellent service to the churches, however, in presenting the issues and viewing them through the perspective of biblical theology.

This outline of the book's content will indicate something of its provocative nature and importance. Many things could be said in defense and in criticism of it. To the reviewer the main limitation is a concentration upon the sacrificial and priestly elements in the Old Testament. The author rightly points to their real meaning and significance. But from the standpoint of the Bible the Body of Christ is not only a "Royal Priesthood"; it should also fulfil the offices of Prophet and Apostle, i.e., heralds of God's Word. Historically, Israel's significance lay not merely in its being "a kingdom of priests and a holy nation," but primarily in its prophetic proclamation (cf. Num. 11:29; Isa. 49:6; etc.). The early Church saw Jesus not only as High Priest and the fulfillment of the sacrificial system, but also as prophet and Messiah (cf. Acts 7). "At-one-ment," a conception borrowed from the sacrificial system, can be and is filled with rich meaning. But there are other terms and categories in the Bible which are even more expressive of God's purpose and saving activity. In other words, biblical terminology is a very rich one, and it is easy in the interest of form to oversimplify it.

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Marriage in War and Peace. By GRACE SLOAN OVERTON. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1945. pp. 190. \$1.75.

The concern of leaders in various areas of community work is prompting articles and books which seek to further understanding and treatment of the consequences of war upon marriage. Among these is *Marriage in War and Peace*. It is helpful principally for orientation of those not already conversant with actual conditions and their pervading significance. Mrs. Overton states, "I here attempt to bring together such an array of the disturbances which have taken place as will help us to understand them." She takes the reader here and there for rapid glances of what is going on. She is interested in the development of certain points of view, primarily an inclination "to gear training and guidance to the newer marriage practices and requirements."

There is an important statement in the book (p. 130) to the effect that some of the present boy-girl relationships, if allowed to develop, will destroy our present pattern of marriage, and that these relationships are due to the inconsistency between the teaching of leaders and their expectations regarding the conduct of young people. The author rightly states that youth are disturbed about this themselves but do not know how to develop a better pattern. It would have been very helpful if guidance had been provided here rather than the strong plea that "boys and girls should be *taught* the place of the caress and kiss in their experimental ventures in friendship." This training of young people to manage well their practices of kissing and caressing is one approach to the problem of improving marriage, a symptomatic approach, it seems to me. Do not these days of crisis demand the more basic one of genuine and adventuresome participation of youth in such actual community developments and events as yield meanings and values vitally appreciated by youth? They are starved for vital meaning in life.

Many problem-situations are sketched in illustration of aspects of marriage being discussed. This makes for vividness in understanding. But lest the reader erroneously gain the impression that counseling given on the basis of a half-hour interview can be effective and sound, it seems important to emphasize that any problem sufficiently troublesome to be taken to a counselor will almost always require hours of co-operative study for reliable treatment. This caution is prompted by the realization of the great increase in the demand for counseling in marriage which is already upon us. Of course, the author is not here giving treatment but trying to promote understanding.

Mrs. Overton's interest and joy in the work out of which this book is written are everywhere apparent in this volume.

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Chicago, Illinois.

This Ministry: The Contribution of Henry Sloane Coffin. Edited by REINHOLD NIEBUHR. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945. pp. vi, 128. \$1.50.

Nine contributors have united in this tribute to Dr. Coffin at the time of his retirement from the presidency of Union Theological Seminary: Morgan P. Noyes, Henry P. Van Dusen, Robert Hastings Nichols, Walter Russell Bowie, William Pierson Merrill, John C. Bennett, Charles W. Gilkey, James R. Angell, Charles Seymour, with Reinhold Niebuhr the editor. In the order cited above they write

of him as "Parish Minister," "Theological Educator," "Leader of Liberal Presbyterianism," "Preacher," "Liturgist and Hymnologist," "Exponent of Social Christianity," "Religious Leader in Colleges," "Member of the Yale Corporation," and "Theologian and Church Statesman."

Such a project might have yielded a long and ponderous volume. In actual fact the book in hand is lean, alert, and fast-moving. Its style and format fit the man himself. Something of his own quickness and holy impatience has communicated its quality to his friends as they pay tribute to him. It has been said that the gracious days of the old-time two-volume biography are probably now gone for good. In any case a brief book, such as *This Ministry*, while it makes no pretense to tell a full life story, may often come nearer the truth of character by its swift and penetrating insights. Patently that is so in this instance.

The Christian religion has always conceded and encouraged diversities of gifts and of operations. Many kinds of craftsmen, working at different tasks, are needed for the "edification" of the Church. To this extent Christianity fits the modern world well. We live in an age of specialization and therefore of divided skills. This is as true of the professions as of industries. The jack-of-all-trades is an outmoded anachronism. Yet there has never been a time when there was greater need of men who can "see life steadily and see it whole." More often than otherwise, however, the man who pretends to see life and the world in something like their entirety is, from the standpoint of the specialist, an incompetent amateur. It is Henry Coffin's distinction to have been able to manifest in his own person during one professional lifetime a diversity of gifts, to have compassed a diversity of operations, to have insisted upon the synoptic view of things, and yet to have won and kept the respect of specialists.

There is a certain amount of repetition in the chapters of this brief volume. Some of the pages overlap like shingles on a roof. Unconsciously, rather than consciously, the writers play into each other's hands. Yet this very fact tells a truth about Dr. Coffin which could not be told if he could have been broken up and parceled out among the contributors. He cannot be departmentalized. There is about him a core of integrity and a "central peace subsisting at the heart of endless agitation."

His has been a long and distinguished career. The bulk of the years were given to the Madison Avenue Church and Union Seminary. Coffin has been essentially a man of the cities over years when the cities, for better or for worse, have made the mind of America. He has shared the zest of life in the greatest of our cities, while he has not shirked its baffling problems. Therefore his mind has moved around the prophetic idea of the "City of God," rather than reverting to some lost "garden."

Robert Nichols' chapter cites Henry Sloane Coffin as "a gallant leader of Liberal Presbyterianism in a time of grave peril for the Church." In his early years, in company with his father, he had witnessed the famous "Briggs Trial." The native generosity of youth, confirmed by his own subsequent studies at Yale, Union, Edinburgh, and Marburg, prompted him to cast his lot with the exponents of modern biblical scholarship. He has never recanted that decision. Both as preacher and administrator he has been the defender of free inquiry and free speech. He has identified himself as a "liberal evangelical." Partisans to the theological right and the theological left might regard the term as equivocal. But Dr. Coffin has held to his conviction that it is possible to remain in the great central ongoing

stream of Christian piety at the same time that one is intellectually a citizen of one's own age. He has been a stranger to controversy, but at the same time he has been a mediator and conciliator. His zeal for the "united Church of Christ" has made him "a Presbyterian only temporarily." One could wish that all narrow sectarians, whether conservative or radical, might catch something of his catholicity.

Coffin's high seriousness has never lapsed to the dull level of solemnity. The saving salt of his quick sense of humor has prevented many a situation from going stale. A shrewd irony has devastated the pretensions of both pedantry and ecclesiasticism. High office and crowded calendar have never impaired his native humanity. The man has always been more patent than the vestments. Yet his inerrant taste for having things done decently and in order has saved him from what might be called cultural antinomianism. And through it all, as a constant and continuing thread, there runs his moral earnestness and his undeviating personal faith in God as revealed through Christ.

WILLARD L. SPERRY

Harvard Divinity School, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

A Newman Synthesis. Arranged by ERICH PRZYWARA. New York: Sheed & Ward, 1945. pp. xiii, 379. \$3.50.

These nearly four hundred pages are a tour de force of combination and compression. They are, to begin with, an abridgment of the original six-volume German edition which is, in turn, an awesome and exhaustive systematization of about everything Newman ever wrote—a massive accomplishment.

This condensed anthology reveals the subtle, spacious, unrelenting movement of Newman's mind and spirit through his most significant writing and writings. Twenty-four sources are cited: the essays, his historical studies, his more specifically controversial efforts, the "Tracts," his lectures on so many subjects, the "Apologia," his sermons, and his poetry.

The author manages it in twenty-one chapters essentially theological in their progressive structure. Each chapter is many sectioned, each section key lettered and key numbered to indicate its source. The selections are naturally controlled by the sympathies and purposes of the compiler. There are, possibly, shadings and calculated omissions. The controversial is much softened, and its backgrounds and occasions in Newman's world, religious and secular, are, of necessity, not there at all.

And yet this very detachment unveils the mind and spirit of Newman with a strange veracity. The paradox of Newman is the interplay of detachment and entanglement in all that he was and all that he wrote. His enduring value is that the true Newman can be thus detached. To turn these pages is to yield again to the magic of his style, to be carried along on the current of his insights and to acknowledge his profound life wisdom.

The passages cited are endlessly quotable. The book is invaluable for those who want a highly competent Newman anthology—without Newman. It would be rewarding to companion it with Mauriac's *Les Pages Immortelles de Pascal*. For all their differences, there is an inner kinship between Newman and Pascal, and they shared the gift to make a sentence or a page timeless.

GAUUS GLENN ATKINS

North Marshfield, Massachusetts.

The Flower of Grass. By ÉMILE CAMMAERTS. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1945. pp. xx, 176. \$2.00.

Increasingly, modern historians and critics are asking when did Christianity lose its control of the Western world and why. Increasingly, also, many of them are adding the more pertinent or impertinent question: Why not! Five centuries ago the *ex cathedra* pronouncements of the Church were international fiat and charters of liberty. As late as three decades ago the encyclicals of popes or the resolutions of Synods and Conferences were front-page news with a promise of peace under spiritual sanctions. Today a global Conference cannot be opened with prayer because it may offend the nonbelieving nations and provoke the secession of their representatives.

It is exactly this problem to which Professor Émile Cammaerts, a Belgian teaching in London University, addresses himself in this timely and provocative book, *The Flower of Grass*. As he sees it after living the prime of life in the twilight between two wars, "the tragedy of modern times is the tragedy of a man who denies the existence of the stars because he is shortsighted. His limited knowledge does not provide him with any guidance. He is free, of course, to go anywhere, but he does not know where to go. Even if he did, he would lose his bearings. He wanders aimlessly in an intellectual blackout, knocking himself against every obstacle."

The Greeks had a word for such an obstacle. They called it a *skandalon*, a scandal, or stumbling block. Professor Cammaerts would approve this designation. Then, with his Gallic ardor tempered by British restraint, he would add that the major scandal of modern thought is probably atheistic humanism. This, he believes, has given us crass materialism in industry, crude mechanism in philosophy, hedonism in personal behavior, and power politics in international relations. He is especially vitriolic, and valid too, in his denunciation of humanistic education with its emphasis on information rather than intelligence, happiness rather than righteousness, nationalism rather than religion, and fear rather than faith.

"Truly Christian education," he says (pp. 40-41), "develops both reason and faith, the mind and the heart. It brings together and harmonizes human faculties. But secular education is apt to separate these faculties and to foster, at the same time, a harsh intellectual attitude and an overexcitable enthusiasm. . . . An utilitarian outlook leads to the neglect of everything which does not achieve 'concrete results.' That is why so much attention is paid today to technology, medicine and economics, and so little to art, literature, and philosophy."

Stated in the American idiom, which Cammaerts might not understand but would approve, the upshot of it all is a global generation of money grubbers, claim jumpers, jitterbugs, perverts, hundred-per-centers, and power politicians proclaiming their divine right to be happy in a world they have cut to ribbons. The thorough-going humanist, he insists (pp. 80-81), "discards all Church discipline, claims man's right to organize society for the sole purpose of satisfying his instincts and aspirations, and substitutes for revealed religion either agnosticism or a vague theism leading to the worship of human reason."

It is disheartening to follow Cammaerts in this devastating attack on humanism. It is also redeeming to admit finally, as he does (p. 85), that it is "a bold experiment which went wrong." It attempted to please rather than to teach and, so, substituted entertainment for education and self-indulgence for religion.

"These actions and reactions," Cammaerts rightly observes (p. 91), "are inevitable as long as we do not recognize that there is no stable order apart from God. . . . As long as this supernatural and therefore supernatural authority is not acknowledged, man will go on fighting in order to conquer or to recover his self-righteous illusions."

Cammaerts is especially disturbed about the impact of humanism on Christian thought. "Christ was no longer God made man," he says (p. 109), "but a certain man made God by his pious admirers. His commandments were no longer absolute; they were relative to the period and to the circumstances in which he lived, and their authority could be questioned in any other period or circumstances." Thus, His way of life has been distorted into a cheap joy ride to success or happiness instead of the Via Dolorosa it really was, "a steep rocky path to be followed on bleeding feet in the stark nakedness of humility and contrition." Professor Cammaerts is wrong here only in assuming that this emasculated Christology is normative for Protestant theology. There are many superhumanists among the liberals who believe and teach that the dynamic of Christianity is its challenge to sacrifice, suffering, or even crucifixion. Protestants and liberals will be especially grateful to Professor Cammaerts for his brilliant elucidation of this harsh but redeeming doctrine.

Even so, the supreme contribution of *The Flower of Grass* is not this redeeming insight but its extension from the personal to the international plane. Professor Cammaerts contends that in the light, not of the humanity, but of the divinity of Christ we are all, nations as well as individuals, in the same condemnation. "The real cause of war," he concludes (p. 171), "was neither arms, nor armies, nor necessarily a particular nation, but man's selfishness increased a thousandfold by international competition, and man's refusal to accept the Christian way of life, substituting co-operation for competition, sacrifice for greed, and charity for hatred." Power politics and peace pacts will restore the lost influence of the Christian religion only as they follow this sacrificial but redemptive way of faith and forgiveness.

EARL MARLATT

Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts.

Clinical Pastoral Training. Edited by SEWARD HILTNER. New York: Commission on Religion and Health, Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1945. pp. xv, 176. \$1.00.

This is a report of the National Conference on Clinical Training in Theological Education which was held in Pittsburgh in June, 1944, in conjunction with the meeting of the American Association of Theological Schools.

This conference, suggested originally by Professor Philip Guiles of Andover Newton Theological School, brought together 114 of the men most concerned with the future of theological education and of the clinical training movement. Its purpose was to secure a frank discussion of the philosophy, techniques, and programs of clinical training and to explore the relation of such training to the curriculum of the theological school. The various papers reflect clearly the community of purpose and the healthy differences in philosophy and in method which already characterize the movement.

There is complete agreement regarding the need of providing opportunities for students of theology to deal under guidance with the infirmities of mankind.

As to just which opportunities are most important and what kind of guidance is to be provided there are divergent views. The Cincinnati School of Applied Religion, which has recently been taken over by the Episcopal School in Cambridge, has believed in a multiple approach. Its students have lived in a common center and have worked in different institutions and agencies. The Institute of Pastoral Care and the Boston group with which it is associated concentrate on the general hospital on the ground that its patients most nearly represent the kind of people the minister has in his parish. The Council for Clinical Training provides internships in both general and mental hospitals and in correctional institutions under the guidance of a trained, resident supervisor. All, however, insist upon the importance of listening, of careful note-taking and of keeping accurate records. And all would agree that they are not seeking to introduce any new subject into the already overcrowded theological curriculum. What they do insist upon is the necessity of beginning with living human experience rather than with books. They insist thus upon a new approach to the age-old problems of religion.

This volume is ably edited. Its chief significance, and that of the Conference which it reports, may be found in the evidence of increasing interest in clinical training on the part of the seminaries and in their increasing readiness to give support and guidance to the movement.

ANTON T. BOISEN

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The Dark Night of the Soul. By GEORGIA HARKNESS. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1945. pp. 192. \$1.50.

That many people are seeking "the garment of praise for the spirit of heaviness" is a fact well known by ministers and social workers. We live in a heavy-hearted age. Dr. Harkness has written "primarily for those who have tried earnestly, but unsuccessfully, to find a Christian answer to the problem of suffering." This study was launched with a confidence that there is a way out of the darkness. The title of the book was taken from a volume written by the sixteenth-century Spanish mystic, St. John of the Cross. Here is a valuable contribution to the literature available in the field of religion and mental or physical health. Its unique approach lies in the sound theological basis, high lighted by case studies from modern medical records, and broadened into historic significance by an examination of the lights and shadows across the souls of saints and mystics through the ages.

"The most characteristic note in all descriptions of the 'dark night of the Soul,'" says the author, "is that of a frustrated sense of the Divine presence." This depression is described also as "a self-distrust with self-condemnation"; as "loneliness resulting from separation from God and man," and as "spiritual impotence." These moods are not characteristic of our day alone. They appear among widely separated religious leaders. Old Testament writers seek refreshment for their famished spirits. The Prophet Jeremiah complains of suffering, saying, "Woe is me!" Saints of the Roman Catholic Church and prophets of the Protestant Church are studied. Each found ponderous hours, like dervishes walking up and down. So dark spiritual nights have been characteristic experiences of all types of religious leaders in all ages. A knowledge of this fact is a profound help for persons who have found depression a companion, but have supposed that they were isolated from God and different from other men.

At this point Dr. Harkness gives the greatest practical aid, outlining a satisfying theology for this phase of suffering, and relating the discoveries of science to the broadest reference and sincerest commitment to God. With an understanding of his emotional tendencies, with certain practical procedures for improvement of his physical condition, and with a valid approach to God the source of all healing, the earnest person can find effective release and real guidance in this book.

This book is written for those who approach their problems from a religious point of view. It is useful for the mature individual who can remain objective as he searches for the light from above. By uniting the insights of religion with the discoveries of psychology and medicine, Dr. Harkness has given all earnest seekers new resources for their quest.

HAROLD C. CASE

Elm Park Methodist Church, Scranton, Pennsylvania.

Pascal: Genius in the Light of Scripture. By ÉMILE CAILLIET. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1945. pp. 383. \$3.75.

In this our time when the Church is forced to raise fundamental questions about her existence and faith, a restudy of Pascal will be immensely fruitful. We can no longer accept systems of theology forged by men of the past. There is no ready-made statement of truth which shall satisfy our minds and formulate our duty in the world today. What we need is the help of men who have been honest and relentless in their search for the basic verities of our existence, who have had the courage to face their God and to receive from him such light as he will bestow for a life proper to man. It is the insights of such wrestlers with God that will lead us to ask the questions which are right for us and to find answers according to the will of God.

Therefore we owe Dr. Cailliet an enormous debt of gratitude for this masterly book on Pascal. No one who knows Pascal denies that he was a great mathematician and physicist. Everyone is astonished at the genius of the young man who wrote the essays on conic sections, on the vacuum, and on the calculus of probabilities. But philosophers and theologians alike have turned away from the man who invented the calculating machine but refused to become one himself! The former have never forgiven Pascal his harsh judgments on philosophers and their "reason." The theologians who are, if anything, more presumptuous than philosophers, have also stayed away from this man who laughed at their subtleties and refused to be impressed by their structures of word and wind. Pascal was a troublemaker, and professional thinkers do not like people like him around. So, they have set him aside and remained undisturbed. However, we who are disturbed through no choice of our own will find in Pascal a kindred spirit, a man who needed God rather than "the system."

In our judgment, Dr. Cailliet's great contribution to our understanding of Pascal is the insight that the Bible was Pascal's primary and essential source for understanding human existence. "In the light of Scripture" Pascal apprehended the profound truths about man and his ways which leave the discerning reader of the *Pensées* breathless. In the perspective of biblical thought, he saw both the grandeur and the misery of man, both his essential goodness and his actual wickedness, both his desire for God and his idolatry. Thus it was that like Augustine, whom he admired greatly, and anticipating Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, he became

a Christian *pneumatologist*, one who knew the spirit of man in relation at once to the finite and to the Infinite. Thus it was that he discovered anew the deep sin and anxiety in the human soul and stated man's need for God who alone can save him from both. Pascal understood in and through the Bible; and this is the reason for his insights into the spiritual life which are perhaps more penetrating than even his mathematical analyses. Pascal, like Augustine and Kierkegaard, is genuine evidence that the Bible is the key to a proper knowledge of human existence.

Lack of space does not permit us to say much in praise of the erudition, organization, and sound judgment which have gone into the making of this book. Dr. Cailliet has offered us a mine of information on one of the greatest of Christian thinkers. He has written with great understanding and a passion proper to his subject. We can only thank him well by careful reading of his book and by a renewed study of Pascal who has more to teach us than will be found in any book about him, even one so excellent as that of Dr. Cailliet.

JOSEPH HAROUTUNIAN

McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, Illinois.

The Story of the Christian Year. By GEORGE M. GIBSON. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1945. pp. 238. \$2.50.

This volume puts into form the feelings and searchings of many ministers and laymen of the nonliturgical churches of America. During the past two decades American Protestantism has been experiencing a new interest in the meaning of worship. Many of our churches are discovering a real significance in the use of the historic Christian year.

The Christian year offers an opportunity to dramatize and make vivid the reality of God in the world. It gives a chance to bring into the marching days of men a spiritual scale of values, making use of all the days to fulfil the likeness of Christ by fellowship and service.

Dr. Gibson has been on a long and interesting spiritual pilgrimage. A Texan and Methodist by birth and education, he has moved into Illinois and Congregational-Presbyterianism. At present he is the successful minister of the Hyde Park United Church in Chicago. Here he is leading a great congregation into the ordered disciplines of God that bring true freedom. Here he uses the seasons of the year as seasons of the soul.

The Christian year is no accident, nor a mere ecclesiastical process. It is rooted deep in the needs of the soul, in the experiences and insights of men. The observance of any ritual year is not a forced or artificial thing. Egyptians and Assyrians, Greeks and Romans, all had their festivals and fasts. Out of its long history the people of Israel built their year of fast and festival.

Dr. Gibson is deeply aware of the history back of Christianity. He puts it well by saying, "The fulfillment of Judaism and the conquest of paganism in Christ is dramatized in the pageantry of the Christian year, and the pageantry itself becomes a chief means for propagating the new faith" (p. 68). Christianity has a form that expresses its eternal spirit.

It is important that the Christian year be seen for what it is and that it be used, not slavishly, not as a mere routine, but reverently, and with the freedom wherewith Christ has made us free. If it did nothing more than put habit on the side of the culture of faith it would justify itself. But that is not its chief justifi-

cation. The great thing that it does is to lead into ordered appreciation and balanced knowledge of the life and spirit of Him who discloses to us all we want or need of God. Following through the Christian year we may recapitulate the life story of Jesus and the initial experience and insight that brought the Church into being.

Christianity is an event in time, rooted in the realities of history, having a place in the calendar and a date in the story of man. "The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth." We cannot escape history and when the pressure of the contemporary is so heavy upon us it is a good and great thing to have days of remembrance when we recall all the gracious wonder of God's disclosure of himself in the Bethlehem Babe who grew to be the Man of Galilee and the Lord of all good life. Here was given a new date to time and a new era in the character and career of man.

Dr. Gibson writes with spiritual insight, disciplined historic balance, and poetic sensitiveness. The art illustrations, which are from his own hand, are superbly well done. Here is a book that should be on the desk of all our Protestant church-school editors, writers, and creators of religious education curricula. Every minister should read it and catch its meaning. Here is a book that will mean much as it finds its way to the book tables of our Christian homes. The *Book of Worship for Church and Home*, which will be published this fall for use in The Methodist Church, has much material in it laid down on the pattern of the historic Christian year. The calendar of the Christian year is helpful and good to live and work by.

An old English ballad sings:

Oh live ye by the Calendar
And with the good ye dwell;
The Spirit that comes down on them
Shall lighten you as well.

OSCAR T. OLSON

Epworth-Euclid Methodist Church, Cleveland, Ohio.

Christianity and the Cultural Crisis. By CHARLES D. KEAN. New York: Association Press, 1945. pp. xi, 211. \$2.00.

In *Christianity and the Cultural Crisis* Charles Duell Kean has made an extraordinarily keen and fair analysis of the problems of present-day civilization. He does not agree with those who believe that Christianity is an altogether private affair nor with those who would apply it as a specific directly to such problems as fascism and unemployment. He looks upon Christianity as providing a frame of reference which transcends history and within which particular social problems may be seen and attacked in perspective (p. viii).

The author considers the present state of the world as something more than an economic and political maladjustment. What is significant, but generally overlooked, is that it is the soul of the West that is profoundly disturbed. Our disease is primarily internal while we have sought our solutions in the external alone. To this position we have been led by an oversight of the role of the person in history, and have thereby lost the meaning of history. We have assumed that if we could control and arrange external facts and circumstances we could solve all our problems. This one-sidedness has been largely brought about by our reference of all solutions to "the economic man," and in spite of our present calamitous situation we still

cherish hopes in some sort of organizational salvation. This appeal to externality has characterized our science, our political and social economy, and even our psychology which has come to look upon man as nothing more than the prey of external impulses. We do not see ourselves as a part of civilization but view civilization as if it were something external to us. We presume that if we had all the facts we could control any situation, whereas the most important fact which we neglect is the control of ourselves which is dependent upon spiritual attitudes and realities that cannot be scientifically mastered. "We cannot understand the meaning of history so long as we externalize its events. Unless we realize that we, ourselves, are within history, and unless we appreciate its problems from the viewpoint of being connected with them, we cannot deal constructively with our contemporary world situation" (p. 7).

The heart of all culture is religion, and the recovery of our own civilization must be a religious recovery. To this end Christianity offers a peculiar and essential insight that nothing is completely external, illustrated in the emphasis of Jesus that one cannot by thought add a single cubit to his stature; that the man who tore down his barns to build larger ones, thinking that thereby he would provide himself a lasting security and satisfaction, was self-betrayed; and the advice to Nicodemus to go beyond the outward formalities of religion to the inner spirit. The tragic position of modern Christianity is perhaps its well-nigh complete departure from this insight.

Opposed to this Christian insight has been our blind following of the Harrington-Lockean concept of the "economic man"—a theory that economics is the key to history. For Locke's notion of freedom was political freedom for economic power: "In other words, *economic power should dictate the ends of government, but should not in turn be controlled by government, the basic function of which was to make things easier for the dominant economic interest*" (p. 20).

This assumption has led us into the notion that peace and welfare are dependent upon prospects for investments. Such a theory demands a continually expanding volume of capital with expanding markets in a world where such expansion has about reached its limits. On such a basis there can be no end of war. What is needed is a new spiritual orientation, the recovery of man to himself in the mechanical organization he has reared. War is the political concomitant of the theory of the "economic man" and "as long as the basic premises of western civilization are unquestioned, we will have war, for it serves to point up the dislocation of modern culture" (p. 167).

The limits of this review compel a cursory examination of one of the clearest and most important diagnoses of our times. The book should be widely read among all men who seek information on the present world situation.

RALPH TYLER FLEWELLING

University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California.

The Collected Poetry of W. H. Auden. New York: Random House, 1945. pp. xiv, 466. \$3.75.

The Collected Poetry of W. H. Auden is a very brilliant and stimulating volume which might be discussed from a number of angles. For this review I am choosing one, the philosophical-religious. It is not easy to discuss for a very simple

reason. It is impossible to read this book without becoming aware that the author has made an extensive pilgrimage in the realm of ideas. But the fact that there is no clue to the date of composition of many of the poems makes it difficult to chart that pilgrimage with any certainty of its landmarks. It is, however, possible to identify many of the elements of experience that went into that development, and it is eminently worth doing so, I think, simply because in them one recognizes many of the familiar ingredients of the intellectual and spiritual experience of a large portion of Mr. Auden's generation.

To begin with, there is the familiar sense of confusion so characteristic of the period, a sense of confusion amounting at times to an agony of futility and self-estrangement. No more pathetic summary of the lost generation was ever penned than that of "September 1, 1939":

Lost in a wood,
Children of the night
Who have never been happy or good.

And there is the reiterated cry of personal loneliness, closely related to that confusion, and perhaps even deeper, the gnawing fear of meaninglessness which was to find its clearest definition in the diagnosis of the time in the famous Christmas oratorio:

We are afraid
Of pain but more afraid of silence; for no nightmare
Of hostile objects could be as terrible as this Void.
This is the Abomination. This is the wrath of God.

It is in this revulsion against these things that Mr. Auden's pilgrimage begins.

But though the impulse to seek faith may come from the spirit's inability to be content with the *Waste Land*, it takes more than that to shape even a yearning. It takes, first of all, some consciousness of what Mr. Auden defines as "our hunger for eternal life." It takes, too, some rudimentary confidence that that hunger is not without possibility of satisfaction. It is significant that the poet over and over again seems to find evidence in that much-debated area of the relations of freedom and necessity. "We are lived by powers we pretend to understand," so he expressed an awareness in his commemoration of Ernst Toller; and in the famous oratorio he found the elucidation in the Child, "And by Him is illuminated the time in which we execute those choices through which our freedom is realised or prevented, for the course of History is predictable in the degree to which each man loves God and through Him his neighbour."

The man who wrote "For the Time Being" was obviously trying to bring to the need of our day the discovery of the Incarnation, as his Simeon puts it, "Wherefore, having seen Him, not in some prophetic vision of what might be, but with the eyes of our own weakness as to what actually is, we are bold to say that we have seen our salvation." The discovery is clear enough, but one misses the exhilaration of it, the wild impatience and joy of it. There is still a shadow of the *Waste Land* about Mr. Auden's vision. He seems to have come so far that one can only hope that he may come even to break through that.

HELEN C. WHITE

University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin.

Fighting Liberal: The Autobiography of George W. Norris. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945. pp. vii, 419. \$3.75.

The autobiography of George W. Norris is a plain account of noble living in the field of public service. No figure in recent American history lived more consistently on the growing edge of Congressional political life. His life story is intimately related to the history of the rise of independency and progressivism in the Republican party and the integration of the spirit of political independence into a social welfare philosophy for the nation as a whole. There was great individuality in Norris; there was little individualism.

Norris' account is not punctuated by an obvious appeal to religious practices; one wishes that he might have written not less about his extroverted activities as reflected in the battles in Congress, but more about the covert spiritual side of his nature. There are hints, however, in his story of deep religious satisfaction in efforts to be morally for the right. "About the only thing in life," he says, "that makes it worth while is the enjoyment of friendly relations. . . . About the only enjoyment I get in my innermost soul is that I try to do that which, in the light God gives me, I believe to be right. . . ." (p. 405).

"The truth is that my religion and my politics are one and the same. It has not always been so. I have come to this belief, not because I tried to, perhaps, not even because I wanted to, but because I have been led to it by what I believe to be the irresistible logic of human events" (p. 405). For Norris, true religion is founded on human love. "True love for humanity is an unselfish desire to perpetuate the welfare and happiness of all the people comprising the government."

Norris began his public career a fanatically devoted Republican. He asked no questions. But, one by one, questions arose and he faced them squarely. As a judge he had formulated some elementary conceptions of social justice which, when acted upon, drove him to break with party dogmatism and machine politics. From the "unhorsing of Speaker Cannon" to the passage of the Lame Duck Amendment and the T.V.A., he fought to make government responsive to the people. His autobiography reflects a sublime faith in the moral good sense of the common man when the issues are frankly presented to him.

The book is an illuminating story of the major issues with which reform has dealt in the past four decades. One of the chief objects of attack was the great utility interests. They more than symbolized the problem of our day for Norris. "Largely until now the unceasing struggle has been to protect the helpless, the weak, and the poor from exploitation by the strong. In the main, the fight has been against the consuming ambitions, both for power and for wealth; the greed and avarice of individuals and groups for wealth; the injection of privilege, favoritism, and discrimination in national policy" (p. 402).

Every person to whom these issues are vital will draw inspiration and strength from the virile prose of Norris' autobiography.

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Christianity Where You live. By Kenneth Underwood. Friendship Press. \$1.00 (cloth), \$.60 (paper). "A report on Protestant church work in camp and war industry communities, migrant and sharecropper areas, factories and labor unions."

Francesca Cabrini: Without Staff or Scrip. By Lucille Papin Borden. Macmillan. \$2.75. A biography of the first canonized American saint.

Pastoral Work and Personal Counseling. By Russell L. Dicks. Macmillan. \$2.00. Written for the average clergyman serving the average church. Illustrated with case studies.

Outline Studies in Mark. By John L. Hill. Abingdon-Cokesbury. \$1.50. A layman's interpretation of the Gospel of Mark for the average reader.

Flight to Destiny! An Interpretation for Youth. Edited by Ruth Isabel Seabury. Association Press. \$1.25. The life of Theodore Carswell Hume with worship materials gathered from his writings.

World Church. By John Foster. S.C.M. Press. 6s. The significance of the world-wide Christian Church in human history, illustrated from events in many lands and many centuries, by the Professor of Church History in the Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham.

My Sermon Notes on the Lord's Supper. By William P. Van Wyk. Baker's Book Store. \$1.25. Thirty-five sermon outlines intended for precommunion, communion, and postcommunion services.

The Logic and Reason in Christianity. By Edward D. Lucas. Revell. \$1.00. Discourses delivered to the Men's Clubs of Petersburg, Virginia, by a lawyer.

Tales From Africa. By Alice Geer Kelsey. Friendship Press. \$.50. One of a series of graded books, leader's guides, plays, pamphlets, and maps issued by the Missionary Education Movement. Illustrated.

From Log Schoolhouse to Church Tower. By James Alton James. \$.30. Available the First Methodist Church, Evanston, Illinois. An excellently written brochure dealing with the history of a notable midwestern parish.

Your Problem—Can It Be Solved? By Dwight J. Bradley. Macmillan. \$2.00. A popular introduction to religious counseling and applied psychology. Includes chapters on analysis and theory. One section illustrates interviews between counselor and patient as applied to typical problems.

Daniel Evans: Teacher, Preacher, Theologian. Edited by Raymond Calkins. Pilgrim Press. \$2.00. A biographical study and estimate of the late Abbott Professor of Christian Theology at the Andover Newton Theological School, together with sermons and addresses by Evans to illustrate his point of view and thought.

The Dictionary of Philosophy. Edited by Dagobert D. Runes. Philosophical Library. \$6.00. A reference tool designed to provide teachers and students with clear and concise definitions of philosophical terms. Covers the range of philosophic thought.

Things Important. By Darwin Xavier Gass. Wilde. \$1.50. Sermons by a minister of the Evangelical and Reformed Church on the abiding convictions of the Christian religion. A Pulpit Book Club selection.

Permanent Peace for Europe. By Harry Lewis Braham. Christopher Publishing House. \$2.25. A plea for a

United Dominion of Europe as a necessary step toward the achievement of world peace, together with suggestions and arguments as to how this may be accomplished.

From Carabao to Clipper. By E. K. Higdon and I. W. Higdon. Friendship Press. \$.50. An evaluation of the work of the evangelical Protestant churches in the Philippines for the period prior to Pearl Harbor. Written by missionaries of the Disciples of Christ.

The School of Prayer. By Olive Wyon. Westminster Press. \$1.50. A small, well-written book intended for those who are confused in the matter of prayer, but who wish to try it seriously; also for those who have tried to pray and have become discouraged with their efforts.

Whither Christian Missions? By D. Barsum Perley. Randolph Press. \$1.50. A brochure, polemical in nature, directed against John Van Ess's *Meet the Arab*, which, it is claimed, presents the Assyrian Christians in an unfavorable light.

One Man's Religion. By Frederick Keller Stamm. Revell. \$1.50. Addresses and sermons, some of which were given over the radio, by the minister of the First Congregational Church, Chicago, Illinois.

Christian Emphasis in Y.M.C.A. Program: A Guide to Policy and Practice. By Paul M. Limbert. As-

sociation Press. Reconsiders the ultimate aim of the Y.M.C.A. and suggests how the Association can be made more Christian in practice and purpose.

The Bible Speaks to Our Day. By George Barclay. Westminster Press. \$1.00. The recent Moderator of the Presbyterian Church of England insists that the Bible does not present a religion of "facile optimism" which has nothing to say "when life grows dark," but that it speaks to "days of calamity, both personal and national."

In Spite of All. By Archer Wallace. Abingdon-Cokesbury Press. \$1.00. Ten character studies of well-known people—Beethoven, Marie Curie, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Spinoza, and others—in which it is shown that they were able to conquer seemingly insuperable obstacles in spite of exceptional hardships.

The Angel of Peace. By John Amos Comenius. Edited by Milos Safranek, with an Introduction by Matthew Spinka. Pantheon Books. \$2.00. An English translation with a Latin text of the proposal for peace which Comenius addressed in 1667 to the ambassadors of England and the Netherlands in Breda.

Letters to "Bill" on Faith and Prayer. By John Gardner. Distributed by Revell. \$.35. Five expositions presented in the form of "letters" on Being Christian Soldiers; Faith, the Key to Life; The Value of Prayer; Our Share in the Redemption of the World; and The Certainty of Eternal Life.